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Abstract
We explore corporate decisions and their solutions under uncertainty using engineering
methods. Corporate decisions tend to be complex; they are interdisciplinary and defy
programmable solutions. To address these challenges, we take an engineering approach.
Our proposition is that as in an engineering system, corporate problems and their
potential solutions deal with the behavior of systems. Since systems can be studied with
experiments, we use Design of Experiments (DOE) to understand the behavior of
systems within which decisions are made and to estimate the consequences of candidate
decisions as scenarios. The experiments are a systematically constructed class of
gedanken experiments comparable to "what if' studies, but organized to span the entire
space of controllable and uncontrollable options.
In any experiment, the quality of data is important. Grounded on the work of scholars,
we develop a debiasing process for eliciting data. And consistent with our engineering
approach, we consider the composite consisting of the organization, their knowledge,
data bases, formal and informal procedures as a measurement system. We then use
Gage theory from Measurement Systems Analysis (MSA) to analyze the quality of the
measuring composite.
To test this engineering approach to decision analysis, we perform four experiments.
The first two are a set of simulations using a company surrogate. Using a progression of
experiments, we simulate two major corporate decisions. Simulation data show that
there is support for the validity of our decision analysis method. We then perform two
in situ experiments: with a manufacturing company and with a technology services
company. Findings from these company experiments also support the validity and
efficacy of our decision analysis method. The company executives were very satisfied
with our findings. Finally, we evaluate our method using method-evaluation criteria.
The evaluation suggests that our DOE-based decision analysis method is valid.
Unexpectedly every experiment resulted in near-decomposable systems at the scale we
formulated our problems. Scaling of corporate decision problems at the appropriate
level of abstraction and the resultant properties of their dynamic behavior are identified
as areas of future work.
This research breaks new ground in corporate decision-analysis as engineering and it
furthers DOE and MSA research to a new domain and a new class of problems.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Warren P. Seering
Weber-Shaughness Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Engineering Systems
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PART I. Motivation and literature review
Inductive inference is the only process known to us by which essentially new knowledge
comes into the world. ... is the kind of contribution to the intellectual development of
mankind which we should expect experimental science would ultimately supply.
R. A. Fisher
1.0 Introduction
Part I, Motivation and Literature Survey, has three chapters. In Chapter 1 we present the
motivations for this research, the research questions we will explore, and the
contributions of this work. The motivations are rooted in an engineering perspective to a
problem of the artificial (Simon 2001) - corporate decisions and their processes. The
central idea of this work is that corporate problems and their potential solutions under
uncertainty can be studied using engineering methods. Chapter 2 is a survey of the
literature of decision theory and decision analysis. The literature reveals three strands of
research, the normative, descriptive, and prescriptive strands. We position our work
within the prescriptive school. In Chapter 3 we survey the DOE and the Gage R&R
method from Measurement System Analysis (MSA). We also position our work as a
new domain for DOE and Gage R&R.
1.1 Motivation
This dissertation will explore a new idea: corporate problems and their potential
solutions under uncertainty can be studied using engineering methods. Our goal is to
investigate the use of two engineering methods; design of experiments (DOE) and
measurement system analysis (MSA), to support executive decision-making. These
methods are regularly applied in technical domains but are barely visible in the study of
organizational decisions or management issues.
Corporate and business-unit level problems are hard*. They tend to be multi-
disciplinary, so that discipline specific methods can only offer limited guidance to
problem representation and solution optimization. To address this situation, we are
taking an engineering approach. Our hypothesis is that as in an engineering system,
corporate problems and their potential consequences depend on the behavior of systems
and processes under uncertainty. As with engineering systems, the behavior of a
company's business systems, although complex, can be studied with experiments (real
or simulated). Therefore, DOE presents us with a way to study the behavior of the
corporate systems within which decisions are made and to estimate consequences of
candidate decisions as scenarios. The experiments to be employed are a carefully
constructed set of gedanken or "thought" experiments comparable in structure to
* This issue is explored in more detail in chapter 9.
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conventional "what if' studies, but organized to span the entire space of controllable
and uncontrollable options.
The theories of DOE present us with methods to specify experimental constructs for
understanding and analyzing decisions for complex corporate problems. This is
significant because:
- these experimental constructs are created using variables that management can
control as well as variables beyond management control. DOE presents us with
methods to determine a sufficient set of options to explore.
- we can make predictions of outcomes over a complete solution space and under a
wide range of uncertainty conditions based on a limited set of experiments.
- we can represent an ensemble of plausible solutions and associated measures of
uncertainty rather than a single solution for executive consideration.
- we can predict the phenomenological system-behavior of the corporate business
processes resulting from potential decisions, without having detailed a priori
knowledge of the system's structure or function.
As in a physical experiment, the quality of the data depends on the instruments and the
procedures for using them. We will consider the composite consisting of the
organization, their knowledge, data bases, formal and informal procedures as a
measurement system. Gage theory from Measurement System Analysis (MSA) presents
us with methods to analyze the quality of the experimental results and of the
organization and its processes. This is significant because:
- we can identify sources of measurement system weaknesses that contribute to low
quality data so that we can formulate and target meaningful improvements.
Decision-making is jealously guarded by senior executives as a "power reserved." Our
objective is not to make corporate level decisions. Rather, it is to provide a more
complete and systematic analysis than is currently practical and to provide the results of
this analysis to corporate leaders in a form that is particularly useful to them.
1.2 Research Questions
This research presents a new approach to the decision-analysis of complex corporate
level problems. In this dissertation, we explore the following:
- A new prescriptive method for decision analysis. Can an engineering approach that
is based on DOE and MSA be effective to help executives make better decisions? Is
there support for the validity of such an approach and such a method?
- A new domain for DOE. How effectively can the phenomenological behavior of a
corporation's business systems and processes be represented and analyzed using
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Design of Experiments? How is this analysis constrained by properties of the
corporate system?
- A new domain for Gage theory. For quantitative forecasting, can we consider the
composite - the organization, their knowledge, data bases, formal and informal
procedures - as a measurement system? Can we use Gage theory from Measurement
System Analysis to evaluate the quality of that system and the data that are produced?
To explore these questions, our research approach is sketched in the next section 1.3.
1.3 Research Approach
State our hypothesis and our research questions. In section 1.1, we presented the
motivations for this work. They are rooted in an engineering perspective to problems of
the artificial - corporate decisions and their processes "...being molded, by goals or
purposes, to the environment in which it lives" and "characterized in terms of functions,
goals, [and] adaptation (Simon 2001)." And as we discussed, we selected DOE as our
engineering method. This led us to the research questions in Section 1.2. The following
paragraphs outline our research approach to these questions.
Develop protocol for experiments. Our first step was to develop an experimental
protocol to embody our DOE-based decision-analysis approach into actionable
procedures. Following scholars in this field, we adapted the "canonical model" (e.g.
Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky 1988, Baron 2000, Bazerman 2002) for decision-making as
the architectural "pattern" (Gamma, Helm, Johnson, and Vlissides 1995) for our
protocol. We then proceeded to concept-test our method using our protocol.
Test our concept with a surrogate. To concept-test, we used an artifact that behaves as
a real firm. Such an artifact, in place of a real firm, served as our concept-testing vehicle
for our decision-analysis method. The artifact is a system dynamics (Sterman 2000)
model (Sterman, Repenning, and Kofman 1997) of Analog Devices Inc. (2006). This
SD model was our "surrogate" to simulate a real firm. Following experimental practice
(Yin 2003, Hoyle, Harris, Judd 2002), we subjected both our surrogate and its
simulation results to tests of validity.
Develop a data-collection protocol. Since Tversky and Kahnemann's (1974) landmark
publication on bias, there has been a torrential discovery of new biases (e.g. Baron
2000). Unexpectedly, there is "little evidence that debiasing techniques are frequently
employed in actual practice (Yates, Veinott, Patalano 2003)." To break that precedent,
we distilled from the literature a set of debiasing principles and developed a data-
collection protocol we used for our in situ company experiments.
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Perform in situ experiments with companies. We performed two experiments with
companies in the field, one in the US with a manufacturing company and another with a
Japanese e-business services company. In both experiments, we used our protocols for
the experiment and for data collection.
Validate our company experiments. As in our surrogate concept testing, we subjected
these two company experiments to tests of validity.
Validate our method. In this work, we established a practice of performing tests of
validation for all key procedures and experimental results. Having completed two
experiments with our ADI surrogate, one company experiment in the US, and another in
Japan, we conclude our work with an evaluation of our method. We apply Carroll and
Johnson's (1990) six criteria to this task.
Using the above research approach, we performed a series of experiments to test the
validity of our DOE-based method for decision analysis. A summary of our findings
and contributions are sketched in section 1.4 below.
1.4 Contributions and Findings
We begin with contributions to the state-of-the-art, follow with technical findings, and
close with managerial findings.
1.4.1 Contributions to the state-of-the-art.
We have developed a new prescriptive method that can help senior corporate executes
make better decisions. This method is distinctive because it is based on engineering
methods. We have uncovered new domains in which DOE and Gage Theory appear
effective. We have:
- Demonstrated that company decisions can be studied with DOE. Therefore we can
explore the entire solution space
explore outcomes over the entire space of uncertainty
systematically construct alternatives for decisions.
" Developed a set of debiasing principles to address overconfidence and embodied
them in an actionable protocol. The protocol was effective in our company
experiments.
- Demonstrated that a company's forecasting composite can be studied as a
measurement system using gage theory. This area is also identified as a new research
opportunity.
- Integrated all these procedures into a new prescriptive approach that can help
corporate executives make better decisions. A new prescriptive method that is based
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on engineering methods. We have subjected our surrogate experiments, our in situ
experiments, and key procedures to validity tests specified by scholars. From our
findings we infer that our method and experiments are valid.
1.4.2 Technical findings
From our surrogate and company experiments, we find that:
- There is statistical support for our controllable variables as predictors of the
outcomes of our corporate decisions.
- Interactions among the controllable variables, though present, are small. This
suggests that the system behavior of the phenomena studied with our experiments
exhibits the property of near-decomposability (Simon 2001) at the scale in which we
have formulated our decision situation.
- Framing the decision situation at the appropriate scale can simplify the
representation of complex corporate systems or processes to near-decomposability.
Scale refers to the "level at which the descriptors of the system present an internally
consistent picture of its behavior (Bar-Yam 1997)." At a large scale, to the observer,
the collective behavior of many elementary parts can behave more simply than on a
smaller scale. "The central point is: When the independence of the components is
reduced, scale of behavior is increased (Bar-Yam 1997, 2003, 2004)." Thus "the
dynamic behavior of a nearly-decomposable system can be analysed without
examining simultaneously all the interactions of the elementary parts (Simon 1997)."
Uncovering and exploring principles of scaling non self-similar systems, such as
corporate business processes, are identified as potential research opportunities.
1.4.3 Managerial findings
From our company experiments in the field, we find that:
" Corporate executives will commit their time and organizational resources. Moreover,
corporate executives found our analysis insightful and useful.
- People can forecast complex scenarios with consistency and reliability.
Our debiasing principles and our data-collection protocol appear effective.
" There is high acceptance for both the orthogonal arrays and adaptive-one-factor-at-a-
time procedures, but for different reasons.
These findings suggest that our method is useful to company executives.
1.5 Dissertation Outline
This dissertation is organized into four parts.
Part I, Motivation and Literature Survey, has three chapters. In Chapter 1 we present the
motivations for this research, the research questions we will explore, and the
contributions of this work. The motivations are rooted in an engineering perspective to a
problem of the artificial (Simon 2001) - corporate decisions and their processes.
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Chapter 2 is a survey of the literature of decision theory and decision analysis. The
literature reveals three strands of research, the normative, descriptive, and prescriptive
strands. We position our work within the prescriptive school. In Chapter 3 we survey
the DOE literature and we position our work as a new domain for DOE.
Part II, Experiments with a Company Surrogate, is comprised of five chapters. The
objectives are to concept-test our decision analysis method and to determine whether
there is support for the validity of the method. Chapter 4 presents the reasons why we
need a company surrogate, the criteria for its selection, and why we selected the Analog
Devices Inc. (ADI) system dynamics (SD) model as our surrogate. Chapter 5 presents
the analysis that validates the ADI SD model as a surrogate for the objective of
maximizing the value of the firm. Chapter 6 puts the surrogate to use. The objective is
to determine whether there is support for our method for the corporate problem of firm
value maximization. Chapters 7 and 8 repeat the procedures of Chapters 5 and 6 for a
different corporate objective, viz. maximizing annual operating income.
Part III, in situ Company Experiments, has three chapters. The objective is to take our
decision-analysis method to the field and report on two company experiments. Chapter
9 presents the objectives of the company experiments and the criteria for company
selection. It is followed by a detailed discussion of the protocols we defined and used
for our company experiments. This discussion includes a survey of the literature that
guided us in its development. The protocol is distinctive because it embodies
informational and procedural debiasing methods. Chapter 10 discusses the decision
analysis experiment with an American electronics manufacturing company. Chapter 11
discusses the experiment with an e-business services company in Japan. Both
experiments are subjected to tests of validity and reliability. We also evaluate the
quality of the decisions studied using Howard's six criteria of decision quality (Howard
2001). The findings and conclusions of these tests and evaluations are reported in the
respective chapters.
Part IV has only two chapters. Chapter 12 presents an overall evaluation of our method.
The evaluation uses Carroll and Johnson's (1990) criteria for evaluating decision
research methods. Chapter 13 titled Summary, Conclusions, and Future Work begins
with an executive summary of this dissertation. This is followed by a summary of our
contributions and key findings from this research. Then we close with a discussion on
future research that will deepen our understanding of the use of DOE and MSA for
corporate decisions, improve its utility in the domain of corporate decisions, and
explore the topic of multiscale properties of non self-similar complex systems, such as
corporate systems and processes.
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2.0 Decision Theory Literature Survey
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a survey of the decision making literature. This survey is
necessarily selective because the body of work is so vast*. We structure this chapter as
shown in Figure 2.1. Using this framework, we will locate our work in the prescriptive
branch of the tree. We will then highlight the rationale for this positioning, as well as,
the salient points of our contributions. But we defer any detailed discussions of our
work to the rest of this document.
decision theory
normative
theory
descriptive
theory
prescriptive
theory
- exp)ected utility
theory
prospect theorv
social judgment theory
naturalistic theory
Analytic Hierarchy Process
Stan/brd Economic-Systems
Value Focused Thinking
real options
focus of our work {
common meta-process
1. recognizing a problem exists
2. defining the problem
3. specifying goals and objectives
4. generating alternatives
5. analyzing alternatives
6. selecting an alternative
7. learning about the decision
Figure 2.1. Chapter structure in graphical form
Scholars identify three research streams: the normative, descriptive, and prescriptive
schools of decision-making. For our survey, we will select key representative work
from each of the three streams as shown in each leg of the tree. Following a brief survey
of the normative and descriptive school, we sketch some apparent new directions in
research. In the prescriptive stream, we select four strands of research as exemplars of
prescriptive methods. These are shown as the right-hand branch of our tree. We will
* Edwards and von Winterfeldt (1986) write that "articles related to judgment and decision-
making appeared in more than 500 different journals." Under "decision theory," Google scholar
shows 652,000 citations and Amazon.books shows 207,238 titles (30 November 2005).
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
show that although each prescriptive method is unique, there is a meta-process that can
represent each prescriptive method. This meta-process is known as the "canonical
model" of decision making. Our work belongs in the prescriptive school. And within
this school, our work is specifically located in the construction phase, i.e. the generation
of alternatives, as well as, the analysis phase of the meta- model. This is the design
phase of the decision process. Design, the subject of identifying and creating
alternatives is virtually absent in the decision-making literature. It is generally assumed
that alternatives exist, are easily found, or readily constructed. Simon (1997a) observes:
"The classical view of rationality provides no explanation where alternate courses of
action originate; it simply presents them as a free gift to the decision markers."
Other scholars note that "Unfortunately, this question has received relatively little
attention in the judgment and decision-making literature ... (Johnson and Raab 2003).
This void is surprising because synthesis must necessarily precede analysis; analysis
that determines the decision maker's preferences among the alternatives and which
culminates in the selection of the one choice to act upon. Analysis has crowded out
synthesis. Consistent with our engineering orientation, we will use an engineering
approach to specify, design, and analyze alternatives. We have excluded the selection of
an alternative, i.e. what is generally considered decision-making, from our work. Our
work in this dissertation concentrates on the construction and analysis of alternatives.
2.2 The three schools of decision making
A decision is making a choice of what to do and not to do, to produce a satisfactory
outcome (e.g. Baron 1998, Yates et al. 2003). A decision is a commitment to action, an
irreversible allocation of resources, and an ontological act (Mintzberg 1976, Howard
1983, Chia 1994, March 1997). Decision theory is an interdisciplinary field of study to
understand decision-making. It is a "palimpsest of intellectual disciplines (Buchanan
2006)". It draws from mathematics, statistics, economics, psychology, management,
and other fields in order to understand, improve, and predict the outcomes of decisions
under particular conditions.
The origins of modem decision theory are found in Bernoulli's (1738) observation that
the subjective value, i.e. utility, of money diminishes as the total amount of money
increases. And to represent this phenomenon of diminishing utility, he proposed a
logarithmic function (e.g. Fishburn 1968, Kahneman and Tversky 2000). However,
utility remained a qualitative concept until the seminal work of von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947). They generalized Bernoulli's qualitative concept of utility (which
was limited to the outcome of wealth), developed lotteries to measure it, formulated
normative axioms, and formalized the combination into an econo-mathematical
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structure - utility theory. Savage (1972) made a seminal contribution with his postulates
and rigorous development of subjective probability. Since then, the volume of research
in decision making has exploded. Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky (1988); Smith and von
Winterfeldt (2004) have segmented the contributions in this field into three schools of
thought "that identify different issues ... and deem different methods as appropriate
(Goldstein and Hogarth 1997)." They are the normative, descriptive, and prescriptive
schools of decision making. We follow Keeney (1992) and summarize the salient
features of these three schools in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. Summary of normative, descriptive, and prescriptive theories
normative descriptive prescriptive
how people should how and why people help people make better
focus decide with logical decisions
consistency dprepare people to decide
criterion theoretical adequacy empirical validity efficacy and usefulness
classes of decisions specific decisions for
scope all decisions tested specific problems
theoretical cognitive sciences 
normative and
foundations utility theory axioms psychology about descriptive 
theories
beliefs and preferences decision analysis axioms
operational analysis of alternatives prevention of processes and
opeatona dterinngsystematic human procedures
focus determinng errors in inference and end-end decision life-preferences decision-making cycle
judges "theoretical sages" experimental applied analystsresearchers
2.2.1 Normative Decision Theory
"Rationality is a notoriously difficult concept to understand." O'Neill
Unlike planetary motion, or charged particles attracting each other, decisions do not
occur naturally; they are acts of will (Howard 1992). Therefore, we need norms, rules,
and standards for decision-making. This is the role of normative theory. Normative
theory is concerned with the nature of rationality, the logic of decision making, and the
optimality of outcomes determined by their utility. Utility is a unitless measure of the
desirability or degree of satisfaction of the consequences from courses of action selected
by the decision maker (e.g. Baron 2000). Utility assumes the gambling metaphor where
only two variables are relevant: the strength on one's belief's (probabilities), and the
desirability of the outcomes (Goldstein and Hogarth 1997). The expected utility
function for a series of outcomes with assigned probabilities takes on the form of a
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polynomial of the product of the probabilities and outcome utilities (e.g. Keeney and
Raiffa 1993, de Neufville 1990). For the outcome X={x1,x 2 , ... , xn}, their associated
utilities u(xi) and probabilities pi for i=1,2, ... ,n, the expected utility for this risky
situation is
u(X)=Ipiu(xi) where Epi= 1.
In order to construct a utility function over lotteries, there are assumptions that need to
be made about preferences. A preference order must exist over the outcome set {xi}.
And the VNM axioms of: completeness, transitivity, continuity, monotinicity, and
independence must apply (e.g. de Neufville 1990, Bell, Raiffa, Tversky 1995 edition,
Resnik 1987, and Appendix 2.1). The outcomes and their utilities can be single attribute
or multiattribute. For a multiattribute objective X ={X, X2 ,...XN} and N ;, under the
assumptions of utility independence, the utility function U takes the form:
KU(X)+ 1 =]f(KkiU(Xi)+ 1)
Where the attributes are independent, the utility function takes the form of a
polynomial. A person's choices are rational, when the von Neumann and Morgenstern
axioms are satisfied by their choice behavior. The axioms establish ideal standards for
rational thinking and decision making.
In spite of its mathematical elegance, utility theory is not without crises or critics.
Among the early crises were the famous paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg (Allais 1953,
Ellsberg 1961, e.g. Resnick 1987). People prefer certainty to a risky gamble with higher
utility. People also have a preference for certainty to an ambiguous gamble with higher
utility. Worse yet, preferences are reversed when choices are presented differently (e.g.
Baron 2000). Howard (1992) retorts that the issue is one of education. Enlighten those
that make these errors and they too will become utility maximizers. Others claim that
incentives will lower the cost of analysis and improve rationality, but research shows
that violations of stochastic dominance are not influenced by incentives (Slovic and
Lichtenstein 1983). These paradoxes were the beginning of an accumulation of
empirical evidence that people are not consistent utility maximizers or rational in the
VNM axiomatic sense. People are at times arational.
A significant critique of classical normative theory was Simon's thesis of bounded
rationality (Simon 1997b). Simon's critique strikes normative decision theory at its
most fundamental level. Perfect rationality far exceeds people's cognitive capabilities to
calculate, to have knowledge about consequences of choice, or to adjudicate among
competing goals. Therefore, people satisfice, they do not maximize. Bounded rationality
is rational choice that takes into consideration people's cognitive limitations. Similarly,
March (1988, 1997), a bounded rationalist, observes that all decisions are about making
two guesses - a guess about the future consequences of current action and a guess about
future sentiments with respect to those consequences (March 1997). These guesses
assume stable and consistent preferences. Kahneman's (2003) experiments cast doubt
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on these assumptions; they show that decision utility and predicted utility are not the
same. Keeney (1992) a strong defender of classical normative theory, identifiesfairness
as an important missing factor in classical utility theory. In general, people are not
egotistically single-minded about maximizing utility. For example, many employers do
not cut wages during periods of unemployment when it is in their interest to do so
(Solow 1980). The absence of equity also poses the question about the "impossibility of
interpersonal utility comparisons (Hausman 1995)." Sense of fairness is not uniform.
Nor does utility theory address the issues of regret (Eppel et al 1992), which has
become an important research agenda for legal scholars (Parisi and Smith 2005).
Experimental evidence is another contributing factor to the paradigmatic crises of
normative theory. Psychologists have shown that people consistently depart from the
rational normative model of decision making, and not just in experimental situations
with colored balls in urns. The research avalanche in this direction can be traced to
Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) article in Science and subsequent book (Kahneman,
Slovic, Tversky 1982) where they report that people have systematic biases. Baron
(2000) reports on 53 distinct biases. In light of these research results, Fischoff (1999),
Edwards and von Winterfeldt (1986) report on a variety of ways to debias judgments.
The analytic power of pure rational choice is not completely supported by experiments
and human behavior because it does not address many human cognitive errors as
presented by descriptive scholars. The contributions from psychologists to economic
theory and decision-making have a high level of legitimacy and acceptance. Simon and
Kahneman have both become Nobel laureates. Research in behavioral economics is
thriving (e.g. Camerer, Lowenstein, Rabin 2004).
We note that many of the arguments and experiments that critique the normative theory
are grounded in descriptions of how decision making actually takes place. Therefore,
we now turn our attention to descriptive theory and then consider new research
directions in decision making.
2.2.2 Descriptive Decisions Theory
"[let them] satisfy their preferences and let the axioms satisfy themselves."
Samuelson
Descriptive theory concentrates on the question of how and why people make the
decisions they do. Simon (e.g. 1997) argues that rational choice imposes impossible
standards on people. He argues for satisficing in lieu of maximizing. The Allais and
Ellsberg paradoxes illustrate how people violate the norm of expected utility theory
(Allais 1952, Ellsberg 1961, and e.g. Baron 2000, Resnick 1987). Experiments by
Kahneman and Tversky's (1974) publication of "judgments under uncertainty:
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heuristics and biases" reported on three heuristics: representativeness, availability, and
anchoring. These heuristics lead to systematic biases, e.g. insensitivity to prior
outcomes, sample size, regression to the mean; evaluation of conjunctive and
disjunctive events; anchoring; and others. Their paper launched an explosive program of
research concentrating on violations of the normative theory of decision making.
Edwards and von Winterfeldt (1986) write that the subject of errors in inference and
decision making is "large and complex, and the literature is unmanageable." Scholars in
this area are known as the "pessimists" (Jungermann 1986, Doherty 2003). For our
work, the bias of overconfidence is very important (Chapter 9 of this dissertation).
Lichtenstein and Fischoff (1977) pioneered work in overconfidence (also e.g.
Lichtenstein, Fischoff and Phillips 1999). They found that people who were 65 to 70%
confident were correct only 50% of the time. Nevertheless, there are methods that can
reduce overconfidence (e.g. Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischoff 1980, Griffin, Dunning,
and Ross 1990). In spite of, or possibly because of, the "pessimistic" critiques of the
normative school, descriptive efforts have produced many models of psychological
representations of decision making. Two of the most prominent are: Prospect Theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 2000) and Social Judgment Theory (e.g. Hammond, Stewart,
Brehmer, Steinmann 1986).
Prospect Theory
Prospect theory is similar to expected-utility theory in that it retains the basic construct
that decisions are made as a result of the product of "something like utility" and
something like "subjective probability" (Baron 2000). The something like utility is a
value function of gains and losses. The central idea of Prospect Theory (Kahneman and
Tversky 2000) is that we think of value as changes in gains or losses relative to a
reference point (Figure 2.2).
value
losses gains
Figure 2.2. Hypothetical value function using prospect theoretic representation
The carriers of value are changes in wealth or welfare, rather than their magnitude from
which the cardinal utility is established. In prospect theory, the issue is not utility, but
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changes in value. The value function treats losses as more serious than equivalent gains.
It is convex for losses and concave for gains. This is intuitively appealing. We prefer
gains to losses. But if we consider the invariance principle of normative decision theory,
this principle is easily violated in Prospect Theory. Invariance requires that preferences
remain unchanged on the manner in which they are described. In prospect theory the
gains and losses are relative to a reference point. A change in the reference point can
change the magnitude of the change in gains or losses, which in turn result in different
changes in the value function that induces different decisions. Invariance, absolutely
necessary in normative theory and intuitively appealing, is not always psychologically
feasible. In business, the current asset base of the firm (the status quo) is usually taken
as the reference point for strategic corporate investments. But the status quo can be
posed as a loss if one considers opportunity costs and therefore a decision maker may
be lead to consider favorably a modest investment for a modest result as a gain.
Framing matters.
The second key idea of prospect theory is that we distort probabilities. Instead of
multiplying value by its subjective probability, a decision weight (which is a function of
that probability) is used. This is the so-called 7t function. (Figure 2.3) The values of the
subjective probability p are underweighted relative to p=1.0 by the 7E function. And the
values of p are overweighed relative to p=0.0. In other words, people are most sensitive
to changes in probability near the boundaries of impossibility (p=0) and certainty (p=1).
This helps explain why people buy insurance - the decision is weighed near the origin.
And why people prefer a certainty of a lower utility than a gamble of higher expected
utility. This decision is weighed near the upper right-hand corner. The latter is called the
"certainty effect" e.g. Baron (2000). This effect produces irrational decisions (e.g.
Baron 2000, de Neufville and Delqui6 1988, McCord and de Neufville 1983).
1.0
0.5
0
0 0.5 1.0
stated probability
Figure 2.3. A hypothetical weighing function under prospect theory
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In summary, prospect theory is descriptive. It identifies discrepancies in the expected
utility approach and proposes an approach to better predict actual behavior. Prospect
theory is a contribution from psychology to the classical domain of economics.
Social Judgment Theory
Another contribution from psychology to decision theory is Social Judgment Theory
(SJT) (e.g. Hammond, Stewart, Brehmer, and Steinmann 1986). SJT derives from
Brunswick's observation that the decision maker decodes the environment via the
mediation of cues. It assumes that a person is aware of the presence of the cues and
aggregates them with processes that can be represented in the "same" way as on the
environmental side. Unlike utility theory or prospect theory, the future context does not
play a central role in SJT. Why is this social theory? Because different individuals, for
example experts, faced with the same situation will pick different cues or integrate them
differently (Yates, Veinott, and Palatano 2003). The SJT descriptive model (lens model)
is shown in Figure 2.4*. The left-hand side (LHS) is the environment; the right-hand
side (RHS) is the judgment side where the decision maker is interpreting the cues, {X},
from the environment. The ability of the decision maker to predict the world is
completely determined by how well the world can be predicted frotii the cues, how
consistently the person uses the available data Ys, and how well the person understands
the world G, C. These ideas can be modeled analytically.
r.
Environment X, Judgment
side X, side
7Ye - r1ii X 3  'is-
Re X4 R
Ye- 'e G YS cues
C Ni
Figure 2.4. The len's model of Social Judgment Theory
The system used to capture the aggregation process is typically multiple regression. We
have a set of observations, Ys. We also have ex post information on the true state Ye.
The statistic ra , the correlation between the person's responses and the ecological
criterion values, reflects correspondence with the environment. Rs :!.0 is the degree to
which the person's judgment is predictable using a linear additive model. The cue
* This description is adapted from Doherty 2003.
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utilization coefficients ris ought to match the ecological validities rie through
correlations. G is the correlation between the predicted values of the two linear models.
G represents the validity of the person's knowledge of the environment. C is the same
between the residuals of both models, and reflects the extent to which the unmodeled
aspects of the person's knowledge match the unmodeled aspects of the environmental
side. Achievement is represented by
ra= Re*Rs*G+C[(1-Re2)*(1-RS2)]
A person's ability to predict the world is completely determined by how well the world
can be predicted from the available data Re, how consistently the person uses the
available data Rs, and how well the person understands the world, G and C. We note the
similarity of this model with Ashby's (1957) Law of Requisite Variety from complex
systems theory. It states that the complexity of environmental outcomes must be
matched by the complexity of the system in order for the system to respond effectively.
In order for the system to be effective in its environment, it must be of similar and
consistent complexity as the environment that is producing the outcomes.
Naturalistic Decision Making
We must bring up another strand in the descriptive school, the Naturalistic Decision
Making school. Members of this strand reject the classical notions of utility maximizing
and economic rationality; they opt for descriptive realism (e.g. Gigerenzer and Selten*
2001, Klein 1989, 1999, 2001, Pliske and Klein 2003). Gigerenzer (2001) writes that
"optimization is an attractive fiction." Instead, for decision making he offers an
"adaptive toolbox," a set of "fast and frugal" heuristics comprised of search rules,
stopping rules, and decision rules. Klein's work describes decision making in
exceptional situations which are characterized by high time pressure, context rich
settings, and volatile conditions. Klein studies experienced professionals with domain
expertise and strong cognitive skills, such as, firefighters, front line combat officers,
economics professors, and the like. He finds that they are capable of "mental
simulations," that is "building a sequence of snapshots to play out and to observe what
occurs (Klein 1999)." They rely on just a few factors -"rarely more than three ... [and] a
mental simulation [that] can be completed in approximately six steps (Klein 1999)." For
us this is an important result, for we will combine this finding with other similar
research findings for our work.
2.2.3 Research-Directions
We have seen how paradoxes and the landmark experiments of Kahneman and Tversky,
present evidence that people arrive at decisions that are not consistent with normative
theory. These paradoxes and experiments are descriptive. The Naturalistic strand of
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* Selten is also a Nobel laureate.
research describes how professionals under situations of extreme pressure and volatile
conditions make decisions, it presents a picture that is different from normative theory.
Zeckhauser's (1986) articulates the debate between normative and descriptive theorists
with three insightful axioms and three practical corollaries. They are paraphrased below
because they capture the spirit of the research directions in decision theory.
Axiom 1. For any tenet of rational choice, the behavioralists can produce a
counterexample in the laboratory.
Axiom 2. For any "violation" of rational behavior, the rationalists will reconstruct a
rational explanation.
Axiom 3. Elegant formulations will be developed by both sides, frequently addressing
the same points, but freedom in model building will result in different conclusions.
Corollary 1. The behaviorists should focus their laboratory experiments on important
real world problems.
Corollary 2. The rationalists should define the domains of economics where they can
demonstrate evidence that supports their view.
Corollary 3. Choice of competing and/or conflicting formulations should be decided on
predictive consistency with real world observations.
Bernoulli (1738) is credited with the qualitative concept of utility. Von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1947) took this concept, formalized it, and build a system of thought for
rational decision making. Recent research is looking more deeply at the fundamentals,
e.g. what is utility? Is it in our interest to maximize utility? What are the deep mental
and psychological processes for decision making and how do they work? Kahneman
(2003) distinguishes between experience utility and decision utility. Experience utility
will differ on how and when it is measured, as it is experienced or retrospectively.
Experimental findings reveal that recall is imperfect and easily manipulated. We
interpret this as another kind of bias. These findings go to the heart of the assumptions
of normative theory: that individuals have accurate knowledge of their own preferences
and that their utility is not affected by the anticipation of future events. Schooler,
Ariely, and Lowenstein (2003) argue that people suffer from inherent inabilities to
optimize their own level of utility. They find that deliberate efforts to maximize utility
may lead individuals to engage in non-utility maximizing behaviors. They suggest that
"utility maximization is an imperfect representation of human behavior, regardless of
one's definition of utility (Schooler, Ariely, and Lowenstein 2003)." The cognitive
processes for decision making appears to be more sophisticated than merely optimizing
utility. Bracha (2004) suggests a framework that involves two internal accounting
processes, a rational account and a mental account. A choice is the result of
intrapersonal moves that results in a Nash equilibrium. This game theoretic approach is
also adopted by Borodner and Prelec (2003) where they model utility maximization as a
self signaling-game involving two kinds of utility: outcome utility and diagnostic utility.
Neuroeconomics is a new research strand. It seeks to understand decision processes at a
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physiological level (e.g. Camerer, Lowenstein, and Prelec 2005). It seeks to use
technology like functional MRI to understand which areas of the brain are used in
decision making. McCabe, Smith and Chorvat (2005) found that people that cooperate
and do not cooperate have different patterns of brain activity. The evidence suggests
that different mechanisms were at work for the same problem. The legal scholars appear
very active in study of irrational behavior to understand the issues of reciprocity,
retaliation and their implications on judicial punishment (Parisi and Smith 2005).
2.2.4 Prescriptive Decision Making
"decision analysis will not solve a decision problem, nor is it intended to. Its purpose is
to produce insight and promote creativity to help decision makers make better
decisions."
Keeney
Prescriptive decision theory is concerned with the practical application of normative
and descriptive decision theory in real world settings. Decision analysis is the body of
knowledge, methods, and practices, based on the principles of decision theory, to
achieve a social goal - to help people and organizations make better decisions (Howard
1983), and to act more wisely in the presence of uncertainties (Edwards and von
Winterfeldt 1986). Decision analysis is a science for the "formalization of common
sense for decision problems, which are far too complex for informal use of common
sense (Keeney 1982)." Decision analysis includes also the design of alternative choices
- the task of "... logical balancing of the factors that influence a decision ... these factors
might be technical, economic, environmental, or competitive; but they could be also
legal or medical or any other kind of factor that affects whether the decision is a good
one (Howard 1983)." Howard (1983) notes that "there is no such thing as a final or
complete analysis; there is only an economic analysis given the resources available."
Prescriptive decision analysis is, therefore, boundedly rational. It seeks to satisfice and
not necessarily maximize as in normative decision theory. "The overall aim of
prescriptive decision analysis is insight, not numbers (Howard 2004; 184).
A comprehensive survey of decision analyses and their applications can be found in
Keefer, Kirwood, and Corner (2004). We will limit our coverage to four prescriptive
methods: AHP (Saaty 1986, 1988); Ron Howard's method, published by Strategic
Decisions Group (SDG) representing the Stanford University school of decision
analysis (Howard and Matheson 2004); Keeney's Value Focused Thinking (Keeney
1992b); and real options (Brach 2003, Adner and Levinthal 2004).
We begin with AHP. It is distinctive, in that it does not use utility theory. Instead it uses
"importance" as the criterion for decisions. It is an exemplar of a prescriptive approach
that departs from the norm of using utility theory. In contrast, Howard's method adheres
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rigorously to the normative rules of normative expected utility theory. As such that is an
exemplar of a normative approach. Keeney's Value Focused Thinking is also utility
theory based. And Keeney has defined and specified comprehensive and pragmatic
processes that strengthen the usually "soft" managerial approaches to the specification
of objectives and to the creation of alternatives. As such it is an exemplar of an
analytically rigorous and simultaneously managerially pragmatic prescriptive method.
Real options is discussed because it is a new trend in decision analysis. Table 2.2
presents a summary of the four descriptive methods. More detail is presented in the
paragraphs that follow.
Table 2.2 Summary of four descriptive methods
AHP Stanford Value Focused real optionsThinking
preference importance utility utility monetary
based on value.
units unitless utils utils monetary units
Ratio scale of Expected utility Expected utility Temporal
foundations pairwise theory and multiattribute resolution of
comparisons. utility theory. uncertainty.
Rigorous use of Pragmatic use of Sequential
principles Linear ordering normativeuse rmative axoms temporalby importance. axioms of utility of utility theory. flexibility.
theory.
Factors Deterministic Specification of Options
distinctive hierarchy. system values and thinking-
processes / Matrix -pairwise representation. objectives. abandon, stage,
analyses comparisons Utility function Guidelines for defer, grow,
No statistics. construction. alternatives. scale, switch.
Analytic Hierarchy Process (A HP)
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a prescriptive method predicated on three
principles for decision problem solving: decomposition, comparative judgments, and
synthesis of priorities (Saaty 1986). The decomposition principle calls for a hierarchical
structure to specify all the elemental pieces of the problem. The comparative judgment
principle calls for pairwise comparisons using a ratio scale to determine the relative
priorities within each level of the hierarchy. The principle of synthesis of priorities is
applied as follows (Forman and Gass 2001):
(1) given i=1,2,...,m objectives, determine their respective weights wi,
(2) for each objective i , compare the j=1,2,...,n alternatives and determine their weights
wj wrt objective i , and
(3) determine the final alternative weights (priorities) W wrt all the objectives by
W = 1wJI+w2jw2+...+wmjwm. The alternatives are then ordered by the Wj.
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AHP is widely used as an alternative to expected utility theory for decision making
(Forman and Gass 2001). Forman and Gass (2001) report that over 1000 articles and
about 100 doctoral dissertations have been published. But concerns have been raised
about AHP. Intransitivity and rank reversal are two violations of normative axioms that
can occur in AHP (e.g. Dyer 1990, Belton and Gear 1984). AHP's approach of pairwise
comparison conflates the magnitude and weight of a comparison in a ratio scale in a
similar way that the Taguchi method's signal-to-noise ratio conflates location and
dispersion effects. Saaty (2000) and Forman and Gass (2001) retort that rank reversal in
closed systems is expected and even desirable when new information is introduced.
Consistent with the pragmatics of a prescriptive approach to decision-making, they
write "There is no one basic rational decision model. The decision framework hinges on
the rules and axioms the DM [decision maker] thinks are appropriate (Forman and Gass
2001)." As a defense, Saaty (1990) quotes McCord and de Neufville (1983b): "Many
practicing decision analysts remember only dimly its axiomatic foundation .... the
axioms, though superficially attractive, are, in some way, insufficient ... the conclusion
is that the justification of the practical use of expected utility decision analysis as it is
known today is weak."
Stanford Normative School
"Decision analysis" was coined by Howard (1966). His approach to decision analysis is
predicated on two premises. One is an inviolate set of normative axioms and the other is
his prescriptive method to decision analysis. Collectively these form his canons of the
"old time religion" (Appendix 2.2) and position others as "heathens, heretics, or cults
(Howard 1992)." His methodology takes the form of an iterative procedure he calls the
Decision Analysis Cycle (Figure 2.5) comprised of three phases, which either
terminates the process or drives an iteration (Howard 2004). Numerous applications
from various industries are reported in Howard (2004).
prior information
deterministic probabilistic informational + decision- action
phase phase phase g
gather
new information new information
information gathering
Figure 2.5. Howard's Decision Analysis Cycle
The first phase (deterministic) is concerned with the structure of the problem. The
decision variables are defined and their relationships characterized in formal models.
Then values are assigned to possible outcomes. The importance of each decision
variable is measured using sensitivity analysis, and at this stage without any
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consideration of uncertainty. Experience with the method suggests that "only a few of
the many variables under initial consideration are crucial* ... (von Sta6l 1976, 137)."
Uncertainty is explicitly incorporated in the second phase (probabilistic) by assigning
probabilities to the important variables, which are represented in a decision tree. Since
the tree is likely to be very bushy, "back of the envelope calculations" are used to
simplify it (von Sta6l 1976). The probabilities are elicited from the decision makers
directly or from trusted associates to whom this judgment is delegated. The outcomes at
each end of the tree are determined directly or through simulation. The cumulative
probability distribution for the outcome is then obtained. Then the decision maker's
attitude toward risk is taken into account. This can be determined through a lottery
process. A utility function is then encoded. The best alternative solution in the face of
uncertainty is the called certainty equivalent. Sensitivity to different variable's
probabilities is performed.
The third (informational) phase is when the results of the first two phases are reviewed
to determine whether more information is required; if so the process is repeated. The
cost of obtaining additional information is traded-off against the potential gain in
performance of the decision.
Value Focused Thinking
The prescriptive approach of Keeney's (1992b) Value Focused Thinking (VFT) shifts
the emphasis of decision making from the analysis of alternatives to "values". In VFT,
values are what decision makers "really care about" (Keeney 1994). The emphasis on
values originates in the potential risks of anchoring and framing (Kahneman and
Tversky 2000). Avoid anchoring on a narrowly defined problem that will preclude
creative thinking. Instead, anchor on values and frame the decision situation as an
opportunity. The assumption is that opportunities lead to more meaningful alternatives
to attain the desired values. The theoretical assumptions of VFT are found in expected
utility theory and multiattribute utility theory (Keeney and Raiffa 1999) and axioms
from normative decision theory (Keeney 1982, 1992b). However, we note that Keeney
is more liberal than Howard, Keeney is prepared to consider a suboptimal decision if it
is more fair (equitable) (Kenney 1992a). He writes that "the evaluation process and the
selection of an alternative can then be explicitly based on an analysis relying on any*
established evaluation methodology (Keeney 1992b)." Adapting from Keeney (1992b),
the operational highlights of the VFT method is illustrated below (Figure 2.6), where
the arrows mean "lead to."
What is distinctive is that this method has specified an iterative phase at the front-end
where the values of the decision-maker are thoroughly specified prior to the analysis of
alternatives. The goal of this phase is to avoid solving the wrong problem and to
identify a creative set of alternatives. These steps avoid many of the biases identified in
* italics are mine.
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descriptive decision theory, such as, framing, availability, saliency and the like. Keeney
(1992b) observes that the most effective way to define objectives and values is to work
with the stakeholders. He offers ten techniques for identifying objectives and nine
desirable properties for fundamental objectives. Having an initial set of objectives is a
prerequisite to creating alternatives. Creativity is the most desirable characteristic for
alternatives and VFT presents 17 ways to generate alternatives (Keeney 1992).
Keeney's book VFT (1 992b) discusses 113 applications.
Thinking about values Deepen discovery
" Translate what you care 0 Search for hidden objectives
about into objectives N-- Confirm values & objectives
- Quantify the objectives
Thinking about Analysis
opportunities and " Guide information collection
alternatives E Engage stakeholders
N Specify opportunities 0 Analyze alternatives
" Specify alternatives a Guide strategic thinking
-Better consequences
Figure 2.6. Operational architecture of the Value Focused Thinking process.
Real Options
Myers (1977) is credited with coining the term real options. An option is a right, but not
an obligation, to take action, such as buying (call option) or selling (put option) a
specified asset in the future at a designated price (e.g. Amram and Kulatilaka 1999).
Options have value because the holder of the option has the opportunity to profit from
price volatility while simultaneously limiting downside risk. Options give its holder an
asymmetric advantage. Real options deal with real assets, not financial instruments that
can be traded in exchanges (e.g. Barnett 2005) in efficient markets. Holders of an option
have at their command a repertoire of six types of actions: to defer, abandon, switch,
expand/contract, grow, or stage (Trigeorgis 1996). Unlike traditional techniques like
discounted cash flow, real options is a flexible method of making investments. A real
option is not subject to a one-time evaluation, but a sequence of evaluations over the
course of the life-cycle of a project. This flexibility to postpone decisions until some of
the exogenous uncertainty is resolved, also reduces risk. The Black-Scholes equation is
a financial tour-de-force (e.g. Brealey and Myers 2002) and it is inextricably linked
with options. But its use in real options has limitations. Returns in the Black-Scholes
equation must be log normal; and it is assumed that there is an efficient market for
unlimited trading. For securities, the value of the asset is observable through pricing in
an efficient market, for real options the value of the asset is still evolving (Brach 2003).
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Fortunately, there are many techniques for valuation (e.g. Neeley and de Neufville
2001, Luehrman 1998a, Luehrman 1998b, Copeland and Tufano 2004). However, the
managerial implications for real options remain non trivial. It requires substantially
more management attention to monitor and to act on the flexibility of the method
(Adner and Levinthal 2004). "The value of the real option lies in exploiting it when
conditions are right (de Neufville 2001)." Barnett (2005) finds that discipline and
decisiveness required to abandon a project are demanding and rare traits in executive
management. We see many applications using real options (e.g. Faulkner 1996; Brach
2003; Luehrman 1998a; Fichman, Keil, Tiwana 2005).
De Neufville (2001) presents a three phase process for real options analysis in systems
planning and design. It is comprised of discovery, selection, and monitoring. Discovery
is a multidisciplinary activity. It entails objectives setting and identifying opportunities.
The selection phase is analytic intensive to calculate the value of the options in order to
select the best one. Monitoring is the process to determine when the conditions are right
to take action. Copeland and Tufano (2004) concentrate on the selection phase and
present a procedure using binomial trees. Luehrman (1 998a, 1998b) present an elegant
and more sophisticated analytic procedure to create a partitioned options-landscape. The
landscape identifies six courses of action: invest now, maybe now, probably later,
maybe later, probably never, and never. These choices are based on financial metrics.
Barnett (2005) presents a framework for managing real options. It is somewhat generic
and not directly actionable. We adapt de Neufville's three phase approach and combine
it with Trigeorgis (1998) repertoire of six actions to illustrate a prescriptive decision
process for real options (Figure 2.7).
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switch
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Figure 2.7. Active management of real options
In summary, real options represents a newer direction in decision analysis. It is
distinctive; it avoids the limitations of discounted cash flow investment approach. The
method is based on sequential incremental decision making to make temporal resolution
of uncertainty work. This makes decision making more flexible.
2.3 The canonical normal form.
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"We assume that the decision maker's problem has been identified and viable action
alternatives are prespecified." Keeney and Raiffa
Although each prescriptive method is unique, we argue that they are all instantiations of
the "canonical paradigm" of decision making (Bell, Raiffa, Tversky 1988, Bazerman
2000). This model is widely adopted in the literature in various forms (e.g. March 1997,
Simon 1997, Keeney 1994, Hammond, Stewart, et al 1986). The canonical paradigm
posits that decision making is comprised of seven steps:
1. recognition that a problem or an opportunity exists
2. defining the problem or opportunity
3. specifying goals and objectives
4. generating alternatives
5. analyzing alternatives
6. selecting an alternative
7. learning about the decision.
The Scientific Method is an instantiation of the canonical paradigm. Biologists,
chemists, and physicists routinely perform experiments that bear little resemblance to
each other, but their methods align consistently with the scientific method. The
scientific method is a meta-process for doing science. The Engineering Method (Seering
2003) is also an instantiation of the canonical paradigm. Electrical, mechanical, and
aeronautical engineers build artifacts that are quite distinct from each other, but their
methods are isomorphic to the engineering method. In this same way, each of the
prescriptive methods we have described in previous sections, although uniquely
distinctive, aligns consistently with the canonical model. The canonical model is a
meta-process for decision analysis.
Simon (1997a) writes that:
"The classical view of rationality provides no explanation where alternate courses of
action originate; it simply presents them as a free gift to the decision makers." And,
"the lengthy and crucial processes of generating alternatives, which include all the
processes that we ordinarily designate by the word 'design,' are left out of the SEU
[subjective expected utility] account of economic choice."
The research on this crucial design phase of decision making (step 4 of the canonical
paradigm) is not emphasized in the decision-making literature. But its importance is
recognized, e.g. "the identification of new options is even more important and necessary
than anchoring firmly on analysis and evaluation as goals of the analysis (Thomas and
Samson 1987)." Alexander (1979) presents case studies of design of alternatives and
finds that there is a tendency to truncate the repertoire of alternatives prematurely in the
overall process. He concludes that "alternatives design is a stage in the decision process
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whose neglect is unjustified ... (Alexander 1979)." Arbel and Tong (1982) prescribe the
use of AHP as a means to identify the most important variables that affect the objectives
of a decision for creating alternatives. But they fall short of providing an actionable
construction process for alternatives. Ylmaz (1997) argues for a constructive approach
to create alternatives and presents a way to do so using explicitly identified decision
factors and their range of responses. His construction requires full-factorial information,
which makes the construction process complicated.
This thin presence in design of alternatives is also discernable in our prescriptive
exemplars (Table 2.3).
Table 2.3. Summary comparison
real thisAHP Stanford VFT otions ork
1 Detection of problem/opportunity 0 0 0 0 0
2 Definition of the problem 0 0
3 Specify objectives 0 0 0
4 Creating alternatives 0 0
5 Analysis of alternatives
6 Select alternatives 0 G)
7 Learning, communicating 0 0 0 0 0
o assumed doable
o guidelines provided
o generic alternatives defined
* explicit prescriptions
Given a set of alternatives, AHP offers guidelines for creating a hierarchy of decision
factors. AHP assumes that the alternatives are known, but what are unknown are the
weights of the factors that will enter into the selection of an alternative. By building a
hierarchy of the decision factors, the objective, factors, the alternatives are linked
through the hierarchy. Using the relative importance of the factors, the AHP method
identifies the alternative that satisfies the most important factors. In Stanford's method,
through sensitivity analysis one finds the variables that have the highest impact on the
output. Using those variables, we are directed to create creative alternatives, but we are
not presented with explicit means to construct alternatives. With the alternatives at
hand, utility theory is used to identify the best one. Value Focused Thinking makes
creating alternatives the centerpiece of the method and it presents a comprehensive
approach to objectives specification. Objectives are used to guide the creation of
alternatives. To create alternatives, 17 very useful guidelines are presented. We are told
that "the mind is the sole source of alternatives" and therefore creativity is important.
Although we are given a comprehensive set of guidelines and many examples of
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alternatives from a wide range of applications, Value Focused Thinking does not offer a
construction mechanism for the creation of alternatives. At the core, real-options is
about two things: sequential incremental decisions, and temporal resolution of
uncertainties as time progresses so that the valuation and selection of alternatives are
more certain. Like other prescriptive methods it assumes that alternatives can be
analyzed rigorously following the procedures of their method. What is distinctive about
the real options method is that has a predefined set of generic alternatives (e.g.
Trigeorgis 1998, Luerhman 1998a). For example, see Figure 2.7.
This void in research in step 4 of the canonical model, the construction of alternatives,
is unexpected. Prescriptive methods are the engineering of decision making; and
construction of alternatives is the design phase of the canonical paradigm. It is generally
assumed that alternatives exist, are easily found, or readily constructed. These
assumptions are surprising because synthesis must necessarily precede analysis;
analysis that determines the decision maker's preferences among the alternatives and
which culminates in the selection of the one choice to act upon. Analysis has crowded
out synthesis. This is like the apocryphal basketball team that that only shoots free
throws at every practice (Seering 2003). The assumption being that "the rest of the
game is a straightforward extension of making free throws and can best be learned by
experience in a game situation (Seering 2003)." Our work will not assume that
alternatives are present and ready for analysis. We will use engineering methods of
DOE for the construction of alternatives and for the analyses of alternative solutions
under uncertainty. These are the subjects of this dissertation and we will try to show that
our work is distinctive because:
- We provide an explicit construction mechanism for alternatives creation.
- Alternatives are constructed using variables that are under managerial control and
those that are external to management control and are therefore uncontrollable.
- Alternatives span the entire solution space.
- The analysis of alternatives does not require exhaustive analysis of every possible
alternative, but is able to predict the value of the maximum outcome.
- The analysis does not require the subjective translation from natural units (e.g. profit,
safety...) into subjective utility or judgments of "importance" as in AHP. All the
analyses are performed in their natural units.
" In the face of uncertainty, we can construct a robust decision (e.g. Taguchi,
Chowdury, Taguchi 2000). This is a proactive approach whereby we can construct an
alternative that will satisfice under conditions that are unpredictable over the entire
space of uncertainty.
The goal of decision analysis is concerned with helping people make better decisions.
We must ask: What is a good decision? This is the subject of the next section.
43
2.4 What is a good decision?
"We can never prove that someone who appeals to astrology is acting in any way
inferior to what we are proposing ... up to you to decide whose advice you would seek."
Howard
There is no consensus on the definition of a good decision. We will review
representative positions on this issue and then present Howard's criteria of a good
decision, which is the one we will adapt for our work.
Those that favor the normative school of decision-making draw a sharp distinction
between a good decision and a good outcome (e.g. Howard 1983, Baron 1988). Any
decision that adheres to rational procedures and the axioms of normative theory is
considered a good decision (Appendix 2.1). To them, the actual outcome is not a valid
evaluative factor because any decision can produce bad results given the stochastic
nature of the events (e.g. Hazelrigg 1996). We adopt this position. The emphasis on
axioms and rigorous rules of thought characterize the practitioners of the "old time
religion (Howard 1992)" of decision making. (Appendix 2.2 shows the canons of the
old time religion.) In contrast, scholars from the descriptive school report on
experiments where people do consider good results, missed opportunities, difficulty,
and other factors as important categories of decision quality (Yates et al. 2003).
Research in behavioral decision making shows a more complicated picture about the
mental processes of decision making than single minded "utility" maximization (e.g.
Kahneman 2003, Schooler, Ariely, and Lowenstein 2003, Stainer 2004).
Those of the prescriptive school are more pragmatic and embrace bounded rationality.
Edwards (1992) presents "proverbs" for descriptive theory although he calls them
"assumptions and principles" (Appendix 2.4). Keeney (1992b) writes that the problem
should guide the analysis and the choice of axioms. And for selecting axioms, he offers
the following guidelines. (Table 2.4)
Table 2.4 Objectives of axiom selection for decision analysis
Objectives of axioms for decision analysis
Provide the foundation for a quality analysis
address the problem complexities explicitly
provide a logically sound foundation for analysis
provide for a practical analysis
be open for evaluation and appraisal
And to bring insight into the decision and maximize the quality of an analysis, he
specifies a set of objectives for the practice of decision analysis (Table 2.5). Unlike
many from the descriptive school, "good outcomes" is noticeably absent.
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Table 2.5 Objectives of decision analysis quality
Objectives of decision analysis
Provide insight for the decision
create excellent alternatives
understand what and why various alternatives are best
communicate insights
Minimize effort necessary
time utilized
cost incurred
Contribute to the field of decision analysis
Maximize professional interest
enjoy the analysis
learn from the analysis
In summary, to those from the normative school, a good decision has coherence and
invariance with the axioms of utility theory. Moreover, given the unpredictability of
future events, the quality of a decision is completely decoupled from outcomes. To
those who favor descriptive theories, outcomes and other behavioral variables are
important factors that determine decision quality. Their argument is buttressed by
empirical evidence. Those in the prescriptive camp are boundedly rational, the specific
problem guides the selection of axioms, and insights that are useful to the client are the
key determinants of decision quality.
Edwards (1992) reports on an informal survey he took at a prestigious conference. His
survey showed an overwhelming agreement that expected utility theory is the
appropriate normative standard for decision making under uncertainty. The same group
also showed an overwhelming agreement that experimental evidence shows that
expected utility theory does not fully describe the behavior of decision makers. Tversky
and Kahneman (2000) summarize work from scholars that show that dominance and
invariance are essential and that selective relaxation of other axioms is possible. This
lends force to Keeney's (1992b) pragmatic objectives for prescriptive decision analysis
and axioms selection.
Howard's Criteria of a Good Decision
Howard (2001) identifies six criteria to determine decision quality. They are:
1. A committed decision-maker. By definition a decision is a commitment to action,
of making a choice of what to do and what not to do (Section 2.2 of this chapter). A
decision does not exist without a principal who is ready to take action and reallocate
resources for more attractive outcomes.
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2. A right frame. A decision frame is "the decision maker's conception of the acts,
outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice. (Tversky and
Kahneman 1981)". Framing is the process of specifying the boundaries of the
decision situation. The frame determines what is considered relevant and what is
irrelevant in the decision analysis.
3. Right alternatives. Step 4 of the canonical model is the process of generating
alternatives. Howard states that this is the "most creative part of the decision
analysis procedure (Howard 1983)." His test of a creative alternative is one that
"suggests the defect in present alternatives that new alternatives might remedy."
4. Right information. Right information is a body of facts and/or knowledge that will
improve the probability that the DM's preferred choice will lead to a more desirable
outcome (e.g. Hazelrigg 1996).
5. Clear Preferences. Howard's desiderata in Appendix 2.2 summarize what he
means by "clear preferences."
6. Right decision procedures. This means adherence to the desiderata of Appendix
2.2 and consistent with the axioms of Appendix 2.1. Having the right decision
procedure also means following "good engineering practice" for the synthesis of
new alternatives prior to analysis of alternatives. .
We will use these criteria to evaluate the decision quality of our field experiments. Note
that the outcome of the decision is not a criterion of decision quality. We agree with this
position, any decision can produce bad results given the stochastic nature of the events
(e.g. Hazelrigg 1996). Howard (1992) cogently articulates this position ...
"Everyone wants good rather than bad, more rather than less - the question is
how we get there. The only thing you can control is the decision and how you go
about making that decision. That is the key."
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Appendix 2.1 The Utility Theory Axioms
A lottery, or gamble, is central to utility theory. A lottery is a list of ordered pairs
{(x 1,pi), (x2,p2), ... , (xn,pn)} where xi is an outcome, and pi is the probability of
occurrence for that event.
completeness.
For any two lotteries g and g', either g tg' or g' g.
i.e. given any two gambles, one is always preferred over the other, or they are
indifferent.
transitivity.
For any 3 lotteries, g, g', and g", then if g tg' and g' g", then g>g".
i.e. preferences are transitive.
continuity.
If g_>_ g'_> g", then there exists a, P in (0,1) 3: ag+(1- a)g">g' i pg+(1- $)g".
i.e. the Archimedean property holds, a gamble can be represented as a weighted average
of the extremes.
monotinicity.
Given (xi,pi) and (x1,p2) with pl>p2, then (xi,pi) is preferred over (x1,p2).
i.e. for a given outcome, the lottery that assigns higher probability will be preferred.
independence (substitution).
If x and y are two indifferent outcomes, x-y, then xp+z(1 -p) ~yp+(l -p)z.
i.e. indifference between two outcomes also means indifference between two lotteries
with equal probabilities, if the lotteries are identical. i.e. two identical lotteries can be
substituted for each other.
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Appendix 2.2 Desiderata of Normative Decision Theory
Normative decision theory's strongest evangelist is Howard from Stanford. He puts
forward the canons of "old time religion" as the principles of normative decision
making. These are summarized by Eppel et al (1992) as shown below.
Desiderata of Normative Decisions
Essential properties
applicable to any decision
must prefer deal with higher probability of better prospect
indifferent between deals with same probabilities of same prospects
invariance principles
reversing order of uncertain distinctions should not change any decision
order of receiving any information should not change any decision
"sure thing" principle is satisfied
independence of immaterial alternatives
new alternatives cannot make an existing alternative less attractive
clairvoyance cannot make decision situation less attractive
sequential consistency, i.e. at this time, choices are consistent
equivalence of normal and extensive forms
Essential properties about prospects
no money pump possibilities
certain equivalence of deals exist
value of new alternative must be non-negative
value of clairvoyance exists and is zero or positive
no materiality of sunk costs
no willingness to pay to avoid regret
stochastic dominance is satisfied
Practical considerations
individual evaluation of prospect is possible
tree rollback is possible
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Appendix 2.3. Keeney's Axiomatic Foundations of Decision
Analysis
Keeney articulates 4 sets of axioms of decision analysis (Keeney 1992b) as below:
"Axiom 1
Generation of Alternatives. At least two alternatives can be specified.
Identification of Consequences. Possible consequences of each alternative can be
identified.
Axiom 2
Quantification of Judgment. The relative likelihoods (i.e. probabilities) of each
possible consequence that could result from each alternative can be specified.
Axiom 3
Quantification of Preferences. The relative desirability (i.e. utility) for all possible
consequences of any alternative can be specified.
Axiom 4
Comparison of alternatives. If two alternatives would each result in the same two
possible consequences, the alternative yielding the higher chance of the preferred
consequence is preferred.
Transitivity of Preferences. If one alternative is preferred to a second alternative and if
the second alternative is preferred to a third alternative, then the first alternative is
preferred to the third alternative.
Substitution of consequences. If an alternative is modified by replacing one of its
consequences with a set of consequences and associated probabilities (i.e. lottery) that is
indifferent to the consequence being replaced, then the original and the modified
alternatives should be indifferent."
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Appendix 2.4. Foundations of descriptive theory (Edwards
1992)
The following are direct quotes from Edwards (1992) except for our comments in
parentheses and italics.
"Assumptions
1. People do not maximize expected utility, but come close.
2. There is only one innate behavioral pattern: they prefer more of desirable
outcomes and less of undesirable outcomes. These judgments are made as a
result of present analysis and past learning.
3. It is better to make good decisions than bad ones. Not everyone makes good
decisions.
4. In decision making, people will summon from memory principles distilled from
precept, experience, and analysis."
"Principles
Guidance from analysis
1. more of a good outcome is better than less
2. less of a bad outcome is better than more
3. anything that can happen will happen
(we interpret this to mean that outcomes are uncertain.)
Guidance from Learning
4. good decisions require variation of behavior (e.g. be creative)
5. good decisions require stereotypical behavior (e.g. be thorough, don't play
around)
6. all values are fungible
7. good decisions are made by good decision makers based on good intuitions
8. risk aversion is wise. "look before your leap."
Guidance from experience
9. good decisions frequently, but not always, lead to good outcomes
10. bad decisions never lead to good outcomes
(we interpret this to mean that poorly formulated problem statements and, ad-
hoc decision analyses are unlikely to produce relatively good outcomes even
under favorable conditions.)
11. the merit of a good decision is continuous in its inputs
12. it is far better to be lucky than wise"
(we interpret this to mean that the stochastic nature of future events may
surprise the decision maker with a favorable outcome. We are certain Edwards
is not suggesting that we depend on luck as the basis for decision making.)
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3.0. Design of Experiments (DOE) and Measurement Systems
Analysis (MSA) Literature Survey
3.1 What is DOE?
An experiment is a test (Montgomery 2001). An experiment is a structured and
purposeful procedure to investigate a principle or a hypothesis. Principles or hypotheses
can be about nature, systems, or processes. In keeping with our engineering and
organizational orientation, we choose to concentrate on the behavior of corporate
systems and processes resulting from potential decisions that can be made. Moreover,
the focus of our experimental goals is to understand and to improve the performance of
such systems or processes. The vast majority of experiments are performed with
physical apparatus, e.g. Michelson Morely's celebrated inquiry about the speed of light
(Michelson and Morely 1887). However, equally insightful experiments can also be
performed without any physical artifacts, as in Einstein's gedanken experiments (Shi
2000). This is an example where gedanken experiments have been very useful in
making inferences about the behavior of a system. We note this observation because
gedanken experiments will be important and form a pivotal element of our work.
However, regardless of the type of experimental asset that is used, physical or
intellectual, the fundamental questions that need to be addressed in any experiment are:
" What kind of experiments do I need?
" What is a sufficient and comprehensive set of experiments?
Design of Experiments (DOE) answers these questions by first positing that a system or
a process can be represented by a simple and abstract model, the p-diagram (Phadke
1989, Montgomery 2001) shown in Figure 3.1. In Appendix 3.1 we present a sample of
typical engineering problems that have been studied using DOE.
uncontrollable variables
signal variable system/process output/response
controllable variables
Figure 3.1 p-diagram
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The inputs to the system or process, fi, ... ,fp and s are controllable by the experimenter
and ni, ... nqare uncontrollable. The response is given by y-(s,fi, ... ,fp,nI, ... ,nq). DOE
is an experimental methodology to determine the kind of experiments and the sufficient
number of comprehensive experiments required in order to make inferences and
predictions about the behavior of a system or process. DOE allows the experimenter to
determine its phenomenological behavior. The idea is to fit a relationship over the
design space of controllable and uncontrollable variables (also called factors) using the
set of responses from the experiments (Otto and Wood 200 1).
"A well organized experiment, followed by a thorough data analysis ... can provide
answers to the following important questions:
- Which are the most important factors affecting the performance characteristics?
- How do the performance characteristics change when the factors are varied?
" What is the joint influence of factors on the performance characteristics?
- Which is the optimal combination of factor values?" (Vuchkov, Boyadjieva 2001).
DOE presents methods to answer the questions of the kind of experiments that can be
constructed, the ways to analyze them, and how to make reasoned and informed
predictions about the output y. DOE provides methods to determine the number of
experiments that meet the criteria of sufficiency and comprehensiveness.
3.1.1. Literature Survey
The history of modem experimental methods is recent. We follow Montgomery (2001),
Wu and Hamada (2001) and punctuate the historical development of DOE into stages of
progressively more sophisticated methodologies and increasingly more applications in
different domains of inquiry.
Stage 1 is the agricultural era. DOE was invented by R.A. Fisher (Fisher 1958, 1966).
Fisher's interest was the production of high yield crops given controllable and
uncontrollable variables of water, fertilizer, rain, sunshine and other factors. Fisher
systematically formulated experiments by specifying treatments - combinations of
variables with different values. And because the set of possible treatments became very
large, he devised methods to reduce their number to a fraction of the total. And to
analyze experimental results he created the analysis of variance (ANOVA) as a method
to study the joint effect of many factors. Fisher also articulated the well known
experimental principles of randomization, replication, and blocking.
Stage 2 is the industrial era. Box and Wilson (1951), a statistician and a chemist,
recognized that unlike protracted agricultural experiments; chemical and process type
experiments can produce results with much greater immediacy. Learning from
immediate results, they were able to plan an improved next experiment. Armed with
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this insight and more sophisticated statistical methods, they developed the Response
Surface Methodology (RSM). RSM is a sequential procedure. The objective is to move
in steps from the current operating region to the optimum. The investigator begins with
simple models, and as knowledge about the solution space improves, more advanced
models are used to explore the regions of interest and to determine the extremum.
Stage 3 is the product and manufacturing quality era. Taguchi (1987, 1991), Phadke
(1989), Taguchi and Clausing (1990) introduced the Taguchi Method to product design
and manufacturing. Taguchi uses DOE for robustness. A product or a process is robust
when:
- the performance, its response or output, is insensitive to uncontrollable or difficult-
to-control environmental factors,
- the performance is insensitive to variations transmitted from components.
Relying on Taguchi type of DOE methods, robustness is achieved through design. The
experimenter specifies settings of controllable variables that drive the mean to a desired
value, e.g. a maximum, while simultaneously reducing variability around this value. It
is rare that both of these objectives can be met simultaneously, and the designer must
make an artful compromise. Taguchi presents signal-noise ratio heuristics that simplify
this task using signal-noise ratios derived from a quadratic loss function. Taguchi
further simplified the task of designing treatments by providing a comprehensive set of
pre-defined treatments in the form of orthogonal arrays. For decades, these ideas have
been applied in a wide variety of engineering applications and found to be effective, e.g.
Wu and Wu (2000), Clausing (1994), Phadke (1989), Taguchi, Chowdhury, and
Taguchi (2000). Specific examples are presented in Appendix 3.1.
However, the Taguchi method is not without its critics, e.g. Nair (1992), Box, Bisgaard,
and Fung (1988), Tribus and Szonyi (1989). One criticism is that low resolution
Taguchi arrays do not provide any visibility of the interactions among the controllable
variables; and if interactions are present, they are confounded in the main effects. Use
of higher resolution arrays and domain knowledge (in order to select variables that are
known to be highly independent) are ways to resolve this criticism, albeit at the cost of
escalating the number of treatments. Another criticism is of the use of signal-noise ratio,
which conflates location and dispersion effects. However, this can also be seen as an
advantage since it produces a linear ordering of alternatives which simplifies the
selection of an optimum alternative. However, wide and successful use of Taguchi's
signal-to-noise ratio has convinced many practitioners of its effectiveness. Others point
to potential pitfalls in the use of ANOVA for analyzing signal-noise ratios (Vuchkov,
Boyadjieva 2001). ANOVA assumes normally distributed functions. The signal-noise
ratios defined by the Taguchi method are non-linear functions of normally distributed
random variables, which may not turn out to be normal. However, the investigator is not
obligated to use signal-noise for the analysis; she can rely on the variances to reach a
judgment. It is this latter approach that we adopt in our work.
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Stage 4 is the current era. DOE is practiced in a wide variety of domains, many new
methodological improvements are developed, and one finds that it is widely taught in
universities. New theoretical and methodological improvements include, for example,
methods for non-normal data (Wu and Hamada 2000), Taguchi dynamic experiments
with a focus on the ideal experimental function (Taguchi, Chowdhury, Taguchi 2000),
and more recently an advanced revival of one-at-a-time methods (Frey 2003a, 2003b)
that considers the relationship of interactions on performance improvements.
3.1.2. Foundations
DOE has four pillars: analysis of variance (ANOVA), regression analysis, confidence
and power, and the basic principles of DOE (Vuchkov and Boyadjieva 2001, Wu and
Hamada 2000).
ANOVA is a statistical method to quantitatively derive from the results of an
experiment, the relative contribution that each controllable variable, interaction, or error
make to the overall measured response. Common practice is to present the results of an
experiment using an ANOVA table as shown below for two factors A and B (Table 3.1)
(Montgomery 2001). We discuss the ANOVA table in more detail in Appendix 3.2
Table 3.1 Analysis of Variance Table for Two-factor Fixed Effects Model
Source DOFuares Mean Square F p
A a-1 SSA MSA=SSA/(a-1) FA=MSA/MSE pA=f(FA)
B b-1 SSB MSB=SSB/(b-1) FB=MSB/MSE PB=f(FB)
AxB (a-1)(b-1) SSAB MSAB=SSAB/(a-1)(b-1) FAB=MSAB/MSE PAB=f(FAB)
Error ab(n-1) SSE MSE=SSE/(ab)(n-1)
Total abn-1 SST
The second pillar is regression analysis. Regression analysis is a powerful method for
model building because experimental data can often be modeled by the general linear
model (also called the multiple regression model). Given response (output) y is related
to p variables x1 , ... , xP as y-Xp3xj+E. If we have N observations y1, ..., yN , then the
model takes the form yi=po+pix 1+ ... +ppxp+ci , with i=1,...,N. These N equations are
then y-XP+e in matrix form. X is the Nx(p+1) model matrix. Since the experiment
gives us only a sample, we want y=Xp^ and from the least squares estimate we obtain
p^=(X'X)YX'y and using the R2 statistic we can determine the proportion of total
variation explained by the fitted regression model Xp^. And using the F statistic we can
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get the p values for the explanatory variables x 1, ... , xp. The p values are a function of
the F statistic of a variable (e.g. Vuchkov and Boyadjieva 2001, Wu and Hamada 2000).
The third pillar is the set of statistical concepts of confidence and power. A confidence
interval represents a range of likely values for a population parameter (based on sample
data) that we would expect to lie within the range (e.g. Montgomery 2001). This is
useful for we can quantify the precision of a population parameter. Practically, power is
the ability of a test to discern a difference when it exists (e.g. ibid). More precisely,
power is the probability that we correctly reject the null hypothesis when it is indeed
false. Failure to do so is called a Type II error. Power is a useful concept because given
a sample and a difference we want to discern, we can determine the power of the test.
Comparing against confidence for the given power of an experiment provides a
quantitative measure of the risk of the result.
The fourth pillar is the set of principles first formulated by Fisher (1958, 1966). They
are randomization, replication, and blocking. Randomization is a fundamental principle
of any statistical analysis. It refers to both the allocation of experimental assets as well
the time and sequence in which treatments are performed. Randomization minimizes the
impact of systematic bias that may exist. Replication is a distinct concept from repeated
measurements of single experiment. Replication refers to performing the same
experiment and taking measurements. Replication permits us to determine repeatability
and reproducibility of experiments. Blocking is a way to control for factors that are not
considered critical to the response of the experiment, e.g. the time or day when the
experiment is performed or the supplier of materials.
3.1.3. Advantages of DOE
Demonstrably effective. DOE methods are researched, reviewed in refereed journals,
and documented in the literature. Wu and Hamada (2001) present 80 examples in their
book. Frey, Engelhardt, Greitzer (2003a) identify a very wide variety of applications in
engineering and science. Otto and Antonsson (1993), Otto (1994) use Taguchi methods
in product design. Clausing (1994) based on his experience in Xerox presents examples
of how Taguchi methods can be used at different phases of the product development life
cycle. Fowlkes and Crevelling (1995) do the same based on their experiences in Kodak.
Taguchi, Chowdhury, Taguchi (2000), Wu and Wu (2000) present data, models, and
analysis from numerous successful industry experiments. Appendix 3.1 contains an
illustrative sample of DOE applications in engineering with pointers to the references.
Quantifies the impact of uncertainty. The DOE approach structures the uncontrollable
external environment very explicitly by means of uncontrollable variables that are
specified as part of the problem formulation. The representation of the external
environment spans the entire space of the uncontrollable environment. Using DOE we
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can derive the consequences (outcomes) of a decision-maker's actions (specified by
configurations of controllable variables) over this entire space of uncertainty. We can
compare and contrast the results of alternative actions and make inferences about the
impact of uncertainty (i.e. set of distinct configurations of the uncontrollable variables).
Following French (1989) and section 3.1 of this chapter,
yi,j is the consequence of taking action ai under an uncertain environment sj.
where ai=(s,fi, ... ,fQ) and sj=(ni, ... np)i
and ai x sj= yij i.e. the cross product (s,fi, ... ,fp) x (ni, ... ,np)i= yij
and therefore, we can linearly order the set {yi,j}in its natural units of the problem or
with a preference function {p(yij)}. From this linear ordering we can judge the impact
of uncertainty over our space of potential actions {ai} under uncertainty {sj}.
Addresses key difficulties. DOE's statistical methods mitigate many difficulties facing
an experimenter. The key difficulties are noise, complexity, and causation versus
correlation (Box, Hunter, Hunter 1978). Noise is a major source of uncertainty. DOE
clearly separates controllable variables from uncontrollable variables, i.e. noise
variables, to analyze the effect of the interactions among the controllable and
uncontrollable variables on the output. To address complexity, accumulated empirical
evidence has distilled three useful principles for the analysis of factorial effects; they
are hierarchy, sparsity, and heredity (Wu and Hamada (2000). For causation and
correlation, "interplay between theory and practice" must come together (Box, Hunter,
Hunter 1978). The experimenter must rely on domain knowledge to construct valid
relationships among variables.
Permits "black-box" approach. A major advantage of DOE is that it permits a
phenomenological approach to the analysis of systems and processes. The system or
process under investigation can be considered as a "black box" and provided the inputs
and variables are known, we can infer the behavior of the system by analyzing its
output. The ability to view systems phenomenologically as a black-box combined with
the ability to consider the effect of uncontrollable variables gives us the opportunity to
make predictions about the performance of the system or process (Otto and Wood
2001). And we can also make the system or process robust against noise, i.e. against the
effect of uncontrollable conditions. These "black-box" benefits are particularly useful
when the experimenter may not know or be able, ex-ante, to express the behavior of the
product or system with equations. Moreover, through DOE methods the experimenter
can, ex-post, empirically derive the transfer function that represents the behavior of the
system over the solution space.
3.1.4. DOE presence in managerial problems
Application of DOE for management decisions made at senior-corporate executive
levels is very thin in the literature. Smith, Osborne and Forde (1995) report on the
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problem of optimal scheduling of earth-moving equipment using simulations with a
queueing model they developed. They then use DOE to find the optimal setting for
controllable variables to optimize their output. They do not use uncontrollable variables,
so the effects under uncertainty are not explored. Using experiments to find the right
mix of the 4-P's of marketing' (Kotler 2005) for consumer products is reported by
Almquist and Wyner (2001). But the use of uncontrollable variables is not discussed
and therefore the effect of uncertainty is indeterminate. Thomke (2001, 2003a, 2003b)
argues that experiments using prototypes, computer simulations, and field tests of
service offerings should be integrated into a company's business process and
management system. We agree. However, for Thomke the role of experimentation is
concentrated in screening concepts and product testing during the early phases of
product development, which is important and useful, but distinct from ours.
"... [the] lacuna is that experimentation has never been thought [of] as a separate
management discipline cutting across functional silos to bring innovative solutions ...
(Sudhakar Shenoy 2005)2,.
A goal of this research is to address this apparent void. There is an abundance of
research literature on DOE applications in engineering, manufacturing, and the
sciences, but there is a conspicuously thinner presence in managerial applications.
Possibly this can be explained by the fact that the applications are in disciplines rooted
in the sciences, and engineering, or operations research. In these domains,
experimenters have the benefit of the laws of nature or empirical equations to guide
them to identify the variables and to frame their experiments. Students of corporate
decisions do not have that advantage.
3.1.5. Our usage of DOE
Our research strategy is to approach corporate decisions as engineers. We use product
development as a metaphor and consider decisions as constructed intellectual artifacts.
The basis of decision-making is the selection of an intellectual artifact that is
determined to be superior from other alternatives. We use the DOE approach to frame
our problem that requires a decision, use DOE methods to construct alternatives, and
predict their performance. We address uncertainty by exploiting DOE methods that
distinguish controllable and uncontrollable variables and provide methods to analyze
their interactions and effects on the output. And we use DOE principles to guide us in
the planning, execution, and analysis of the corporate decisions under consideration.
But we do not make decisions. That is a power reserved to executive decision makers.
We are decision analysts (Howard 1988).
The 4 P's are Price, Promotion (advertising), Place (distribution), and Product.
2 Emphasis is ours. The source of this quote is a book review, though we do not have evidence
that the author is a research scholar, the observation is insightful and accurate in our judgment.
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3.2 Measurement Systems Analysis (MSA)
Experiments depend on data. How do we know the data is "good enough"? And how do
we know why or why not? Good-enough means that the data are accurate and precise.
"Accurate" means that the data is located where it is supposed to be relative to a
reference value. "Precise" means that repeated readings under different conditions
produce data that are close to each other. Accuracy and precision can be determined by
the statistical property of variation. Given that variations will be present, we need to
know the sources of these variations. The variation can be inherent in the data itself, due
to the operator taking the measurements, and due to the measuring instrument. Gage
R&R (gage repeatability and reproducibility) theory (e.g. Montgomery 2001, Breyfogle
2003) from Measurement Systems Analysis (e.g. MSA 2002, Creveling, Slutsky, and
Antis 2003) gives us the machinery to perform this kind of analysis.
Measurement System Analysis (MSA) is a statistical method used to asses the
performance of a measurement system. "A measurement system consists of the
equipment, fixtures, procedures, gages, instruments, software, environment, and
personnel that together make it possible to assign a number to measured characteristic
or response (Creveling, Slutsky, and Antis 2003)". Gage R&R is a MSA method to
study the components variability in a measurement system (Montgomery 2001). Gage
R&R is a widely used method in engineering, manufacturing, and other disciplines (e.g.
Liggett, Low, Pitchure and Song 2000, Frost, and Krenceski 2002, NIST/SEMATECH
2006).
Let us consider an environment where different operators are measuring parts in a batch
being produced from manufacturing. The sources of variations in measurements are
decomposed as shown in Figure 3.2 (next page). We have,
G total 2 2pail + G meas.sys. (2part + 2rpt 2 rpd
2
part 2
2 actual variation G rpt
C total part-part repeatability
variation across parts variation by
overall oeoeao
variation in 2 one operator
measurements ineas. SYS. r a given part
measurement
system 
2
variation reproducibility rpd
Gauze R&R variation
o/dif/erent operators
for a given part
Figure 3.2. Sources of variability for measurements
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- Part-part is the variability in measurements across different parts from the same
batch. Ideally, we want this variation to dominate all the remaining variations.
" Reproducibility is the variability in measurements obtained when parts are measured
by different operators. That is to say, for a given part, are different operators able to
reproduce a measurement?
- Repeatability is the variability in measurements obtained when parts from the same
batch are measured by the same operator, i.e. is an operator able to repeat the forecast
value for a given treatment?
- Gage R&R is the sum of these two variances, which is the measurement system
variation and gives us our measure of precision.
In our work we will adapt the Gage R&R method to the task of decision analysis as
shown in Table 3.2 below.
Table 3.2 Adaptation of Gage R&R to DOE-based decision analysis
manufacturing approach mapped to DOE decision analysis approach
measurements 4 forecasts of treatment performance
operators 4 participants making the forecasts
We will show in Chapters 9 how we operationalize this mapping. And in chapters 10
and 11 we show the analyses from two in situ company experiments that result from
this operationalization.
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Appendix 3.1 Sample of Engineering Applications Using DOE
Engineering problems Reference
- Chemical vapor deposition process
- Tuning computing systems
" Design of accelerometer
- Paper feeder without misfeeds and
multifeeds
" Waste water treatment plant
- Camera zoom shutter design
" Capstan roller printer
" Numerically controlled machine
- V-process casting of Al-7% Si Alloy
" Development of a filter circuit
" Gold plating process
" Optimization of inter-cooler
" Xerographic replenisher dispenser
" Electronic Warfare Receiver System
- Multicycle chemical process
" Yield of chemical process
" Impeller machine for jet turbines
" Body panel thick variation
- Tensile strength of air bag
- Electrostatic powder coating
" Chemical reaction experiment
- Task efficiency
" Injection molding shrinkage
- Carbon electrodes study
- Clutch case study
- Phadke (1969)
- Phadke (1969)
" Otto and Antonsson (1993)
" Clausing (1994)
- Clemson, Tang, Pyne, Unal (1995)
- Fowlkes and Creveling (1995)
- Fowlkes and Creveling (1995)
- Wu and Wu (2000)
- Kumar, Barna, Gaindhar (2000)
- Wu and Wu (2000)
" Wu and Wu (2000)
- Taguchi, Chowdhury, Taguchi (2000)
" Taguchi, Chowdhury, Taguchi (2000)
- Taguchi, Chowdhury, Taguchi (2000)
" Montgomery (2001)
" Montgomery (2001)
" Montgomery (2001)
" Roy (2001)
" Roy (2001)
- Roy (2001)
" Wu and Hamada (2001)
- Wu and Hamada (2001)
- Wu and Hamada (2001)
" Frey (2003)
" Frey (2003)
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Appendix 3.2 Analysis of Variance, ANOVA
ANOVA is a statistical method to quantitatively estimate the % contribution that each
controllable variable, interaction, or error makes to the output (response) that is being
measured (e.g. Montgomery 2001, Box, Hunter and Hunter 1978, Levine, Ramsey and
Smidt 2001). This contribution is determined by the relative intensity of the variation of
each controllable variable, interaction, or error to the total variation observed from the
measurements. Each variation is obtained from the sum of squares analysis and they are
reported in an ANOVA table as shown in Table 3.1 in this chapter.
Knowing the % contribution that each controllable variable or interaction makes to the
output is important because it gives the decision-maker insight into the relative
importance of each controllable factors to the output. In our field experiments (Part III
of this dissertation) a senior executive remarked, "Always thought this factor was
important but for the first time, I am told how important. And with numbers no less." In
our Japanese experiment, we found that one variable which the decision maker
agonized intensely about turned out to have only a negligible effect on the final result.
Knowing the % contribution of the interactions is significant because if the interactions
are small, it tells the decision-makers that they can think about the controllable variables
additively. The allocation of company resources to the implementation of corporate
decisions can now be made in a way that is consistent with the contribution that a
controllable factor can make to the outcome.
A typical ANOVA table is, for example, Table 6.8 in chapter 6. (This is a typical
display that is produced by Minitab@.)
....................... 9  . u... .  ....................D ..  .......... .. .. ...... .....A d  -....  .. ...A  ... ....d ... . . ... ... .... ... ... .. . ... ... ...
Source DE Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 712 712 356 8.63 0.003
yield 2 21686 21686 10843 262.82 0.000
cogs 2 20733 20733 10367 251.28 0.000
price 2 58059 58059 29030 703.65 0.000
yield*cogs 2 257 257 128 3.11 0.072
Error 16 660 660 41
* Total 26 102107
* S =6.42305 R-Sq =99.35% R-Sq(adj) =98.95%
"Source" is the column that identifies a controllable variable, interaction, or error. DF
(or DOF) means degrees of freedom. One can think of DF analogously as the number of
equations needed to solve for unknowns. The number of equations represents their
capacity to solve the problem. DF represents the capacity of a variable (or an
experimental design) to produce additional information. For controllable and
uncontrollable variables with n levels, the DF is n-l. The Sum of Squares Total (SST)
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represents the total variation among all the observation around the grand mean. The sum
of squares due to a factor A (SSA) represents the differences the various level of factor
A and the grand mean. Seq SS measures the SS as each variable is considered in the
sequence they are listed under the column with the heading of "Source". The adjusted
SS measures the amount of additional variation in the response that is explained by the
specific variable, given that all the other variables have already been considered.
Therefore, the value for the Adj. SS does not depend on the order in which they are
presented in the column Source. The Seq SS and Adj SS are identical when the model is
balanced. Balance is a combinatorial property of the model. For any pair of columns in
the array that is formed for all the treatments, all combinations of factor-levels occur an
equal number of times (e.g. Wu and Hamada 2001). Orthogonal arrays are balanced by
definition; therefore, the Seq SS and the Adj SS columns display identical values.
(Adj MS)=(Adj SS)/(DF) for a particular variable. It is the variance of the
measurements for a particular variable. We obtain its % contribution through a simple
division of its Adj MS by the sum of the individual elements.
F is given by:
F(controllable variable A)=(Adj MS of variable A)/(Adj MS error).
This is also called the variance ratio and is used to test the statistical significance of the
variable A.
" For F<l, the experimental error is bigger than the effect of the variable. The effects of
the variable cannot be discriminated from the error contribution. The particular
variable is therefore statistically insignificant as a predictor of the output.
- For F-2, the controllable variable has a modest effect on the output.
- For F>4, the controllable variable effect is much stronger than the effect of error and
is therefore statistically significant and a good predictor of the output.
However, we prefer to examine the p values of the variables. The p values can be
obtained from the dof's and F values and statistical tables. Following accepted practice,
we will consider variables or interactions with p<0.05 as statistically significant, and if
p<<0.05, they are also strong predictors of the output being studied.
It is good practice to examine the residuals from the ANOVA model to convince
ourselves that they are random normal with a mean of zero. This will indicate that they
are not carriers of input information and thus increase our confidence in the validity of
our models. We like the half-normal plot as in the plot of residuals in the next page. The
x-axis shows the range of the values of the residuals. The sloping straight line is a
logarithmic plot of a cumulative normal distribution with mean zero and SD of the
residuals. The dots are the residuals. If all the residuals lie on the line, they are normally
distributed. Or if they are close, e.g. within the diameter of a "fat pencil," the
distribution can be judged to be normal by the "fat-pencil" test. The box in the chart
shows some statistics that can tell us more definitively whether the residuals are normal
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with mean zero. We rely on the p values of the test statistic, the Anderson-Darling test.
If p>0.05, the residuals are normal. The test hypothesis is taken, the residuals are
normal. This may appear confusing, but the null hypothesis H0 is that the residuals are
normal, so that if p>0.05, we accept the hypothesis as correct.
Residuals of ANOVA for MVF with 1 interaction t= 12
Normal
99- I.I
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 residuals
From our orthogonal arrays, we are able to obtain the Response Tables and the Tables
for the standard deviations. For example, below is the response table for one of our
simulations, which will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters.
..........................................................................................................................................................
Response Table for Means t=12 Response Table for Std Deviations
Level r&d yield cogs price Level r&d yield cogs price
1 760.4 719.3 787.3 693.7 1 104.2 101.5 104.8 100.2
2 753.3 753.5 754.7 761.3 2 103.1 103.4 103.4 103.0
3 747.8 788.7 719.5 806.5 3 101.8 104.3 101.0 105.9
Delta 12.5 69.4 67.9 112.8 Delta 2.3 2.8 3.8 5.8
Rank 4 2 3 1 Rank 4 3 2 1
We focus our attention on the LHS of the table above. The left-hand column, under the
heading of "Level", lists the three levels for the controllable variables. For this
simulation, level 2 is the existing operating condition, of "business as usual" (BAU)
level. The controllable variables are r&d expenditures, manufacturing yield, cost to the
company of the goods sold (cogs), and price at which they sell those goods. The value
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of each cell (at the intersection of a level and a specific variable) is the average of all the
values of the measured output (in this case the market value of the firm in $M) for that
variable at that level. For example for r&d level-1, the cell entry is 760.4 $M. This is
the average value of nine values from the L27. There are nine values of r&d level-2 and
nine more for r&d level-3, for a total of 27. Delta is the maximum distance between any
two levels; for example for the variable yield, 69.4=(788.7-719.3). Rank is simply an
ordering of the row Delta from high to low. Rank tells us which variable has the
greatest influence on the output. We note that price has the largest influence on the
output; Delta is largest. The standard deviations are calculated from the string of
numbers for each variable at a level to obtain the response table for standard deviations.
We can plot these tables to get the plots below.
Min Effects
r&d yield
719.3
753.5
Z
788.7
1 2 3 1 2 3
- cogs price
1 2 3 1 2 3
These tables and
yield the highest
level-3, cogs at
Std Dev
r&d yield
101.5
103.4
104.3
1 2 3 1 2 3
cogs price
0
PI
I I
1 2 3 1 2 3
plots are useful for they can tell us to design the treatments that will
output. From the plots of the LHS, we note that r&d at level-1,
level-1, and price at level-3 will yield the highest output.
yield at
So the
treatment (1,3,1,3) will produce a maximum response. Looking at the right hand side,
we note that this treatment will also produce the highest standard deviation, which is
therefore the most risky treatment, as well. Thus finding a treatment that produces a
sufficiently high output with a reduced standard deviation is a task of designing a
solution that satisfices.
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PART II. Experiments with a Company Surrogate
4.0 Company Surrogate for Test Experiments
4.1 Introduction
Part II of this dissertation is about concept testing of our DOE-based method for
decision analysis at the corporate or business-unit level. The ideal instrument for
concept testing is, of course, a real-world company with a problem that requires a
business decision. Just as macro-economists cannot expect to conduct experimental
tests of policy on national economies; neither can we concept test with companies. To
test, we need an artifact that behaves as a real firm. Such an artifact, in place of a real
firm, would serve as "a case study with the participants on the inside (Jones 1998)" for
"computational experiments to explore the implications of varying assumptions and
hypothesis (Bankes 1993)." Our artifact is a system dynamics (Sterman 2000) model
(Sterman, Repenning, Kofman 1997) of Analog Devices Inc. (2006). This system
dynamic artifact will act as a "surrogate" of a real firm for our concept testing. This
chapter is about why this surrogate is appropriate. In section 4.2, we present our criteria
for a useful surrogate. And in section 4.3, we discuss why the system dynamics model
for Analog Devices Inc. meets our criteria for a meaningful surrogate. We appreciate
that showing that our method works in simulation does not assure that it will work in
practice. We see our methods functioning effectively in simulation as a necessary
condition for our proceeding with testing in a corporate setting, which are the subjects
of Part III of this dissertation.
This chapter is also as an introduction to Part II. Chapters 5 through 8 collectively
report our approach and findings for concept testing of our DOE-based decision
analysis method on two distinct ADI corporate objectives, viz. maximizing the value of
the firm (MVF), and maximizing the expected annual operating income (AOI).
Chapters 5 and 6 present the procedure and analysis for MVF. Chapter 5 presents the
analysis to validate the ADI SD model as a surrogate for MVF. Then, chapter 6 puts the
surrogate to use with the objective of finding support for our decision analysis method
for the MVF objective. We find that there is such support. In Chapters 7 and 8, we
repeat the procedures of Chapters 5 and 6, but now using a different corporate objective,
i.e. maximizing AOL. Putting all this together, we will determine whether there is
support that our decision-analysis approach passes the concept test.
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4.2 Criteria for surrogate
The surrogate must satisfy two criteria for it to be useful as a vehicle for concept
testing. First, the surrogate must be a sufficiently complete representation of a real
world company. Second, the simulated behavior of the surrogate must pass key tests of
validity. Can we find support for claims of validity? And does the surrogate produce
results that are consistent with domain knowledge and our understanding of the
problem?
We will also subject our decision analysis method to other tests. One is the external
validity test, i.e. that we can take our method to the field with real companies and
produce meaningful findings for company executives. These are topics for Part III of
this work. The next two sections define conditions for sufficiency with regard to
completeness and validity.
4.2.1 Sufficiently complete and comprehensive
- Addresses keyfunctions of thefirm. Because we are studying decision analysis at the
corporate and business unit level, the surrogate must include the key functions of a
company. They are, but not limited to, product development, manufacturing, finance,
accounting, sales, distribution, and services (Chandler 2004).
" Include endogenous and exogenous variables. "Firms, if not all organizations, are in
competition - competition for factor inputs, competition for customers, and
ultimately, competition for revenues that cover the costs of their chosen manner of
surviving (Rumelt, Schendel, Teece 1994)." It follows that a surrogate must include
internal (endogenous and controllable) and external (exogenous and uncontrollable)
variables in its representation of a firm. These variables form the bedrock of our
representation framework for decision analysis, the p-diagram (e.g. Phadke 1989,
Montgomery 2001). Total R&D-expenditures is an example of an endogenous
variable. And aggregate industry demand is an example of an exogenous variable.
" Availability offine-grained details. The model must allow us to drill-down to study
the relationships among the variables so that we can understand the structure and
functions of ADI's business processes. For example, for Cost of Goods Sold (COGS),
we would like to know how physical parts, manufacturing labor, and manufacturing
overhead contribute to COGS.
- Ability to take snapshots of the firm at different times. All decisions are about future
expectations (e.g. March 1997). Therefore, the temporal dimension of outcomes is
inextricably and inexorably entangled in any decision analysis. The surrogate must
permit us to sample outputs and values of controllable and uncontrollable variables at
a time scale of our choosing.
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4.2.2 Tests of validity
What can we point to that suggest that we have a valid experiment? We follow the
literature and subject our experiment to three tests: construct, internal, and external
validity tests (Yin 2003, Hoyle, Harris, and Judd 2002).
" Construct validity: do we have a conceptual framework for our experiment, which
can be operationalized with the specified independent and dependent variables?
- Internal validity: can we make inferences and draw conclusions about the causal
effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables? Moreover, are these
conclusions plausible and credible? Does the experiment have face validity?
- External validity: can we generalize from this experiment to a larger and more
general population and/or broader settings? (This is covered in Part III)
These tests of validity will be covered in the remaining chapters of Part II of this
dissertation. In chapters 5 and 6 we will test the validity of our MVF experiment. We
will do the same for our AOI experiment in chapters 7 and 8.
4.3 The ADI surrogate
In this section, we discuss why the ADI SD model meets our surrogate criterion of
"sufficiently complete representation of a real company."
- Keyfunctions of thefirm. 620 equations are used to describe 85 business processes of
ADI (Sterman, Repenning, Kofman 1997). The top-level system-description (Figure
4.1) shows twelve business processes, which collectively model ADI. The key
corporate functions that are of interest to us are included in the SD model.
new product market potential competitors
development ne s & market share G.mpetiitor' prod. priceproductspnce
orders prod. price pricing
shipments unit cost
I . costs management
Total yedmanufacturling 'accounting
Quality costs and expenses
Management '0 financial
industry growth balance sheet, str ess,
financial I&E, flow of funds
R&D spedg accounting
market value of the firm
Fstock market
Figure 4.1 System overview of ADI SD model.
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- Endogenous and exogenous variables. The SD model (Figure 4.1) has sufficiently
broad boundaries that include exogenous factors; specifically, we note the presence of
the stock market, competitors, and the customer-market. Examples of endogenous
and exogenous variables are shown in Table 4.1. We note that they are a mix of
managerially controllable variables and those that are beyond management control.
Table 4.1 Examples of endogenous and exogenous variables
Endogenous variables Exogenous variables
- unit sales_ ____ total products introduced __ *_ competitors' product price_
*sales revenues_ _ -_manufacturing yield _____ inflation
- Cost of Goods Sold_ _-_manufacturing cycle time_ __ industry demand
operating Income ____ on time delivery ___ _-_yield of SP 500
- R&D budget - market vale/cash flow - competitors' improvements
- Fine-grained details. The SD model is too large to present in its entirety, we limit our
attention the outcome of Indicated Market Value of the Firm (MVF). We will test our
DOE based decision analysis method for this outcome in chapters 5 and 6. A subset
of the SD stock and flow model that shows the relationship of MVF is shown in
Figure 4.2 in the next page. (There are 85 flow charts like this one each representing a
key element of the enterprise model.)
The flow diagram of MVF depicts, for example, the following analytic relationships
among the variables:
(1) indicated MVF = max[(value of growth+PV of earnings),0]
(2) PV of earnings = (expected annual operating income)/discount rate
(3) value of growth = (exp.annual earningsxeffective growth value)/discount rate.
Equation (1) states that there are two determinants of MVF, one is endogenous and the
other is exogenous. PV of earnings is an endogenous variable determined by the ability
of the firm to produce a profit stream. Equation (3), value of growth, is exogenous; it is
investors' figure of merit assigned to ADI's earnings. Equation (2), PV of earnings, is
the usual temporally discounted-value of earnings. There are 210 loops* that include the
variable MVF. An inspection of a sample of 50 loops shows that each contains >20
variables. The ADI SD system is complex; the number of variables is large, 620, and
the interactions among the variables are intense.
* a loop is a complete circuit of arrows in the same direction in an SD model.
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But not all equations are flows as in the equations above. Expected Annual Operating
Income is a stock, which is an accumulation (an integral) of a net flow given by Change
in Exp OP Income.
(4) Expected Annual Operating Income = f(change in Exp OP income)dt + AOIO.
In system dynamics, a system is a network of linked stocks and flows which are strung
together in feed-forward and feed-backward loops.
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hnktdActal Operating Incoe y
< S al e R e e n u e > < 0 r a ti I o n > I n i a e n u l ~ e a i g I c n
<Operating Incorne
Expected Anual
Chng in Exp OP hnorne
Indicated Market Vake of the frm
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Figure 4.2. SD stock and flow model for MVF.
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- Snapshots of the firm at different times. Figure 4.3 is an example of the type of data
generated by the SD model. It displays a snapshot of ADI's expected annual
operating income (AOL) in a 24 month period under three different conditions: when
manufacturing yield is higher by 10% relative to current yield level, at current yield
level, and at a diminished yield of 90%.
Expected Annual Operating Incone
62.54 M
59.52 M
56.50 M
53.48 M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Tirne (Month)
manufacturing yield increased by 10%
current manufacturing yield 2
manufacturing yield diminished by 10% -
16 18 20 22 24
I I I I I I
Figure 4.3 Snapshot of AOI under different yields.
This graph (Figure 4.3) is also useful to evaluate construct, internal, and face validity.
Figure 4.3 shows there is a meaningful, causal, and temporal relationship between
manufacturing yield and expected AOL. As manufacturing yield increases, AOI
increases. This causal relationship between dependent and independent variables is
consistent with domain knowledge, i.e. manufacturing performance improvements lead
to improved profits. This illustrates construct, internal and face validity for expected
AOI using the variables specified.
The SD model is capable of producing many such streams representing the relationships
among both endogenous and exogenous variables. In the next four chapters, we will
explore these relationships in greater detail.
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5.0 Surrogate Validation for Maximizing Value of the Firm
(MVF)
5.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, we presented the reasons why we need a company surrogate,
the criteria for its selection, and why we selected the ADI system dynamics model to
play that role. In this chapter, we "drill down" and show that our ADI SD model is a
valid surrogate for the specific corporate objective of maximizing the market value of
the firm (MVF). We show that for this objective, the ADI SD model has construct,
internal, and face validity. And therefore, it is appropriate for use as a surrogate for the
MVF problem and decision. This chapter establishes the foundation for chapter 6 in
which we put our surrogate to work to determine whether there is support for our
decision analysis method for the corporate objective of MVF (measured in $ M).
The chapter has four sections. In section 5.2, we describe ADI's MVF corporate
decision and its situational context. We then frame the decision situation in our DOE
normal-form. A series of tests form section 5.3. Since our intent is to use the ADI SD
model as our surrogate for a specific corporate problem and decision, we need to test
our surrogate using the problem's DOE variables and the conditions under which they
will be exercised. In section 5.4, we summarize our findings and infer the validity of
using the ADI SD model as a surrogate for our DOE-based decision-analysis method
for the outcome of MVF.
5.2. Framing the ADI corporate decision
"We do not have to know, or guess at, all the internal structure of the system but only
that part of it that is crucial to the abstraction." H.A. Simon
5.2.1 The decision situation
In 1987, ADI launched a TQM initiative and focused on the firm's technically intensive
functions. The results were dramatic improvements in product quality and
manufacturing. Yield doubled, cycle time was cut by half, product defects fell by a
factor of ten, and on-time delivery improved from 70% to 90%. People worked very
hard to achieve these impressive results. However, operating profit and stock price
plunged. Specifically, operating profit fell from $46 M to $6.2 M and the price per share
dropped from $24 to $6 during the period of 1987-1990. Unprecedented in ADI's
history, people were laid off and manufacturing jobs were transferred overseas long
before it became fashionable to do so. Management lost credibility with the ADI
workforce. The firm's financial crisis threatened Ray Stata, founder of the firm, with a
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hostile takeover from raiders in Wall Street. An ADI senior manager observed "... with
its market value, ADI could have been acquired for about 3 years' cash flow from
operations." Stata, CEO of ADI, is reported to have remarked "... there was something
about the way we were managing the company that was not good enough (Sterman,
Repenning, Kofman 1997)".
5.2.2 Framing the decision in DOE normal form
We assume that Stata does not want the firm to be acquired on the cheap by raiders.
And he also wants to demonstrate that he can turn ADI around by improving the
performance of its key functions and by restoring confidence and morale of its
workforce. We frame the decision situation in DOE normal form as shown in Table 5.1.
Why did we select these outcomes and variables?
Table 5.1. ADI's decision situation in DOE normal form
problem * threat of hostile takeover
loss of confidence in ADI management
1. market value of the firm, MVF.
outcomesoutcomes2. operating profit
1. R&D budget
2. manufacturing yield
3. Cost of Goods Sold (COGS)
4. product price
1. industry growth
uncontrollable variables 2. ADI orders
3. competitors' attractiveness
Outcomes
The first outcome is "market value of the firm". An effective defense against the threat
of ADI being taken over is to increase the market value of the firm (MVF). This makes
ADI less affordable to raiders. It also serves to increase the confidence of stockholders
in the current management so that if it comes to a proxy fight, they will vote to retain
them. High MVF also addresses the problem of loss of confidence by stockholders in
Stata and the current management. A way to restore trust and confidence in ADI's
management is to produce operating profit, our second outcome. Operating profit
reflects management's capability to control cost and expense. Cost is an indicator of
engineering and manufacturing effectiveness; and expense is an indicator of operational
efficiency and effectiveness of the other functions of the firm (e.g. Brealy and Meyers
2002).
Controllable Variables
For the controllable variables, we concentrate on the major functions of a high
technology company. They are the functions of R&D, manufacturing, engineering, and
finance. We assume that each has a senior functional-executive in charge. We imagine
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posing to each of them the question: given the outcome of Market Value of the Firm
(MVF): (i) what are key variables you can control, and (ii) what is the range of
controllability for those variables? At the scale and level of abstraction which we are
considering our problem - for R&D the controllable variable is the budget; for
manufacturing it is manufacturing yield; for engineering it is the cost of goods sold
(COGS), and for finance it is the sale price of ADI's products.
Uncontrollable Variables
For uncontrollable variables, we ask: what are the key secular variables that
management cannot control (or that are extremely difficult or prohibitively costly to
control) and whose behavior has a strong influence on the chosen outcomes? It is the
behavior of these variables that generate the uncertainty conditions under which the
controllable variables will operate. These conditions of uncertainty define the set of
uncontrollable environments that face ADI. Based on the documentation of the problem
(Sterman, Repenning, Kofman 1997), we identify three uncontrollable variables. They
are industry-demand growth, which can "raise or lower all boats" in the industry.
Second is ADI orders. ADI cannot influence the volume of customer orders. ADI is not
a consumer product company. Its market is an industrial market (e.g. Anderson and
Narus 1999). ADI is an OEM (original equipment manufacturer), a commodities
supplier (electronic components) that are delivered as parts to other product
manufacturers. Demand for ADI's components is derived from the sales of the final
products of the manufacturers that use ADI parts. ADI has very limited control on the
demand for those final products. Finally, the third uncontrollable variable is the
attractiveness of competitors' products.
Levels for controllable variables
Next we set the levels that bracket the range of controllability for the controllable
variables (Table 5.2). We specify three levels to demarcate the range of controllability.
We set level 3 where there is an increase from the current level of operations. In all
cases except for COGS an increase is expected to improve the output of MVF. For
example, we would expect that all things being equal, an increase in the products' prices
will increase the MVF. An increase in COGS will make the product less competitive, so
this situation not will improve the outcome of MVF. Except for COGS, the +xx%
represents our assumption for the maximum level that can be achieved with a very
strong effort. For COGS that level is assumed to be at -10%. Again except for COGS,
the -xx% represents our assumptions for the maximum decline that are tolerable to
management. In this chapter, we will test the behavior of ADI under each of these
assumptions. The entries with an * to denote the current level of operations. This will
be referred to as Business-As-Usual (BAU) throughout this document.
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Table 5.2. Controllable factors and levels
controllable factors level 1 level 2 level 3
R&D budget -10% current level * + 10%
IC yield -15% current level * + 15%
COGS -10% current level * + 10%
product price -10% current level +10%
Levels for uncontrollable variables
The levels for the uncontrollable variables are based on the maximum and minimum
plausible values of the uncontrollable variables. They are our assumptions about the
best and worst case that are realistic, for the uncontrollable variables. As a general
principle, domain expertise and competent judgment are required to set these upper and
lower bounds. Unlike the controllable variable levels, which specify the limits of
managerial action, the levels for the uncontrollable variables represent secular
conditions, which are the most favorable or the most unfavorable to the firm (Table
5.3). Given 3 factors of uncertainty (uncontrollable variables), each at two levels, ADI
faces 23=8 full factorial potential distinct scenarios of uncertainty that are distinct from
its current condition.
Table 5.3. Uncontrollable factors and levels.
uncontrollable factors level 1 current state level 2
industry growth rate current-25% I current *current+25%
ADI orders rate current-25% current * current+25%
competitors' attractiveness current-25% current * current+25%
Notation
We have 4 controllable factors. For a specific configuration of controllable factor-
levels, we use a 4-tuple. For example, (2,1,2,2) means factor 1 at level 2, factor 2 at
level 1, factor 3 at level 2, and so on. We have 3 uncontrollable factors, so for a specific
uncontrollable factor-level configuration, we use a 3-tuple.
The Business-As-Usual (BAU) Situation
The BAU situation in the current condition, is (2,2,2,2) in the current environmental
condition, which in this case is the "center point" of the controllable space hypercube
(Table 5.4). Given the definition and the level specifications for the uncontrollable
environments, we surmise that for ADI the best environment is (2,2,1), i.e. industry
demand is high, ADI orders are strong, and competitors are weak. Similarly, we surmise
that the worst environment is (1,1,2), i.e. when industry demand growth is weak, ADI
orders are weak, and competitors are strong. We will test these assumptions in this
chapter.
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Table 5.4. BAU and the current environmental condition.
controllable factors BAU level
R&D Budget 2 $28.47 M
manufacturing yield 2 0.20
COGS 2 $11.28 M
product price 2 $17.38
uncontrollable factors
growth in demand current 0.02
ADI orders current 1.487 M
Competitors' attractiveness current 4.955e-005 (this is an index)
5.3 Testing the ADI surrogate
Using our ADI surrogate, we will test the sensitivity of the outcome MVF with respect
to our controllable and uncontrollable variables. We want to know whether there is a
causal linkage between our MVF outcome (our dependent variable), and our
independent variables (our controllable and uncontrollable variables). And if these
causal linkages behave as we would expect given our understanding of the problem, we
can infer construct and face validity.
5.3.1 MVF=f(a controllable variable)
In this section, we show the behavior of the dependent variable, MVF, as a function of
the independent variables, i.e. the controllable variables. The goal is to determine
whether there is a causal linkage between the dependent variable and the independent
variables.
Figure 5.1 plots MVF versus product price as a function of time. MVF under the current
BAU situation, with no change in product price, behaves as shown (curve #3). (All
quantitative figures of MVF will be in monetary units of $M.) With a 10% increase in
product price, MVF grows as shown in curve #1. With a 10% decline in product price,
MVF behaves as shown in curve #2, which is everywhere dominated by curve #1 and
#3. We find that the dependent variable, MVF, behaves as one would expect relative to
price changes.
* This is a very low figure, but it is what is reported in Sterman's et al. paper (1997).
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hIdicated Market Value of the firm
1.006 B
870.06 M
current
product price
597.39 M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Tir (Month)
10% increase in product price 1 i i 1 i i
current product price 2 2 2 2 2 2
10% decline in product price > 3 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 5.1 MVF with higher, current, and lower price.
Figures 5.2, and 5.3 are similar plots of MVF for the controllable variables of
manufacturing yield, and COGS respectively. MVF rises when manufacturing yield
rises; and when COGS declines, MVF increases.
Indicated Market Value of the firm
974.81 M
849.47 M
724.13 M current yield
598.80 M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Tim (Month)
10% decline in yield 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10% improvement in yield 2 2 2 2 2 2
current yield 3 3 3 9 3 3
Figure 5.2. MVF with higher, current, and lower yield
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Indicated Market Value of the firm
982.06 M
854.21 M
current COGS
726.36 M
598.51 M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Tirne (Month)
10% increase in COGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10% decline in COGS 2 2 2 2 2 2
current COGS 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 5.3. MVF with higher, current, and lower COGS.
After three quarters, for higher R&D, MVF declines (Figure 5.4). This appears
counterintuitive for a technology firm. But this is precisely the problem with ADI
during this time: technically excellent, but unable to produce financial performance.
Indicated Market Value of the firm
986.66 M
857.55 M
current
728.45 M R&D expense
599.34 M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Tim (Month)
10% decline in R&D expense 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
10% increase in R&D expense 2 2 2 2 2 2
current level of R&D expense 3 3 3 3 3 9 3
Figure 5.4. MVF with higher, current, and lower R&D expense
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Finding
For MVF, our controllable variables influence the dependent variable in the
direction that is consistent with our understanding of the decision situation.
5.3.2 MVF=f(an uncontrollable variable)
We have just shown the behavior of MVF as a function of the controllable variables.
We now show the behavior of MVF as a function of the uncontrollable variables. As
before, the goal is to determine whether there is a causal linkage between the dependent
variable and the uncontrollable variables.
Figure 5.5 plots MVF as a function of time versus the uncontrollable factor, industry-
demand growth. Curve #3 shows MVF with current industry-demand growth "as is."
For 30% stronger industry-demand, MVF rises (curve #2). The "rising tide" raises
ADI's MVF. If industry-demand growth is diminished by 30%, MVF declines (curve
#1). Curve #1 is everywhere dominated by curves #2 and #3. The dependent variable
MVF behaves as one would expect given the independent (and uncontrollable) variable
of industry-demand. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 are similar plots of MVF for the uncontrollable
variables of competitors' attractiveness, and order rate for ADI products. MVF rises
when ADI is more competitive and when orders for ADI products rise. And the
converse is also apparent from the plots.
Indicated Market Value of the firm
1.003 B
868.62 M
733.98 M
599.34 M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Tim (Month)
24
30% decline in industry demand
30% increase in industry demand
current industry demand
Figure 5.5. MVF in higher, current, and lower industry demand.
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current
industry
demand
I
1.036 B
890.60 M
744.67 M
598.75 M
0
Indicated Market Value of the firm
current
competitors'
attractiveness
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Tine (Month)
22 24
25% decrease in competitors' attractiveness I i 1 1 1
25% increase in competitors' attractiveness 2 2 2 2 2
current competitors' attractiveness 3 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 5.6. MVF with higher, current, and lower competitors' strengths.
Indicated Market Value of the firm
1.008 B
872.22 M
735.78 M
599.34 M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Tine (Mont
15% decline in ADI order rate
15% increase in ADI order rate
current ADI order rate
14 16 18 20 22 24
i I i i i i I
2 2 2 2 2 2
Figure 5.7. MVF with higher, current, and lower order rate for ADI.
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Finding
For MVF, our uncontrollable variables influence the dependent variable
in the direction that is consistent with our understanding of the decision
situation.
5.3.3 MVF=f(ensemble of uncontrollable variables)
We have shown the behavior of MVF vis ' vis the uncontrollable variables one at a
time. What is the behavior of Market Value of Firm given distinct configurations of the
uncontrollable variables?
Since we have three uncontrollable variables with two levels each, the full factorial of
uncontrollable situations has 23=8 combinations. Plus the current condition makes nine
environmental situations. Under these environmental conditions, how does the BAU
treatment of (2,2,2,2) behave? Figure 5.8 shows the plots of MVF under each of these
conditions.
In section 5.2.2, we surmised that the best environment is (2,2,1), i.e. industry growth is
high, ADI orders are strong, and competitors are weak. Similarly, we surmised that the
worst environment is (1,1,2) when industry demand growth is weak, ADI orders are
weak, and competitors are strong. Curve #2 is the MVF under the best environment of
(2,2,1). Indeed under the best environmental condition, MVF attains the highest values.
Curve #7 is the worst environment (1,1,2). And indeed, MVF attains its lowest values,
in general, over the 24 month period. During the first six months, the lowest MVF is
attained by BAU curve #9 (current environmental condition). Why is BAU so depressed
during the first six months? MVF is given by the expression,
MVF=max[(value of growth)+(PV of eamings),O].
"Value of growth", is a function that reflects Wall Street analysts' confidence (or lack
of) in the potential improvement in ADI's performance. Because ADI is so poorly
managed, this function is depressing MVF for the first six months. Analysts' opinion
trumps the effect of the environment. Value of Growth picks up after six months.
However, taken as a whole, the surrogate simulations indicate that the impact
environmental uncertainty is forceful and convincing, thereafter. It has a nontrivial
impact on the performance of the dependent variable of MVF outcome.
Finding
Different configurations of the uncontrollable variables influence the MVF
dependent variable in the direction that is consistent with our understanding
of the decision situation.
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Indicated Market Value of the firm
best
best
environment
current
worst environment environment
envronen
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Tint (Month)
20 22 24
environment (2,2,2)
best environment (2,2,1)
environment (2,1,2)
environment (2,1,1)
environment (1,2,2)
environment (1,2,1)
worst environment (1,1,2)
environment (1,1,1)
current environment
1 1 1
4 4 4 4
9 9 9
Figure 5.8. MVF under the entire spectrum of uncontrollable conditions
5.3.4 MVF=f(ensemble of controllable variables)
We have shown the behavior of MVF vis a vis the uncontrollable variables. The next
question we address is: What is the behavior of MVF given an ensemble configuration
of the controllable variables? Since we have four controllable variables each with three
levels, the full factorial set has 3 4=8 1 combinations. Out of the 81, we have the BAU
treatment of (2,2,2,2). Are there configurations of the controllable variables, i.e.
treatments that outperform the BAU treatment? Are there treatments that underperform
the BAU treatment? In other words, does the configuration of controllable factor-levels
matter?
We surmise that an effective treatment is (1,3,1,3), i.e. R&D is low (see Figure 5.4),
yield is high, product costs (COGS) are low, and the product price is high. Using similar
81
1. 175 B
947.72 M
720.26 M
492.79 M L
reasoning, we guess that (3,1,3,1) is the least effective treatment. Figure 5.9 shows these
three cases in the best environment of (2,2,1). Curve #3, which is the surmised best
treatment, exhibits the best performance for MVF. Curve #1, which is the surmised
worst treatment, exhibits the worst performance. Curve #2 is the BAU treatment of
(2,2,2,2) and is indeed bracketed between the best and worst treatment. Of course, there
are many other treatments that are bracketed within these two (Figure 5.10).
Indicated Market Value of the firm
1.215 B
1.008 B BAU (2,2,2,2)
801.76 M
594.94 M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Time (Month)
worst treatment (3,1,3,1) for MVF 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BAU (2,2,2,2) treatment 2 2 2 2 2 2
best treatment (1,3,1,3) for MVF 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 5.9. MVF with surmised best and worst treatments in the best environment.
A natural question is: Does this behavior (Figure 5.10) of ADI's MVF persist in the
worst environment? The answer is in the affirmative as shown in Figure 5.11 (page 84).
This figure is the analog of Figure 5.10 in the worst environmental condition for a
different set of treatments, but bracketed by the best and worst treatments, which are the
same ones as is Figure 5.10.
Our findings from these series of runs of the ADI surrogate are consistent with our
understanding of the corporate problem and the ADI business decision. The data
suggest there are causal linkages between our independent and dependent variables. The
simulations suggest that behavior of the ADI surrogate for MVF, given our controllable
and uncontrollable variables, has face validity.
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Indicated Market Value of the firm
1.216 B
best treatment
BAU
1.009 B
802.20 M
worst treatment
594.94 M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Tint (Month)
best treatment (1,3,1,3)
treatment (1,3,1,2)
treatment (1,1,2,1)
treatment (1,2,2,1)
treatment (2,1,2,3)
BAU (2,2,2,2)
treatment (2,1,2,2)
treatment (1,2,1,3)
worst treatment (3,1,3,1)
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4 4 4
I- 5
9 9 9
Figure 5.10. BAU MVF and a variety of treatments in the best environment.
Figure 5.11 is on the next page.
Findings
- Different configurations of the controllable variables influence the
dependent variable in the direction that is consistent with our understanding
of the decision situation.
- These different configurations of the controllable variables influence the
dependent variable under different environmental conditions such that
the observed results are consistent with our understanding of the
environmental uncertainties.
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Jndicated Market Value ofthe firm
best treatment
BAU
worst treatment
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Tim (Month)
best treatment (1,3,1,3)
BAU (2,2,2,2)
treatment (1,2,1,3)
treatment (2,1,2,2)
treatment (1,3,1,2)
treatment (2,1,3,2)
treatment (1,1,2,1)
treatment (1,1,2,1)
worst treatment (3,1,3,1)
2 2 2
3 3 3
7-F-- ----6 6
Figure 5.11. BAU MVF with a variety of treatments in the worst environment.
5.4. Summary
The goal of this chapter has been to test the ADI systems dynamics model as a surrogate
company to test our DOE-based decision analysis method. We framed a corporate
decision, maximizing the market value of the firm (MVF) that was meaningful given
the definition of the ADI system dynamics model. For our problem, we identified four
controllable variables (factors) which could be specified at three levels of performance.
This gave us a space of 34=81 possible configurations of factor-levels - our entire
solution space. We also identified three uncontrollable variables, which we specified at
2 levels of performance. This gave us a space of 2 3=8 uncontrollable factor-level
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722.43 M
535.85 M
349.27 M
162.69 M
configurations. To these eight environmental conditions we added the current
environment, giving us a total of nine environmental conditions. The size of the
outcome space is then 81*9=729 outcomes. For senior-executive decision-making this
is a very large space of outcomes to consider.
Our first task was to test the behavior of the ADI surrogate using our controllable and
uncontrollable factors. We tested the sensitivity of the dependent variable MVF against
each of the controllable and uncontrollable variable one at a time. We also tested the
sensitivity of the dependent variable MVF against ensemble configurations of
controllable and uncontrollable factor levels. The data from these tests suggest that our
controllable and uncontrollable variables influence the dependent variable MVF in the
direction that is consistent with our understanding of the problem. The outcomes of the
dependent variable MVF are also consistent with our understanding of the problem
under different environmental conditions. These tests suggest the existence of a non-
random causal linkage between the independent and dependent variables. Putting all
this together, we infer that the ADI surrogate has face validity.
Next we set out to determine whether there is support for the predictive power of the
controllable variables and whether there is support for our DOE-based decision analysis
method.
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6.0. MVF Decision-Analysis Using the Company Surrogate
6.1. Introduction
In chapter 5, we have shown that the controllable and uncontrollable variables do
influence the outcome of MVF when we use the ADI SD surrogate. However, we do
not have any data to support the predictive power of the controllable variables if we use
our DOE-based method. Nor do we have any data to support our belief that using our
DOE-based decision analysis method we will be able to find a treatment that yields the
maximum MVF. Nor do we have any evidence that the results, from different
experimental designs*, but for the same treatment, are consistent or are so widely
divergent that they are not meaningful. And we do not have any evidence that any
results produced are statistically meaningful. We address these questions in this chapter
using our DOE-based decision analysis method for the ADI corporate objective of
MVF. (Recall that MVF is measured in monetary units of $M).
6.2. Protocol for testing
As a testing protocol for our DOE-based decision analysis method, we use a progression
of DOE experimental designs, from the most complex to the simplest (Table 6.1).
Table 6.1. Progression of experiments for DOE testing
experimental design complexity
L81(34,23+1) full factorial high
4-1 3
7(3,2 +1) high resolution medium
L9(3,2 3+1) low resolution simple
AOFAT adaptive hill-climbing very simple
We begin with the full factorial design of controllable factors and the full factorial of
uncontrollable factors, i.e., L81(34 ,23+1). We use this as the "gold standard" for our
other experimental designs. High resolution means that we will be able to analyze the
data for the presence, as well as, statistical significance of the interactions of the
controllable variables. Low resolution means that the interaction effects confound the
main effects and the interaction effects cannot be obtained. The Adaptive One-Factor-
At-A-Time (AOFAT) is Frey's (2003a, 2003b) hill-climbing approach.
* We refer to all the treatments within a designated array structure as an experimental design.
Different array structures represent distinct experimental designs.
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What are we trying to learn by proceeding in this sequence? And why is it important?
We want to find out what is the simplest experiment we can perform that will give us
sufficient data for a decision. The simplest experiment is important because experiments
are costly. The kind of experiments we are proposing to study - decisions for corporate
problems - are very expensive. They are expensive because they require corporate staffs
to collect data and perform analysis, experts to review, and management time to
evaluate. The simpler the experiment, the smaller the cost incurred. We start with the
full-factorial experiment because this gives us the outcomes over the entire solution
space and under all the potential uncontrollable environmental conditions. We use these
results as our "gold standard" against which we will compare the results obtained from
simpler experiments. And if the simpler tests yield sufficiently close results, then we
can conclude that a simpler experiment will suffice. Naturally, more complex
experiments produce more data. We would like to know what additional insights we
may gain from more complex experiments.
6.3. L81(34,2 3+1) Data Set
The data set is in Appendix 6.1 for the time period t=12, i.e. 12 months out. The data
sets for t=1 8, and t=24 are available on request. Since this is the full factorial space, we
are able to find, by inspection, the treatment for which MVF reaches its maximum. The
L81(34 ,23+1) maxima for the three time periods ending at t=12, 18, 24 are in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2. L81(3 4,23+1) maximum MVF for t=12, 18, and 24.
L8 1 (34,23+1)
period max treatment MVF by inspection
t=12 1,3,1,3 $ 870.09 M
t=18 11,3111,3 $ 970.82M
t=24 1,3,1,3 $ 820.73 M
Table 6.3 is the ANOVA table for L81(34,23+1) at t=12. All the controllable variables
are statistically significant with p=0.000. There are three 2-factor interactions (2-fl) and
one 3-factor interaction (3-fi). They all have p<0.05. This experimental design exhibits
the properties of hierarchy, sparsity, and heredity (Wu and Hamada 2000, Frey and Li
2004). The interactions are 0.59% of the total Adj. MS. This shows that although 2-fi
and 3-fi are present, their contribution to the outcome is small. Figure 6.1 is a plot of
the residuals. Although the residuals have zero mean, the distribution is not normal due
to the presence of outliers. Upon their removal, we get residuals that are much closer to
normal (We show this in Appendix 6.2). This shows that the DOE model is still noisy
and an imperfect representation of the business process. However, as we shall show in
the subsequent sections of this chapter, the L2 7 and L9 models behave more "regularly",
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i.e. their residuals are normal N(O,a). In all subsequent analyses, we do not remove
outliers for we prefer to work without modifications of the original data set.
Table 6.3. L81(34,23 +1) ANOVA for MVF for t=12.
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 1623 1623 812 52.61 0.000
yield 2 63350 63350 31675 2053.25 0.000
cogs 2 62825 62825 31413 2036.26 0.000
price 2 168603 168603 84301 5464.65 0.000
yield*cogs 4 1340 1340 335 21.72 0.000
yield*price 4 901 901 225 14.61 0.000
cogs*price 4 556 556 139 9.01 0.000
yield*cogs*price 8 263 263 33 2.13 0.049
Error 52 802 802 15
Total 80 300263
S = 3.92768 R-Sq = 99.73% R-Sq(adj) = 99.59%
Histogram of L81 ANOVA model t=12 with 4 interactions
Normal
70- Mean 3.228145E-14
StDev 3.167
60- N 81
50-
40-
2 30-
20-
10-
0 =F
-20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 1'0
Figure 6.1. L81(34,23+1) residuals of ANOVA of MVF for t=12.
We summarize our findings of the ANOVA statistics for each of the time periods
ending at t=12, 18, and 24 in Table 6.4 (details are presented in Appendix 6.2). All the
controllable variables are strong predictors of the outcome of MVF; they all have
p<<0.05. In Table 6.5 we show summary statistics about the interactions. We have three
2-factor interactions (2-fi) and one 3-factor interaction (3-fi) that are statistically
significant with p<<0.05. Although the interactions become stronger for t>12, their
collective contribution to the MVF outcome remains consistently small.
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Table 6.4. L81(3 42 3+1) summary for MVF for t=12, 18, 24.
L81(34,23+1)
t=2t=-18 t=24factors
Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
R&D 812 0.000 5018 0.000 10162 0.000
yield 31675 0.000 41267 0.000 31544 0.000
COGS 31413 0.000 44334 0.000 33024 0.000
product price 84301 0.000 137643 0.000 123712 0.000
yield*COGS 335 0.000 2356 0.000 6495 0.000
yield*price 225 0.000 2021 0.000 6161 0.000
COGS*price 139 0.000 1623 000 5743 0.000
yield*COGS*price 33 0.049 326 0.000 1030 0.000
error 15 - 4 - 5 -
total 148948 - 234592 - 217876 -
Table 6.5. L81(3 42 3+1) interactions for MVF for t=12, 18, 24.
L8 1(34,23+1)
three 2-factor & t=12 t=18 t=24
one 3-factor
interactions adj. MS % of total adj. MS % of total adj. MS % of total
total interactions 732 0.59% 6326 2.7 % 19429 8.9 %
The collective contributions of the interactions increase with time although they remain
small (Table 6.5). We posit that the explanation lies in the complex system behavior of
ADI. One of the hallmarks of complex systems is that the aggregate of stocks and flows
determine the behavior of the system (e.g. Sterman 2000). The presence of stocks
creates delays and smoothes the responses of the system variables. They are like springs
and capacitors in physical systems. The empirical data of the interactions of our
experiment suggests this is the phenomenon of the increasing contribution of the
interactions. For example, between yield and price there are a set of complex causal
relations involving stocks and flows. We illustrate this below. There are many more
paths than shown that include many more variables. But we limit ourselves to a single
chain of events to simplify the illustration. (x->y indicates y-f(x))
yield->M Cost of Work of Finished Good-+M Cost of Goods Sold-
->Cost of Goods Sold->Total per Unit Cost->
->Perceived Total Per Unit Cost->Target Price->Price.
Between yield and price there are three stocks, which contribute to the delay of the
interactions, but which are revealed as time rolls forward.
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Findings
- All the controllable variables are strong predictors of the MVF outcome.
They all have p<<0.05.
- The 2-fi and 3-fi are present. They are strong predictors of the outcomes.
2-fi have p<<0.005 and 3-fi have p<0.05.
The collective contribution of the interactions to the outcome is small.
- The experiment exhibits the properties of hierarchy, sparsity, and inheritance.
The data for the controllable variables vis d vis MVF suggest they are strong predictors
of the MVF outcome. We ask whether the same is true for the uncontrollable variables.
We "rotate" the inner and outer arrays of the L81(34 ,23+1); we make the outer array the
"inner array" and make the inner array the "outer array." The ANOVA table for that
construct is shown in Table 6.6. We note that all the uncontrollable variables have
p<<0.05. The residuals are plotted in Figure 6.2, they have a mean of zero and the
distribution is normal.
Table 6.6. Rotated L81(34,23 +1) for MVF for t=12
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 1463 1463 1463 17.08 0.014
ADI orders 1 65794 65794 65794 768.54 0.000
Competitor 1 15146 15146 15146 176.92 0.000
Error 4 342 342 86
Total 7 82745
S = 9.25250 R-Sq = 99.59% R-Sq(adj) = 99.28%
residuals of ANOVA L81 uncontrollables t=12
Normal
Mean 4.263256E-14
95 StDev 6.994
N 8
90 AD 0.331
80- P-Vakue 0.417
70-
C 60-
sou 50 - .......
40-
30-
20-
10-
5-
-20 -10 0 10 20
Figure 6.2. Rotated L81(34,23+1) residuals of MVF for t=12.
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We summarize our findings for the ANOVA statistics for each of the time periods
ending at t=12, 18, and 24 (Table 6.7). The complete ANOVA tables for the time
periods t=18 and t=24 are in Appendix 6.3.
Table 6.7. L8 1(34,23+1) summary for MVF for t=12, 18, 24.
Rotated L8 1(34,23+1)
t= 12 t=18 t=24factors
Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
Long term growth 1463 0.000 12879 0.001 29601 0.001
ADI orders 65794 0.000 171615 0.000 168167 0.000
compet.
attactiveness 15146 0.014 63637 0.000 89059 0.000
error 86 - 214 - 491 -
total 83489 248345 - 287318
Findings
All uncontrollable variables have p<<0.05 and exert a strong influence
on the outcome of MVF.
Summary of the L81(3 423 +1) testing
We populated the full factorial L81 orthogonal array using a full factorial noise array to
be able to address the uncertain environments of the decision. We are able to find by
inspection the maximum MVF for each of the time periods ending at t=12, 18, and 24
(Table 6.2). We analyzed the L81 arrays for the time periods of t=12, 18, and 24. The
ANOVA tables for both the controllable variables and uncontrollable variables support
our belief that they are predictors of the output of MVF in all three time periods (e.g.
Tables 6.4 and 6.7). The data indicate that 2-fi and 3-fi of the controllable variables are
present and statistically significant, but collectively they contribute a small percentage
to the outcome of MVF (table 6.5). We discern from Table 6.4 that the experiments
using the L81 design exhibit the properties of hierarchy, sparsity, and inheritance. With
these results, we have our gold standard for the rest of our experiments.
6.4. L 27(34-1 2 3+1) Data Set
The data set for L27(3 4-1 ,23+1) for t=12 is in Appendix 6.4 and the orthogonal array
L 27(3 4-1 ,2 3+1) is in Appendix 6.5. (The data sets for t=12, 18 and 24 are available on
request). The L27(3 4-1 ,2 3+1) orthogonal arrays give us enough dof's to address 2-fi
(Appendix 6.6). We need to answer whether the controllable variables are statistically
significant predictors of the output. To address this, we turn our attention to the
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ANOVA table for L27(3' -,2 +1) (Table 6.8). All variables are strong predictors of the
outcome of MVF with p<<0.05. The most significant 2-fi relative to the other
interactions is yield*cogs with p<0.08. Its contribution to the outcome MVF is 0.25%.
The residuals are N(0,5) with p>>0.05 (Figure 6.3).
Table 6.8. L27(34 1 ,2+1) ANOVA for MVF for t=12.
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 712 712 356 8.63 0.003
yield 2 21686 21686 10843 262.82 0.000
cogs 2 20733 20733 10367 251.28 0.000
price 2 58059 58059 29030 703.65 0.000
yield*cogs 2 257 257 128 3.11 0.072
Error 16 660 660 41
Total 26 102107
S = 6.42305 R-Sq = 99.35% R-Sq(adj) = 98.95%
Residuals of ANOVA for MVF with 1 interaction t=12
Normal
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Figure 6.3. L27(34- 23+1) residuals of ANOVA of MVF for t=12.
Table 6.9 is a summary of the ANOVA statistics for each of the time periods ending at
t=12, 18, and 24. All factors are strong predictors of the outcome of MVF with p<<0.05
except for R&D at t=24. We have only one 2-fi and it has p>0.05 at t=12, 18, and 24.
Table 6.10 presents the summary statistics about the interactions and it shows their
contribution to be small and can, therefore, be ignored.
93
Table 6.9. L27(34-1 ,23+1) summary for MVF for t=12, 18, 24.
L27(3 4- ,2+1)
t=12 t=18 t=24
factors
Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
R&D 356 0.003 2279 0.019 4599 0.065
yield 10843 0.000 102 0.000 10383 0.005
COGS 10367 0.000 14605 0.000 11053 0.004
product price 29030 0.000 46417 0.000 41335 0.000
yield*COGS 128 0.072 871 0.171 2402 0.213
error 41 - 441 - 1409 -
total 50765 - 78695 - 71181
Table 6.10. L27(3 4- ,2 3+1) interactions for MVF for t=12, 18, 24.
most t=12 t=18 t=24
significant 2-fi Adj. MS % of total Adj. MS % of total Adj. MS % of total
yield*COGS 128 0.25 % 871 1.1 % 2402 3.4 %
Findings
- All the controllable variables are strong predictors of the MVF outcome,
with one exception at t=24 for R&D with p=0.65.
- L27 reveals only one 2-fi, which is not statistically significant.
- The L27 experiment exhibits the property of sparsity.
Using our L27(3 41 ,2 3+1) response tables, we can design the treatment that yields the
maximum MVF and derive its value. Table 6.11 shows the response tables for t=12.
The tables for t=1 8 and t=24 are in Appendix 6.7
Table 6.11. L27(341 ,23+1) response table for MVF and stdev for t=12.
Response Table for Means t=12 Response Table for Std Deviations
Level r&d yield cogs price Level r&d yield cogs price
1 760.4 719.3 787.3 693.7 1 104.2 101.5 104.8 100.2
2 753.3 753.5 754.7 761.3 2 103.1 103.4 103.4 103.0
3 747.8 788.7 719.5 806.5 3 101.8 104.3 101.0 105.9
Delta 12.5 69.4 67.9 112.8 Delta 2.3 2.8 3.8 5.8
Rank 4 2 3 1 Rank 4 3 2 1
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Figure 6.4. L 27(3 4-1 ,23+1) plots for response and stdev for MVF for t=12.
The left panel of Table 6.11 shows the main effects for MVF, the right panel shows the
response table for standard deviations. These are shown in graphical form in Figure 6.4
for t=12. (t=18 and t=24 are in Appendix 6.8.) "Delta" is the difference between the
highest and lowest responses for a given variable. "Rank" is an ordering of the variables
by Delta; therefore Rank identifies the variable that has the highest leverage on the
output. Inspection of the LHS of Table 6.11 and the LHS of Figure 6.4 reveals that
product price is the dominant contributing factor to MVF; it has rank 1. From the LHS
panel of Figure 6.4, we deduce that treatment (1,3,1,3) produces the highest MVF, i.e.
R&D at level 1 (lower R&D budget), yield at level 3 (highest), product cost (COGS) at
level 1 (lowest), and highest product price at level 3. Inspection of the RHS of Figure
6.4 shows that stdev moves in the same direction as the MVF effects. Product price has
the highest leverage (rank 1) on MVF and stdev. At level 3, it also contributes the most
to MVF variation since it has the highest stdev.
The maxima for the three time periods are shown in Table 6.12 where we also show a
comparison of the derived values for (1,3,1,3) MVF from the L27(34 - ,23+1) versus the
values from our "gold standard" the L81(3 423 +1). We note that the I%Aj L27 vs. L8 1 are
small, with an average of 3.3%.
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Table 6.12. MVF for t=12, 18, and 24, L2 7 vs. L8 1.
L27(3_~ _3+2 ) L81(34 23 +1 I
period Firm Firm L27 vs. L8 1
max treatment Market-Value Market-Value Firm Market-
derived values by inspection Value
t=12 1,3,13 $ 881 M $ 870M %
t=18 11,391,3 $ 1003 M $ 971 M 3 %
t=24 1,3,1,3 $ 877M $821M 6%
average 3.3%
Findings
- Using the L27(34-,23 +1) we are able to design the treatment that yields
the maximum MVF. The resulting treatment is identical to the one
revealed by L81 full factorial array.
- The derived values for maximum MVF designed from L27 are very close
to the actual values from our gold standard of the LgI full factorial array.
The data for the controllable variables vis a vis MVF support construct validity, i.e.
they are strong predictors of the outcome. As before, we ask whether the same is true
for the uncontrollable variables. Again, we "rotate" the inner and outer arrays of the
L2 7(34-1,2 3 +1) and make the outer array the "inner array" and make the inner array the
"outer array." The ANOVA table for that construct is shown in Table 6.13. We note
that all the uncontrollable variables have p<0.015 and that the residuals are N(0,7) and
p>>0.05 (Figure 6.5).
Table 6.13. Rotated L27(34- 1,23+1) MVF for t=12 for uncontrollable variables.
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 1453 1453 1453 17.32 0.014
ADI orders 1 65810 65810 65810 784.12 0.000
Competitor 1 15109 15109 15109 180.02 0.000
Error 4 336 336 84
Total 7 82708
S = 9.16124 R-Sq = 99.59% R-Sq(adj) = 99.29%
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Figure 6.5. Rotated L27(34 1,23 +1) residuals ANOVA of MVF for t=12 for
uncontrollable variables.
We summarize our findings for the ANOVA statistics for the uncontrollable variables
for t=12, 18, and 24 in Table 6.14. The data for t=18 and t=24 are in Appendix 6.9.
Table 6.14. L27(34 1,23 +1) MVF for t=12, 18, 24.
Rotated L27(34 1,23 +1)
t=12 t=18 t=24
factors
Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
Long term growth 1453 0.014 12831 0.001 29440 0.001
ADI orders 65810 0.000 171516 0.000 168536 0.000
compet.
ctven 15109 0.000 63468 0.000 89094 0.000
attractiveness
error 336 - 214 - 484
total 82708 248029 - 287554 -
Findings
All the p values of the uncontrollable variables indicate they are strong
predictors of the outcome of MVF with p<<0.05.
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Summary of the L27(34- 1,23+1) testing
We populated the L27(34-1,23+1) orthogonal array using a full factorial noise array to be
able to address the uncertain environments. We analyzed the L27 arrays at t=12, 18, and
24. The ANOVA statistics for both the controllable variables and the uncontrollable
variables support our belief that they are strong predictors of the output of MVF in all
three time periods (e.g. Tables 6.9 and 6.14), except for R&D at t=24. The data indicate
the presence of only one 2-fi for the controllable variables with p>0.05. It contributes a
small percentage to the outcome of MVF (Table 6.10). We are able to design the
treatment that yields the maximum MVF for each of the time periods of t=12, 18, and
24 (Table 6.12). Significantly, using the L27(34- ,23+1), the treatment that yields the
maximum MVF is identical to the one revealed by the L81 full factorial array. Moreover,
the derived values for maximum MVF from L27 are very close (Table 6.12) to the actual
values from L8 1 full factorial array, our gold standard.
6.5. L9(34-2 23 +1) Data Set
This section follows the same approach of section 6.4 for the L2 7 analysis. The data set
for t=12 is shown in Appendix 6.10. (The entire data set for t=12, 18, and 24 is
available on request). The L9 (3 4-2 3+1) is the simplest orthogonal array. Recall that
simpler experiments are of great interest to us because the simpler the experiment, the
lower its cost and the easier to perform. Therefore, we want to know whether analysis
of the L9(3 4- 2 3+1) will continue to support the predictive power of the controllable
variables we specified. An L9 array does not have enough dof's to obtain the F statistic
and therefore the p values of all four controllable variables. Therefore, we add two
treatments our L9(3 4-,2 3+1) array as shown in Appendix 6.10. We identify this new
array as L' 9(34-2 ,23+1), i.e. and L9(3 4-,2 3+1) that has been extended by two treatments.
To address this question, we turn our attention to the ANOVA table for L' 9(34- 2,2 3+1)
(Table 6.15). We note that all factors are strong predictors of MVF with p<0.05. Since
this is a low-resolution model, we are unable to find the interactions. The residuals are
N(0,1.7) with p>>0.05 (Figure 6.6).
Table 6.15. L'9(34-2 2 3 +1) ANOVA for MVF for t=12.
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 368.7 550.0 275.0 20.03 0.048
yield 2 4822.6 5349.4 2674.7 194.78 0.005
COGS 2 6100.8 8380.6 4190.3 305.15 0.003
price 2 21098.0 21098.0 10549.0 768.21 0.001
Error 2 27.5 27.5 13.7
Total 10 32417.5
S 3.70567 R-Sq =99.92% R-Sq(adj) =99.58%
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Figure 6.6. L' 9(34- 2 3+1) residuals of ANOVA of MVF for t=12.
We summarize our findings for the ANOVA statistics for each of the time periods
ending at t=12, 18, and 24 (Table 6.16). Details are in Appendix 6.11.
Table 6.16. L' 9(34 -2 3+1) summary for MVF for t=12, 18, 24.
L9(3 4- 2 3+1)
t=12 t=18 t=24factors
_ actors _Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
R&D 275 0.048 1888 0.052 4591 0.075
yield 2675 0.005 3240 0.031 2185 0.146
COGS 4190 0.003 6547 0.016 7128 0.050
product price 10549 0.001 15931 0.006 13759 0.026
error 13.7 - 104.1 - 374 -
total 17703 - 27710 - 28037 -
Findings
- All the p values of the controllable variables indicate they are strong
predictors of the outcome MVF with two exceptions at t=24 with R&D
and yield with p=0.075 and p=O.15 respectively.
The response tables* for t=1 2 are shown in Table 6.17. Those for t=1 8 and t=24 are in
Appendix 6.12.
* We now revert to our L9(34- 2 ,23+1) and do not use L' 9(34- 2 ,23+1) any longer.
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Table 6.17. L9(34- 2 ,23+1) response table for MVF and stdev for t=12.
Response Table-Means Response Table- St Deviations
Level r&d yield cogs price Level r&d yield cogs price
1 759.7 720.9 782.6 690.7 1 105.1 102.0 104.2 98.8
2 746.4 749.4 753.4 753.4 2 100.8 100.2 104.4 101.9
3 742.0 777.9 712.1 804.0 3 101.2 104.8 98.3 106.3
Delta 17.8 57.0 70.6 113.3 Delta 4.32 4.63 6.11 7.52
Rank 4 3 2 1 Rank 4 3 2 1
The LHS of Table 6.17 shows the main effects for MVF, the RHS shows the response
table for standard deviations. These numerical data are shown in graphical form in
Figure 6.7 for t=12 where we show a few sample values. (For t=18 and t=24 are in
Appendix 6.13.). We summarize our results from the L9(34- 2,23+1) analysis and make a
comparison relative to our "gold standard" L81 (Table 6.18).
main effects t=12
r&d yield
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Figure 6.7. L9(34-2 23+1),) plots for response and stdev for MVF for t=12
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Table 6.18. MVF for t=12, 18, and 24, L9 vs. L27 and L81.
Market Value of the Firm (MVF)
L27(3 2 L81(34,23+1) L9(34 2 ,23+ j%Al I%A
max derived by derived L27 v L8 1  L9 v. L81
treatment values inspection values
t=12 1,3,1,3 $ 881 M $ 870 M $876 1% 1%
t-18 1,3,1,3 $ 1003 M $ 971 M $1005 3% 4%
t=24 1,3,1,3 $ 877. M $ 821 M $826 7% 1 %
We have shown that using our L9(3 -,23+1), our controllable variables are strong
predictors of the outcome of MVF, except for t=24 for R&D (p=0.075) and yield
(p=0.146). Relative to our gold standard of L81, with a mean absolute error (MAE) of
2% for the derived outputs from our L9(34-2,23+1
Findings
- Using the L9(342,23+1) we are able to design the decision (treatment) that
yields the maximum MVF. The treatment is identical to the one revealed
by the L81 full factorial array and derived from our L27 array.
- The derived values for maximum MVF from L9 are very close to the
actual values from L81 full factorial array and L27 array.
It is appropriate to ask whether the uncontrollable variables in our L9(3 4-2,23+ array
are also statistically significant and therefore influence the outcome of MVF. As before,
we swap the inner and outer arrays of L9(34- 2 ,23+1) and obtain the ANOVA table below
(Table 6.19). We note that all the uncontrollable variables have p<<0.0.5 and the
residual is N(0,7.2) with p>>0.05 (Figure 6.8).
Table 6.19. Rotated L27(34 1,23+1) for MVF for t=12, 18, 24.
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 1404 1404 1404 15.54 0.017
ADI orders 1 65002 65002 65002 719.43 0.000
Competitor 1 14657 14657 14657 162.22 0.000
Error 4 361 361 90
Total 7 81425
S = 9.50540 R-Sq = 99.56% R-Sq(adj) = 99.22%
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Figure 6.8. Rotated L9(34-2 23+1) residuals ANOVA of MVF for t=12.
We summarize our findings of the ANOVA statistics for each of the time periods
ending at t=12, 18, and 24 (Table 6.20). The data for t=18 and t=24 are in Appendix
6.13.
Table 6.20. L9 (34-2 23+1) summary for MVF for t=12, 18, 24.
Rotated L27(34- 1,23 +1)
t=12 t=18 t=24
factors
Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
Long term growth 1404 0.017 13177 0.002 30330 0.002
ADI orders 65002 0.000 1715 0.000 16996 0.000
compet.
attactvenss14657 0.000 621 0.000 896 0.0attractiveness
error 90 - 230 - 529 -
total 81153 -. 248413 - 289317 -
Findings
All the p values of the uncontrollable variables indicate they are strong
predictors of the outcome of MVF.
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Summary of the L 9 (3 4-2 23+1) testing
We populated the L9(34- 2 ,23+1) orthogonal array using a full factorial noise array to be
able to address the uncertain environments of the decision. We analyzed these L9 arrays
for the time periods ending at t=12, 18, and 24. The ANOVA tables for both the
controllable variables and uncontrollable variables support our belief that they are
predictors of the output of MVF in all three time periods (Table 6.16), except for R&D
and yield for t=24. Since we do not have enough dof's in our orthogonal array, we are
unable to determine the interactions. Although we know they confound the main effects,
we do not know the extent to which they do. But the data show that the MAE is small
relative to our gold standard of L81. For decision-making, we are able to design the
decision (treatment) that yields the maximum MVF for the time periods of t=12, 18, and
24 (Table 6.18). Significantly, using the L9(34- 2 ,23+1), the treatment that yields the
maximum MVF is identical to the one revealed by the L81 arrays. Moreover, the derived
values for maximum MVF from L9 are very close to the actual values from L81 full
factorial array (MAE of 2%), as well as, from L27(3 4 ,23+1) (MAE of 2%).
Adaptive One-Factor-At-A-Time
We try Frey's (Frey 2003a, 2003b) Adaptive One-Factor-At-a-Time (AOFAT)
procedure to find the treatment that will produce a maximum MVF. We first apply the
AOFAT procedure on our L81 and identify the entries by inspection. We begin with
BA U (2,2,2,2). Why? AOFAT is a hill-climbing process. By starting with BAU, we
hope to improve our position. The procedure is as follows:
- "begin with a baseline set of factors levels and measure the response.
" For each experimental factor in turn change the factor to each of its levels that
have yet been tested, keeping all other experimental factors constant (Frey
2003b)."
- Repeat until done.
We then apply the procedure and derive the MVF for the treatments using our L27 and
L9 orthogonal arrays. The results from the AOFAT procedure are shown in Table 6.20
on the next page. The results for L27 and L9 are in Appendix 6.14. We find that by
inspection, and by AOFAT using our L2 7 and L9 arrays, we reach the same maximum
treatment of (1,3,1,3) for t=12, 18, and 24 (Table 6.21). Moreover the derived values
for MVF are close to those from the L81 and L27 (Table 6.21).
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Table 6.20. AOFAT for MVF for t=12, 18, 24.
treatment t=12 treatment t=18 treatment t=24
2,2,2,2 761.94 2,2,2,2 866.64 2,2,2,2 769.42
2,2,2,3 775.04 2,2,2,3 910.66 2,2,2,3 794.77
2,2,2,1 695.45 2,2,'2,1 781.08 2,2,2,1 685.58
2,2,1,3 835.98 2,2,1,3 936.28 2,2,1,3 801.28
2,2,3,3 775.04 2,2,3,3 881.58 2,2,3,3 783.23
2,3,1,3 864 2,3,1,3 915.91 2,3,1,3 797.3
2,1,1,3 810.61 2,1,1,3 957.05 2,1,1,3 804.09
1,3,1,3 870.09 1,3,1,3 970.82 1,3,1,3 820.73
3,3,1,3 858.04 3,3,1,3 944.7 3,3,1,3 790.49
Table 6.21. MVF for t=12, 18, and 24. L9, L2 7 and L8 1 comparisons.
L81(34,23 +1) L27 L9
max AOFAT AOFAT
treatment MVF by MVF MVF L27 vs. L8 i L9 vs. L27
inspection AOFAT AOFAT MVF MVF
t=12 1,3,1,3 $ 870 M $ 881 M $ 876 M 1% 1%
t=18 1,3,1,3 $ 971 M $ 1003M $1005M 3% 4%
t=24 1,3,1,3 $ 821 M $ 877M $895M 6% 9%
avg 33% avg 2%
Findings
- AOFAT procedure using derived MVF from our orthogonal arrays of
L27 and L 9 find the same treatment for the maximum MVF in all time
periods of t=12, 18, and 24.
- The derived values for MVF using the L27 and L9 are close.
Summary of the AOFAT testing
We ran the AOFAT procedure using derived values from our L27 and L9 orthogonal
arrays to find the maximum MVF at t=12, 18, and 24. We find that the OFAT approach
finds the same treatment that is revealed by the full-factorial L81. Moreover, the derived
values are close to those from our gold standard of L81.
6.6. Summary
Macroscopic behavior of physical systems can be described or determined by only a
few relevant parameters. It is not always necessary to describe the behavior is terms of
the finest scale. Y. Bar-Yam
* Y. Bar-Yam is president and founder of the New England Complex Systems Institute (NECSI).
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In our previous chapter, we tested the behavior of the ADI surrogate using our
controllable and uncontrollable factors. These tests suggest the existence of a non-
random causal linkage between the independent and dependent variables. Putting all
this together, we inferred that the ADI surrogate has face validity.
The objective of this chapter has been to determine whether there is support for our
DOE-based decision analysis method for the ADI corporate problem of maximizing the
value of the firm (MVF). To that end we proceeded through a progressive series of tests
using L81, L27 , L9 orthogonal arrays, and Frey's AOFAT procedure. We use this
sequence of tests because we want to find the simplest experiment we can perform that
will give us sufficient data for a decision. Simple is important because experiments are
costly. And the corporate problems we intend to study are expensive. They are costly
because they require corporate staffs to collect data and perform analysis, experts to
review, and management time to evaluate. The simpler the experiment, the smaller the
cost incurred. We start with the full-factorial experiment L81 and used its results for our
"gold standard" against which we compared the results obtained from simpler
experiments. We would like to know what additional insights we may gain from more
effort so that we may judge whether the cost justifies the additional insights effort
obtained. To draw comparisons, we used the L27 and the L9, which are high resolution
and a low resolution arrays respectively. Table 6.22 presents the results from our three
experimental designs. The data suggest that our variables have good explanatory power
(high R2) and are also strong predictors (p<<0.05 except for few exceptions at t=24) of
the outcome of MVF. We note that with the more complicated designs L81 and L27, the
interactions are revealed with greater clarity.
Table 6.22. Controllable factors explanatory and predictive power t=12, 18, 24
controllable factors' p values for MVF
L81  L27 L9
t=12 t=18 t=24 t=12 t=18 t=24 t=12 t=18 t=24
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.019 0.065 0.048 0.052 0.075
yield 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.031 0.146
COGS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.050
prod. price 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.026
yield*COGS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.171 0.213 - -
yield*price 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - -
COGS*price 0.000 0.000 0.000 - - - - -
yield*COGS* 0.049 0.000 0.000 - - - - - -
price
R2% _ 99 99 99 99 95 86 99 99 99
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Table 6.23. % contribution of interactions to MVF.
% contribution of interactions to the outcome of MYF
L81 L27 L9
t=12 t=18 t=24 t=12 t=18 t=24 t=12 t=18 t=24
interactions 0.5% 2.7% 8.9% 0.25% 1.1 % 3.4 % - - -
We also tested the statistical significance of the uncontrollable variables on our outcome
of MVF (Table 6.24) using our L81, L2 7 ,L9 arrays. The data indicate that the
uncontrollable variables do create uncertain environmental conditions that have a strong
influence on the outcome of MVF.
Table 6.24. p values for uncontrollable variables to MVF for t=12, 18, 24
controllable factors' p values
t=12 t=18 t=24 t=12 t=18 t=24 t=12 t=18 t=24
ind. demand 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.002 0.002
ADI orders 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.016 0.050
competit'ness 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.026
The data from these analyses suggest that the controllable and uncontrollable have
strong predictive power on MVF. By inspection, our L81 reveals the treatment for the
maximum MVF at each of the time periods of t=12, 18, and 24. With our L27 and L9
orthogonal arrays, we design the decisions (treatments) for maximum MVF. The
designs are identical as the one revealed by our L81. Moreover, the derived values are
close to the gold standard (Table 6.25) as shown by the modest MAE.
Table 6.25. MVF for t=12, 18, and 24, OFAT L9 vs. L2 7 and L8 1.
4 3 AOFAT AOFAT I %AI
mx L 1 (3,) 27 L AOFAT L2 7  AOFAT L9max __________________
treatment MVF by MVF MVF v L81 v
MMVF
inspection AOFAT AOFAT
t=12 1,3,1,3 $ 870 M $ 881 M $876M1%%
t=18 3 13 $971M $1003M $1005M 3% 4%
t=24 1,3,1,3 $ 821 M $ 877 M $ 895 M 6% 9%
3.3% 2%
MAE
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We infer that:
- The system dynamics model of ADI is a valid company surrogate for the decision-
analysis situation described in the previous chapter.
" Our controllable and uncontrollable variables have strong explanatory and predictive
power for our outcome of Market Value of the Firm (MVF).
- At the scale of our decision analysis, the interactions among the controllable variables
are small.
- From a very small sample (L9) of the entire solution space, we can design a decision
that yields the maximum outcome from the entire solution space, and with a larger
sample (L27) we can also find the influence of the one 2-fi, which is small.
- The outcomes can be analyzed over the entire uncertainty space.
- The Adaptive One-Factor-At-A-Time method is economical and efficient in finding a
treatment that yields a maximum outcome.
The data from our ADI-surrogate simulations of our MVF corporate decision suggest
there is support for our DOE-based method for decision analysis. Our method is able to
parameterize the system behavior of the corporation for the MVF outcome. It is also
able to parameterize the set of uncontrollable uncertainties it faces. Therefore, using our
DOE-based method, we can explore the entire solution space over the entire space of
environmental uncertainty. The data show that the interactions are small and their
contribution to the outcome is small. Therefore the data show that system behavior of
the corporation for the MVF outcome is "nearly-decomposable" (Simon 1997) at our
scale of analysis (Bar-Yam 1997), which says that we can represent that emergent
system behavior with a linear model. Simon (1997) writes that "If we are interested
only in certain aggregated aspects of behavior, it may be that we can predict those
aggregates by use of an appropriately aggregated model." And that "the dynamic
behavior of a nearly-decomposable system can be analysed without examining
simultaneously all the interactions of the elementary parts (Simon 1997)." Bar-Yam
(1997, 2003, 2004) makes a similar argument, that by looking at complex systems at the
appropriate scale, i.e. at a level where the descriptions are self-consistent, "the wealth of
behavior [of lower level objects] is not relevant at the larger scale." Bar-Yam makes
what is in our opinion a very insightful observation: "The existence of multiple levels
implies that simplicity can also be an emergent property. This means that the collective
behavior of many elementary parts can behave simply on a much larger scale (Bar-Yam
1997)." He writes: "The central point is: When the independence of the components is
reduced, scale of behavior is increased."
Next chapter, we try the same approach for a different outcome to determine whether
the findings will continue to support these inferences. Subsequent chapters will present
two field experiments with companies where we bring to bear our method to actual
company decisions.
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Appendix 6.1. L81(3 4,23+1) MVF data set for t=12.
FIRM VALUE $M
uncontrollable variables
same lower lower lower lower higher higher higher higher
stronge stronge stronge stronge
same weaker weaker r r weaker weaker r r
stronge stronge stronge stronge
same weaker r weaker r weaker r weaker r
current 000 001 010 011
current ... worstcase
644.3
715.2
756.8
599.8
678.8
724.4
554.2
635.5
689.9
675.1
740.1
780.5
638.1
709.7
751.2
596.9
675.6
721.3
705.8
767.2
807.3
676.8
740.9
770.6
644.3
713.8
743.2
638.6
708.9
750.3
594.1
672.4
717.6
548.5
629.1
553.0
610.1
650.7
514.6
576.4
617.5
473.8
540.6
583.4
581.8
637.4
677.6
550.0
607.3
647.7
518.4
576.5
617.3
613.0
667.8
707.5
586.0
641.7
669.8
558.4
614.9
641.9
549.3
606.1
646.6
510.7
572.3
613.1
469.9
536.4
813.1
875.4
926.8
757.8
834.1
888.3
702.0
782.4
848.2
847.6
905.0
954.5
805.4
869.2
920.9
755.2
831.7
885.9
882.8
937.6
985.3
849.7
906.6
943.7
813.9
875.1
912.5
807.8
869.4
920.0
752.5
828.1
881.5
696.8
776.5
737.7
809.4
853.1
697.7
770.2
817.4
652.3
729.1
778.5
768.0
838.7
880.7
735.1
806.5
850.0
699.2
771.1
817.7
800.6
869.7
911.2
773.0
842.9
872.7
744.4
815.4
844.2
731.7
802.8
846.0
691.7
763.5
810.1
646.3
722.4
100 101 110 111
best
case
669.2
742.7
787.7
625.4
705.7
754.3
580.1
681.9
719.2
699.4
767.1
812.2
662.4
736.7
781.3
622.0
701.8
750.6
729.2
795.1
839.4
700.6
767.5
801.5
667.6
740.0
772.4
663.3
736.3
780.8
619.5
699.3
747.3
574.1
655.3
572.9
632.0
674.1
534.0
598.8
641.4
492.3
562.5
607.7
600.9
658.4
699.9
569.5
628.9
670.6
534.4
598.4
640.7
631.2
687.7
728.7
604.7
661.9
691.7
577.4
635.6
664.3
568.9
627.7
669.5
529.9
594.3
636.7
488.2
557.9
852.1
918.6
965.7
792.9
880.2
934.1
732.5
826.2
898.1
885.8
944.0
984.0
843.6
912.5
960.9
789.6
877.3
931.3
918.1
965.8
1003.
887.1
944.5
976.1
852.1
917.1
954.1
846.8
912.6
958.9
787.5
874.2
927.4
727.2
820.2
763.5
827.9
876.4
721.7
789.8
837.9
673.9
749.5
800.4
793.2
859.1
906.9
760.2
824.3
872.4
722.6
789.9
837.6
824.6
893.8
938.3
797.0
863.2
897.5
768.8
832.6
865.6
757.5
821.3
869.1
715.7
783.1
830.6
667.9
742.8
(-Industry demand
(-ADI orders
-Competitiveness
y-bar
705.8
772.2
817.0
660.8
735.7
783.1
612.8
694.9
747.3
736.1
799.0
842.2
700.8
767.8
812.5
660.1
734.3
781.5
767.3
828.0
870.1
739.0
801.4
833.2
708.5
773.9
805.5
700.5
766.4
810.6
655.4
729.7
776.6
607.4
686.7
108
C
1,1,1,1
1,1,1,2
1,1,1,3
1,1,2,1
1,1,2,2
1,1,2,3
1,1,3,1
1,1,3,2
1,1,3,3
1,2,1,1
1,2,1,2
1,2,1,3
1,2,2,1
1,2,2,2
1,2,2,3
1,2,3,1
1,2,3,2
1,2,3,3
1,3,1,1
1,3,1,2
1,3,1,3
1,3,2,1
1,3,2,2
1,3,2,3
1,3,3,1
1,3,3,2
1,3,3,3
2,1,1,11
2,1,1,2
2,1,1,3
2,1,2,1
2,1,2,2
2,1,2,3
2,1,3,1
2,1,3,2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
746.5
819.0
861.3
703.4
787.2
832.6
654.0
746.7
800.3
773.3
841.7
883.9
742.9
815.5
857.7
703.1
786.3
831.3
800.7
867.2
910.3
776.3
843.8
875.4
750.0
820.5
851.6
740.3
812.3
854.3
697.1
780.3
825.2
647.7
739.7
2,1,3,3
2,2,1,1
2,2,1,2
2,2,1,3
2,2,2,1
2,2,2,2
2,2,2,3
2,2,3,1
2,2,3,2
2,2,3,3
2,3,1,1
2,3,1,2
2,3,1,3
2,3,2,1
2,3,2,2
2,3,2,3
2,3,3,1
2,3,3,2
2,3,3,3
3,1,1,1
3,1,1,2
3,1,1,3
3,1,2,1
3,1,2,2
3,1,2,3
3,1,3,1
3,1,3,2
3,1,3,3
3,2,1,1
3,2,1,2
3,2,1,3
3.2.2.1
3.2.2.2
3.2.2.3
3,2,3,1
3,2,3,2
3,2,3,3
3,3,1,1
3,3,1,2
3,3,1,3
3,3,2,1
3,3,2,2
3,3,2,3
3,3,3,1
3,3,3,2
3,3,3,3
792.8
767.1
835.1
876.8
736.7
808.7
823.9
696.8
779.3
823.9
794.7
860.7
903.3
770.2
837.2
878.6
743.8
813.8
855.0
734.0
805.4
847.0
690.7
773.4
817.7
641.2
732.6
785.2
760.9
828.3
869.5
730.4
801.8
843.1
690.4
772.4
816.4
788.6
854.1
896.4
764.0
830.4
871.4
737.5
807.0
847.6
682.9
669.4
734.0
774.3
632.4
703.4
714.5
591.2
669.3
714.5
700.3
761.4
801.2
671.2
734.9
774.7
638.6
707.6
748.1
633.3
703.3
744.6
588.5
666.5
711.6
542.8
623.0
676.6
664.2
728.6
768.7
627.0
697.8
738.9
585.6
663.4
708.5
695.3
756.2
795.9
666.0
729.5
769.1
633.2
702.0
742.4
579.1
578.1
633.4
673.6
546.2
603.3
613.0
511.5
572.4
613.0
609.4
664.1
703.5
582.3
637.8
677.4
554.7
610.9
650.8
546.1
602.8
643.1
507.5
568.8
609.6
466.6
532.9
575.4
575.1
630.3
670.1
543.1
600.0
640.1
508.3
569.0
609.5
606.5
660.9
700.2
579.3
634.6
674.0
551.6
607.6
647.3
841.5
842.4
899.0
947.7
800.1
863.2
879.1
750.0
825.7
879.1
877.5
931.5
978.6
844.4
900.6
949.0
808.7
869.1
919.5
801.8
862.6
912.7
746.5
821.3
874.0
690.9
769.7
833.8
836.3
892.3
940.4
794.0
856.4
906.7
743.9
818.8
871.6
871.5
924.9
971.4
838.4
893.9
941.7
802.6
862.3
912.1
771.2
762.1
832.2
873.7
729.2
799.9
810.5
693.2
764.4
810.5
794.7
863.3
904.3
767.1
836.4
877.6
738.5
808.9
850.6
725.4
796.0
838.7
685.3
756.6
802.7
639.9
712.6
763.6
755.9
825.5
866.6
722.9
793.1
835.6
686.8
757.5
803.1
788.7
856.8
897.4
769.9
829.8
870.5
732.2
802.1
843.3
712.1
693.6
760.8
805.4
656.5
730.3
743.5
616.1
695.3
743.5
723.4
788.8
832.8
694.8
761.2
805.3
661.7
733.6
777.3
657.3
729.9
774.3
613.5
692.6
740.4
568.1
648.6
704.9
687.7
754.7
799.3
650.5
723.8
767.8
610.0
688.7
736.6
717.9
783.2
827.0
688.9
755.1
799.2
655.7
727.1
770.9
602.9
597.0
654.1
695.5
565.5
624.5
636.0
530.3
593.9
636.0
627.3
683.6
724.4
600.8
657.7
698.5
573.3
631.2
672.3
565.5
624.1
665.8
526.3
590.5
632.8
484.5
554.0
598.9
593.6
650.6
691.9
562.0
620.9
662.2
526.7
590.2
632.1
624.1
680.2
720.9
597.4
654.2
694.9
569.9
627.7
668.6
891.4
880.5
938.0
977.3
838.3
906.5
924.6
784.3
871.3
924.6
912.8
959.9
996.6
881.8
938.5
977.0
846.7
911.1
956.7
840.7
905.7
951.3
781.6
867.3
919.7
721.3
813.3
888.7
874.4
931.1
969.9
832.3
899.6
946.3
778.3
864.4
916.9
906.7
953.1
989.3
875.7
931.6
969.1
840.7
904.2
949.1
793.1
787.2
852.5
899.7
754.2
817.7
830.3
716.6
783.2
830.3
818.7
887.3
931.2
791.1
856.6
903.3
762.8
826.0
873.1
751.0
814.2
861.5
709.2
775.9
822.8
661.4
735.5
785.1
780.8
845.5
892.3
747.8
810.6
857.6
710.1
776.1
822.5
812.4
880.5
924.0
784.7
849.7
895.9
756.4
818.9
865.6
740.8
730.8
793.2
836.0
695.4
761.9
775.0
654.4
728.3
775.0
762.1
822.3
864.0
733.7
795.6
837.9
703.2
768.0
811.5
695.0
760.4
804.3
649.9
723.7
770.1
601.9
680.2
734.7
725.4
787.4
829.8
690.0
756.0
799.8
648.9
722.3
768.6
756.9
816.7
858.0
729.4
789.9
831.8
697.7
762.1
805.2
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Appendix 6.2 ANOVA for L81(34 ,23+1) MVF, t=12, 18, 24.
The ANOVA table for t=12 is in the main body of section 6.3.
treatments with large standardized residuals (SR):
The following are the
treatments
# 15
# 24
#27
# 42
# 69
# 8
Then we get ti
(1,2,2,3)
(1,2,2,3)
(1,2,2,3)
(1,2,2,3)
(1,2,2,3)
(1,1,3,2)
he following::
SR
3.5
-2.16
-2.41
-6.43
-2.93
-2.78
Normal Probability Plot of the Residuals
(response is y 12 w/o outlier)
99.9 - ._________
99-
95-
90-
80-
50
20-
30-
5
50- .. .... .
20.
5-15
0.1
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
Residual
Histogram of the Residuals
(response is y 12 w/o outlier)
30-
25-
20 -
10-
5
0
-0.8 -0.4 0.0 .4 0.8
Residual
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General Linear Model: L81(34,23+1) MVF t=18
Analysis of Variance for y bar 18, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source
r&d
yield
cogs
price
yield*cogs
yield*price
cogs*price
yield*cogs*price
Error
Total
DF Seq SS
2 10036
2 82533
2 88669
2 275285
4 9422
4 8085
4 6492
8 2609
52 226
80 483357
S = 2.08475 R-Sq = 99.95%
Adj SS Adj MS
10036 5018
82533 41267
88669 44334
275285 137643
9422 2356
8085 2021
6492 1623
2609 326
226 4
R-Sq(adj) = 99.93%
111
F
1154.58
9494.95
10200.80
31669.83
541.99
465.04
373.42
75.04
P
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Histogram of residuals of ANOVA for t=18 with 4 interactions
Normal
40- Mean -4.21062E-14
StDev 1.681
N 81
30-
-
= 20-C*
U.
10-
0
General Linear Model: L81(3 2 +1) MVF t=24
Analysis of Variance for y bar 24, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj PIS F P
r&d 2 20325 20325 10162 2078.86 0.000
yield 2 63088 63088 31544 6452.87 0.000
cogs 2 66048 66048 33024 6755.64 0.000
price 2 247424 247424 123712 25307.32 0.000
yield*cogs 4 25979 25979 6495 1328.58 0.000
yield*price 4 24642 24642 6161 1260.24 0.000
cogs*price 4 22971 22971 5743 1174.75 0.000
yield*cogs*price 8 8240 8240 1030 210 .72 0. 00 0
Error 52 254 254 5
Total 80 478972
S =2.21097 R-Sq =99.95% R-Sq(adj) =99.92%
7E-14
1.783
81
-4 -2 0 2 4
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Histogram of L81 ANOVA t= 24 with 4 interactions
Normal
40 - Mean 4.14044
StDev
N
30-
C. 20-
10-
Appendix 6.3. ANOVA L81(3 4,23+1) MVF uncontrollable
variables at t=18, 24
In this appendix we show the ANOVA tables for the uncontrollable variables. We note
that the uncontrollable variables all have p<<0.05 indicating that they are statistically
significant as predictors of the outcomes AOI. When we examine the residuals, we note
that we must reject the hypothesis that they are normal by the Anderson-Darling test.
There are only eight points; the sample size is not large enough. However, since the
zero, there is no bias. We infer that the uncontrollable variables are random because
they have practical significance (Montgomery 2001).
General Linear Model: MVF L81(34,23) uncontrollable variables MVF t=18
Analysis of Variance for MVF t=18, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 12879 12879 12879 60.17 0.001
ADI orders 1 171615 171615 171615 801.84 0.000
Competitor 1 63637 63637 63637 297.33 0.000
Error 4 856 856 214
Total 7 248987
S = 14.6296 R-Sq = 99.66% R-Sq(adj) = 99.40%
residuals of ANOVA L81 uncontrollables t= 18 L81
Normal
99
Mean 2.842171E-14
95 - StDev 11.06
90 N 8
AD 0.736
8. P-Value 0.032
7060-
;30-
20-
10J
5
13
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
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General Linear Model: L81(34,23) uncontrollable variables MVF t=24
Analysis of Variance for MVF t=24, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 29601 29601 29601 60.25 0.001
ADI orders 1 168167 168167 168167 342.28 0.000
Competitor 1 89059 89059 89059 181.27 0.000
Error 4 1965 1965 491
Total 7 288792
S = 22.1655 R-Sq = 99.32% R-Sq(adj) = 98.81%
residuals of ANOVA L81 unconrollables t=24 L81
Normal
99 - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _Mean -1.42109E-14
95 StDev 16.76
90. 1 N 8
AD 0.686
80- P-Value 0.044
S70 -
S60 -
S50-
w40-
30 -
20- r
10-
5-
1
-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
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Appendix 6.4 Data set for L27(3 4-1 ,23+1) MVF t=12
FIRM VALUE in $M
noise
a) (
E _ - C
c1 0 0 1 72 L2 7.
E Cy ~ ) 0) -CD~ 0)
2U,,22 7. 678. a7,. 23. 72 7.7 9.8 80. 08. 3.
C) U)
a) : 3 ) U ) U
co a) a) a,
3 ,,,3 803 8. 28. 4. 7. 1. 2 27 89. 800. 77.
a, - C/U
U) a) a)MVF
1 1,1,1,1 746.5 644.3 553.0 813.1 737.7 669.2 572.9 852.1 763.5 705.8
2 1,1,2,2 787.2 678.8 576.4 834.1 770.2 705.7 598.8 880.2 789.8 735.7
3 1,1,3,3 800.3 689.9 583.4 848.2 778.5 719.2 607.7 898.1 800.4 747.3
4 1,2,1,2 841.7 740.1 637.4 905.0 838.7 767.1 658.4 944.0 859.1 799.0
5 1,2,2,3 857.7 751.2 647.7 920.9 850.0 781.3 670.6 960.9 872.4 812.5
6 1,2,3,1 703.1 596.9 518.4 755.2 699.2 622.0 534.4 789.6 722.6 660.1
7 1,3,1,3 910.3 807.3 707.5 985.3 911.2 839.4 728.7 1003. 938.3 870.1
8 1,3,2,1 776.3 676.8 586.0 849.7 773.0 700.6 604.7 887.1 797.0 739.0
9 1,3,3,2 820.5 713.8 614.9 875.1 815.4 740.0 635.6 917.1 832.6 773.9
10 2,1,1,2 812.3 708.9 606.1 869.4 802.8 736.3 627.7 912.6 821.3 766.4
11 2,1,2,3 825.2 717.6 613.1 881.5 810.1 747.3 636.7 927.4 830.6 776.6
12 2,1,3,1 647.7 548.5 469.9 696.8 646.3 574.1 488.2 727.2 667.9 607.4
13 2,2,1,3 876.8 774.3 673.6 947.7 873.7 805.4 695.5 977.3 899.7 836.0
14 2,2,2,1 736.7 632.4 546.2 800.1 729.2 656.5 565.5 838.3 754.2 695.4
15 2,2,3,2 779.3 669.3 572.4 825.7 764.4 695.3 593.9 871.3 783.2 728.3
16 2,3,1,1 794.7 700.3 609.4 877.5 794.7 723.4 627.3 912.8 818.7 762.1
17 2,3,2,2 837.2 734.9 637.8 900.6 836.4 761.2 657.7 938.5 856.6 795.6
18 2,3,3,3 855.0 748.1 650.8 919.5 850.6 777.3 672.3 956.7 873.1 811.5
19 3,1,1,3 847.0 744.6 643.1 912.7 838.7 774.3 665.8 951.3 861.5 804.3
20 3,1,2,1 690.7 588.5 507.5 746.5 685.3 613.5 526.3 781.6 709.2 649.9
21 3,1,3,2 732.6 623.0 532.9 769.7 712.6 648.6 554.0 813.3 735.5 680.2
22 3,2,1,1 760.9 664.2 575.1 836.3 755.9 687.7 593.6 874.4 780.8 725.4
23 3.2.2.2 801.8 697.8 600.0 856.4 793.1 723.8 620.9 899.6 810.6 756.0
24 3,2,3,3 816.4 708.5 609.5 871.6 803.1 736.6 632.1 916.9 822.5 768.6
25 3,3,1,2 854.1 756.2 660.9 924.9 856.8 783.2 680.2 953.1 880.5 816.7
26 3,3,2,3 871.4 769.1 674.0 941.7 870.5 799.2 694.9 969.1 895.9 831.8
27 3,3,3,1 737.5 633.2 551.6 802.6 732.2 655.7 569.9 840.7 756.4 697.7
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Appendix 6.5. Data structure L27(3 41,2 3+1) orthogonal array
L27(34"-,2 3+1)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
25
26
27
1,1,1,1
1,1,2,2
1,1,3,3
1,2,1,2
1,2,2,3
1,2,3,1
1,3,1,3
1,3,2,1
1,3,3,2
2,1,1,2
2,1,2,3
2,1,3,1
2,2,1,3
2,2,2,1
2,2,3,2
2,3,1,1
2,3,2,2
2,3,3,3
3,1,1,3
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F1=R&D, F2=yield, F3=COGS, F4=product price
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Appendix 6.6 ANOVA L27(3 4-,2 3+1) MVF at t=18, 24
General Linear Model: L27(34 3+1) MVF at t=18
Analysis of Variance for firm value 18, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 4557 4557 2279 5.17 0.019
yield 2 28165 28165 14082 31.95 0.000
cogs 2 29211 29211 14605 33.14 0.000
price 2 92834 92834 46417 105.32 0.000
yield*cogs 2 1743 1743 871 1.98 0.171
Error 16 7051 7051 441
Total 26 163561
S = 20.9931 R-Sq = 95.69% R-Sq(adj) = 92.99%
.......................................................................................................................................................................
Probability Plot of ANOVA firm value t= 18
Normal
99. Mean 4.631686E-14
95 StDev 16.47
90 N 27
AD 0.297
P-Value 0.565
70
60-
u 505 -
40
30
20
10 -
1051-
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
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General Linear Model: L27 (3 23+1) MVF at t=24
Analysis of Variance for firm value 24, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 9199 9199 4599 3.26 0.065
yield 2 20765 20765 10383 7.37 0.005
cogs 2 22106 22106 11053 7.85 0.004
price 2 82669 82669 41335 29.34 0.000
yield*cogs 2 4803 4803 2402 1.70 0.213
Error 16 22542 22542 1409
Total 26 162085
S = 37.5350 R-Sq = 86.09% R-Sq(adj) = 77.40%
Probability Plot of ANOVA firm value t= 24
Normal
99
Mean 4.631686E-14
95 StDev 16.47
90 - N 27
80 AD 
0.297
70 P-Value 0.565
7 60 -60-
30 -
20 -
10 - .* .
5- --
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Appendix 6.7 Response Tables L27(3 4-1,2 3+1) MVF at t=18, 24
41 3+L27(-,2 +1) Firm Value t=18
Response Table for Means
Level r&d yield cogs price
1 863.0 805.1 884.1 767.9
2 843.0 848.4 849.7 860.2
3 831.5 884.1 803.8 909.4
Delta 31.5 79.0 80.3 141.5
Rank 4 3 2 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations
Level r&d yield cogs price
1 185.6 181.2 178.7 179.5
2 180.3 181.2 181.0 179.9
3 174.9 178.4 181.1 181.4
Delta 10.7 2.8 2.4 1.9
Rank 1 2 3 4
4 1 3
L27(3 - ,2 +1) Firm Value t=24
Response Table for Means
Level r&d yield cogs price
1 759.8 698.3 765.6 659.8
2 729.8 741.4 742.7 754.0
3 715.5 765.4 696.8 791.3
Delta 44.3 67.0 68.8 131.5
Rank 4 3 2 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations
Level r&d yield cogs price
1 208.9 204.6 189.1 205.2
2 196.6 198.3 198.4 196.6
3 187.8 190.3 205.7 191.4
Delta 21.1 14.3 16.5 13.8
Rank 1 3 2 4
119
Appendix 6.8 Response Tables Plots L27(3 4-12 3+1) MVF at
t=18, 24
Main Effects Plot (data means) for firm value t=18
r&d yield
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850-
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C 900-
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S182.5-
> 177.5-
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175.0
1 2 3 1 2 3
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Min Effects Plot (cta nmans) for firmvalue t=24
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Appendix 6.9. ANOVA L27(3 4-,2 3+1) MVF with
uncontrollables at t=18, 24
General Linear Model: L 27 MVF t=18 uncontrollable variables
Analysis of Variance for MVF t=18, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 12831 12831 12831 60.02 0.001
ADI orders 1 171516 171516 171516 802.31 0.000
Competitor 1 63468 63468 63468 296.89 0.000
Error 4 855 855 214
Total 7 248670
S = 14.6211 R-Sq = 99.66% R-Sq(adj) = 99.40%
residuals of uncontrollables MVF t= 18 L27
Normal
99- Mean -1.42109E-14
95. StDev 11.05
90-. N 8
80 AD 0.751
P-Value 0.029
7 0-V
u 50-
wl40-
~30-
20 Y
10-
5
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
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General Linear Model: L27(3' ',23+1)MVF t=24 uncontrollable variables
Analysis of Variance for MVF t=24, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 29440 29440 29440 60.77 0.001
ADI orders 1 168536 168536 168536 347.87 0.000
Competitor 1 89094 89094 89094 183.89 0.000
Error 4 1938 1938 484
Total 7 289008
S = 22.0111 R-Sq = 99.33% R-Sq(adj) = 98.83%
residuals for uncontrollables MVF t=24
Normal
99
Mean -5.68434E-14
95 StDev 16.64
90 4 N 8
80 AD 0.711
P-Value 0.03870 
__ _ _ __ _ _ _
S60-
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w40-
30
20- -
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Appendix 6.10. Data set for L,(3 4- 2 3+1) MVF
MVF $M
a)
3:
0
a)
0
a)
0)
C
C,
0)
4-
U,
a) a) 
9>
(1) - a),CQ
C C CC
813.1 737.7
869.2 806.5
912.5 844.2
881.5 810.1
750.0 693.2
920.1 852.6
769.7 712.3
940.4 866.6
824.0 748.0
603.3 863.2 799.9
583.4 848.2 778.5
.-
0)
-c
-C
0)
C9
2
C,,
0)
-C
0)
4-C./
0
a)
-C
0)
C0
C,
0)
C
MCD C C C
669.2 572.9
736.7 628.9
772.4 664.3
747.3 636.7
616.1 530.3
779.2 673.4
648.6 554.0
799.3 691.9
676.4 585.4
730.3 624.5
719.2 607.7
a)Cf,
-
852.1
912.5
954.1
927.4
748.3
952.7
813.3
969.9
862.6
763.5
824.3
865.6
830.6
716.6
875.3
735.5
892.3
772.7
906.5 817.7
898.1 800.4
* rows 10* and 11* only used for L'9(34 -2+2,3 2+1), one time use array to obtain F and p
values for controllable variables.
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0)
--W
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0
03
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E0
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a)
E
E
Co0
C
C
746.5
815.5
851.6
825.2
696.8
851.4
732.6
869.5
752.9
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0
0
a)
-0
C
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709.7
743.2
717.6
591.2
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2
2
2
3
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3
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2
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3
2
3
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1 1
2 2
3 3
2 3
3 1
1 2
3 2
1 3
2 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10*
11*
553.0
607.3
641.9
613.1
511.5
653.5
532.9
670.1
566.9
2 2 2 2
1 1 3 3
MVF
$M
705.8
767.8
805.5
776.6
650.4
812.2
680.2
829.8
715.8
761.9
747.3
Appendix 6.11. ANOVA Tables L,(3-,2 3+1) MVF at t=18, 24
............................................................................................................................................
General Linear Model: L(3 4 2 23+1) MVF t=18
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 3276.7 3775.4 1887.7 18.13 0.052
yield 2 5835.3 6479.2 3239.6 31.12 0.031
COGS 2 9537.0 13094.5 6547.2 62.89 0.016
price 2 31861.2 31861.2 15930.6 153.02 0.006
Error 2 208.2 208.2 104.1
Total 10 50718.4
S = 10.2033 R-Sq = 99.59% R-Sq(adj) = 97.95%
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ANOVA residuals L9 t=18
Normal
99- Mean 6.201100E-14
95. StDev 4.563
90. N 11
80. AD 0.256
70 - P-Value 0.651
u 50-
w40
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1 1 ... ......... .
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residuals
General Linear Model: L(3 4-,2 3+1) MVF 24
Analysis of Variance for firm value 24
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 8536.5 9182.5 4591.2 12.29 0.075
yield 2 3895.9 4370.6 2185.3 5.85 0.146
COGS 2 10892.8 14255.3 7127.6 19.09 0.050
price 2 27518.3 27518.3 13759.1 36.84 0.026
Error 2 746.9 746.9 373.5
Total 10 51590.4
S = 19.3251 R-Sq = 98.55% R-Sq(adj) = 92.76%
ANOVA residuals L9 t=24
Normal
99.-.
Mean -2.06703E-14
95- StDev 8.642
90- N 11
80- AD 0.300
.e 70 P-Value 0.521
60-
U 50-
40-
30-
20-
10-
5-0
1-
-20 -10 0 10 20
residuals
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Appendix 6.12. Response Tables L,(3 -2 2 3+1) MVF at t=18, 24
Response Tables MVF t=18
Orthogonal Array L9
Response Table for Means
Level r&d yield COGS price
1 868.1 811.5 878.7 771.4
2 835.2 838.8 855.3 846.2
3 823.2 876.1 792.5 908.9
Delta 44.9 64.6 86.2 137.5
Rank 4 3 2 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations
Level r&d yield COGS price
1 187.9 182.9 178.8 181.2
2 179.4 178.1 182.8 178.2
3 174.2 180.6 180.0 182.2
Delta 13.7 4.8 4.0 4.0
Rank 1 2 4 3
Response Tables MVF t=24
Orthogonal Array L9
Response Table for Means
Level r&d yield COGS price
1 772.8 709.6 760.5 669.2
2 720.6 724.0 758.1 733.9
3 704.5 764.4 679.4 794.8
Delta 68.3 54.8 81.1 125.5
Rank 3 4 2 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations
Level r&d yield COGS price
1 210.2 207.1 192.9 208.9
2 196.7 196.0 197.0 195.6
3 189.0 192.8 206.0 191.5
Delta 21.2 14.3 13.2 17.4
Rank 1 3 4 2
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Appendix 6.13. Plots Responses L9(3 4- 2 3+1) MVF at t=18, 24
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Main Effects for Firm Value t=18
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Appendix 6.13. ANOVA L9(3 4-2 3+1) uncontrollable variables
at t=18, 24
In this appendix we show the ANOVA tables for the uncontrollable variables. We note
that the uncontrollable variables all have p<<0.05 indicating that they are statistically
significant as predictors of the outcomes AOL. When we examine the residuals, we note
that we must reject the hypothesis that they are normal by the Anderson-Darling test.
There are only eight points, the sample size is not large enough. However, since the
zero, there is no bias. We infer that the uncontrollable variables are random because
they have practical significance (Montgomery 2001).
General Linear Model: MVF t=18 uncontrollable variables
Analysis of Variance for MVF t=18, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 13177 13177 13177 57.34 0.002
ADI orders 1 171735 171735 171735 747.27 0.000
Competitor 1 63271 63271 63271 275.31 0.000
Error 4 919 919 230
Total 7 249102
S = 15.1597 R-Sq = 99.63% R-Sq(adj) = 99.35%
residuals for L9 MVF uncontrollables ANOVA t=18
Normal
99
Mean 0
95 StDev 11.46
90. N 8
80 AD 0.776
70-1 P-Vakue 0.025
5 600
Lu 50-
w40-
30f
20-
10
5
1-
-30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30
residuals
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General Linear Model: MVF t=24 uncontrollable variables
Analysis of Variance for MVF t=24, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 30330 30330 30330 57.35 0.002
ADI orders 1 169396 169396 169396 320.31 0.000
Competitor 1 89062 89062 89062 168.41 0.000
Error 4 2115 2115 529
Total 7 290904
S =22.9966 R-Sq =99.27% R-Sq(adj) =98.73%
residuals for L9 MVF uncontrollables ANOVA t=24
Normal
99 Mean -2.13163E-14
95- StDev 17.38
90- N 8
80- AD 0.725
P-Value 0.034
60-
U 50 -40--
~30-
20-
10
5-
1
residuals
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Appendix 6.14. AOFAT results for MVF using L27 and L9 data
by derivation
L27
exp
2,2,2,2
2,2,2,3
t=12
761.3
806.5
2,2,2,1 1 693.65
2,2,1,3
2,2,3,3
2,3,1,3
2,1,1,3
1,3,1,3
839.08
771.22
874.3
804.88
881.43
3,3,1,3 1 868.88
exp t= 18
2,2,2,2 863.79
2,2,2,3 912.98
2,2,2,1 771.52
2,2,1,3 947.38
2,2,3,3 867.08
2,3,1,3 904.06
2,1,1,3 983.05
1,3,1,3 1003
3,3,1,3 971.52
exp t=24
2,2,2,2 762.81
2,2,2,3 800.19
2,2,2,1 668.67
2,2,1,3 823.07
2,2,3,3 754.26
2,3,1,3 779.97
2,1,1,3 847
1,3,1,3 876.99
3,3,1,3 832.69
by derivation
L9
exp t= 12
2,2,2,2 754.53
2,2,2,3 805.09
2,2,2,1 691.78
2,2,1,3 834.31
-2,2,3,3 763.73
2,3,1,3 862.8
2,1,1,3 805.81
1,3,1,3 876.11
3,3,1,3 858.34
exp t=18
2,2,2,2 848.99
2,2,2,3 911.76
2,2,2,1 774.21
2,2,1,3 935.13
2,2,3,3 848.96
2,3,1,3 907.86
2,1,1,3 972.42
1,3,1,3 1005.3
3,3,1,3 960.43
exp t=24
2,2,2,2 738.66
2,2,2,3 799.51
2,2,2,1 673.97
2,2,1,3 801.92
2,2,3,3 720.84
2,3,1,3 78752
2,1,1,3 842.3
1,3,1,3 894.49
3,3,1,3 826.21
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7.0 Surrogate Validation for Maximizing Operating Income
(AOI)
7.1 Introduction
Using a different corporate objective, this chapter will repeat the experiment of chapter
5. This time the task is: to maximize ADI's annual operating income. A high operating
income will prove to Wall Street and to the company's workforce that ADI's future is in
good hands. In previous chapters, we simulated and analyzed the corporate objective of
maximizing ADI's Market Value, MVF, in order to impede a hostile take over. The data
from those ADI-surrogate simulations suggest support for the validity of our DOE-
based method for MVF. The goal of this chapter is to determine whether our previous
findings and inferences persist when we consider a different corporate objective. One of
our objectives is to make each description of our surrogate experiments self-contained;
therefore, some repetition from previous chapters is unavoidable. We will try to keep
them to a minimum.
7.2 Framing the ADI corporate decision
In the systems that occur in nature, or are designed by man, not all components interact
strongly with other components. Most such systems are, in fact, nearly completely,
decomposable. H.A. Simon
7.2.1 Framing the decision in DOE normal form
The decision is framed as shown in Table 7.1. The framing is identical to Chapter 5
except that here the desired outcome is annual operating income (AOI) in $M.
Table 7.1. AOI decision situation in DOE normal form
threat of hostile takeover
problems loss of confidence in ADI management
outcome annual operating income (AOI)
1. R&D budget
2. manufacturing yield
3. Cost of Goods Sold (COGS)
4. product price
1. industry demand growth
uncontrollable 2. ADI orders
variables 3. competitors' attractiveness
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New Objective - Annual Operating Income
Operating income is the stock of funds remaining from revenues after subtracting cost
and expenses. High operating income reflects executive's ability to manage cost and
expense. Low cost is an indicator of engineering and manufacturing effectiveness;
frugal expenses indicate operational efficiency and effectiveness. Expenses include
expenditures for R&D, sales, and administrative functions (e.g. Brealy and Meyers
2002). The US tax code makes R&D an expense.
Controllable Variables and Uncontrollable Variables
Because we presented these in chapter 5, we do so here without the narrative and limit
ourselves to the table of factors and levels below (Table 7.2).
Table 7.2. Controllable factors and levels
controllable factors level 1 level 2 level 3
R&D budget -10% current level + 10%
IC yield -15% current level + 15%
COGS -10% current level + 10%
product price -10% current level + 10%
Levels for controllable and uncontrollable variables
Table 7.3. Uncontrollable factors and levels.
uncontrollable factors level 1 current state level 2
industry growth rate current-25% current current+25%
ADI orders rate current-25% current current+25%
competitors' attractiveness current-25% current current+250
The Business-As-Usual (BAU) Situation
Consistent with our previous constraints, we restrict ourselves to the table below.
Table 7.4. BAU and the current environmental condition.
controllable factors BAU level
R&D Budget 2 $28.47 M
manufacturing yield 2 0.20
COGS 2 $11.28 M
product price 2 $17.38
uncontrollable factors
growth in demand current 0.02
ADI orders current 1.487 M
Competitors' attractiveness current 4.955e-005 (this is an index)
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7.3 Testing the ADI surrogate
We test the sensitivity of the outcome of AOI with our ADI surrogate using our
controllable and uncontrollable variables. We want to know whether there is a causal
linkage between our AOI outcome (the dependent variable), and our independent
variables (our controllable and uncontrollable variables). And if these causal linkages
behave as we would expect given our understanding of the problem, we can infer
construct and face validity.
7.3.1 AOI=f(a controllable variable)
Figure 7.1 plots AOI versus product price as a function of time. Curve #2 is AOI under
the current BAU situation. With a 10% increase in product price, the AOI grows as
shown by curve #1. Curve #3 shows AOI under a 10% decline in product price. We find
that the dependent variable, AOI, behaves as one would expect relative to price
changes.
Expected Annual Operating Incone
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Tin (Month)
10% increase in product price
current product price
10% decline in product price
16 18 20 22 24
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 7.1 AOL with higher, current, and lower price.
Figures 7.2, and 7.3 are similar plots of AOI for the controllable variables of
manufacturing yield, and COGS respectively. AOI rises when manufacturing yield
rises; and when COGS declines, AOI increases. In Figure 7.4, we note that when R&D
expense declines, AOI increases and vice versa. This is because R&D is an expense.
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64.44 M
59.61 M
54.78 M
49.94 M
current
product price
Expected Annual Operating 1ncorre
current yield
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Tine (Month)
24
10% improvement in yield
current yield 2 2 2 2 2 2
10% decline in yield
Figure 7.2. AOI with higher, current, and lower yield.
Expected Annual Operating Incone
current COGS
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Tin (Mont
10% increase in COGS
current COGS
10% decline in COGS
14 16 18 20 22 24
z. z. z z
3 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 7.3. AOI with higher, current, and lower COGS.
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62.54 M
59.52 M
56.50 M
53.48 M
63.38 M
59.94 M
56.50 M
53.06 M
I,
Expected Annual Operating Incone
61.75 M
58.70 M
55.66 M
current
R&D expense
52.61 M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
Tine (Month)
10% increase in R&D expense i i i 1 1 1 1
current R&D expense 2 2 2 2 2 2
10% decline in R&D expense 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Figure 7.4. AOI with higher, current, and lower R&D expense.
Finding
Results from the ADI surrogate simulations for AOI suggest that our
controllable variables influence the dependent variable in the direction that is
consistent with our understanding of the decision situation.
7.3.2 AOI=f(an uncontrollable variable)
We have just shown the behavior of AOI as a function of the controllable variables. In
this section, we show the behavior of AOI as a function of the uncontrollable variables.
As in the previous section, the goal is to determine whether there is a causal linkage
between the dependent variable and the uncontrollable variables.
Figure 7.5 plots AOI as a function of time versus the uncontrollable factor, industry-
demand growth. The curve #2 is the situation with current industry-demand growth "as
is". AOI rises and falls as industry-demand growth rate rises and falls, curves #1 and #3
respectively. The dependent variable AOI behaves as one would expect. Figures 7.6 and
7.7 are similar plots of AOI for the uncontrollable variables of competitors'
attractiveness, and order rate for ADI products. AOL rises when ADI is more
competitive and when orders for ADI products rise. And the converse is also apparent
from the plots.
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Expected Annual Operating Inconr
current
industry
demand
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Tim (Month)
24
30% increase in industry demand
current industry demand
30% decline in industry demand
~2 ~) -y
3 3> 3 3 a
Figure 7.5. AOI in higher, current, and lower industry demand.
Expected Annual Operating Incone
62.52 M
55.64 M
48.77 M
41.89 M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Tinm (Mont
14 16 18 20 22 24
25% increase in competitors' attractiveness
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Figure 7.6. AOI with higher, current, and lower competitors' attractiveness.
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Figure 7.7. AOI with higher, current, and lower order rates for ADI.
Finding
The simulations of the ADI surrogate for AOI suggest that our
uncontrollable variables influence the dependent variable in the direction
that is consistent with our understanding of the decision situation.
7.3.3 AOI=f(ensemble of uncontrollable variables)
We have shown the behavior of AOI vis a vis the uncontrollable variables one at a time.
How does AOI behave given distinct configurations of the uncontrollable variables?
The best environment is (3,3,1), i.e. industry growth is high, ADI orders are strong, and
competitors are weak. (Figure 7.8) Similarly, the worst environment is (1,1,3), i.e. the
reverse. Curve #2 is the AOI under the best environment of (3,3,1). Indeed under the
best environmental condition, AOI attains the highest values. Curve #7 is the worst
environment (1,1,3). And indeed under the worst environmental condition, AOI attains
its lowest values, in general. We note that BAU (t<6) in the current environment
underperforms even the worst environmental case. Why? Operating Income is given by
Operating Income = gross margin - operating expense.
ADI's undertook TQM to improve technical operations, which were performing poorly
from t=O through t=6. This resulted in declining gross margins. Simultaneously, ADI
had a track record of escalating expenses that further depressed operating income during
the first six months. The combination of declining gross margins and increasing
operating expenses overwhelmed the financial results of ADI to the point that the
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environment could not influence the financials of ADI. However after five months, the
surrogate simulations indicate that the impact of environmental uncertainty takes effect.
Then it has a nontrivial effect on the performance of the dependent variable of AOI
outcome.
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43.35 M current
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Figure 7.8. AOI under the entire spectrum of uncontrollable conditions.
Finding
The simulations suggest that different configurations of the uncontrollable
variables influence the AOI dependent variable in the direction that is
consistent with our understanding of the decision situation.
7.3.4 AOI=f(ensemble of controllable variables)
We have shown the behavior of AOI vis d vis the uncontrollable variables. We show in
this section that the configuration of controllable factor-levels does matter. An effective
treatment is (1,3,1,3), i.e. R&D is low, yield is high, product costs (COGS) are low, and
the product price is high. Similarly, we guess that (3,1,3,1) is least effective. Figure 7.9
shows these three cases in the best environment of (3,3,1). Curve #1, the surmised best
treatment, exhibits the best performance. Curve #3, the surmised worst treatment,
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exhibits the worst performance. Curve #2 is BAU. It is bracketed by the best and worst
treatment. Of course, there are many other treatments within this envelope, Figure 7.10.
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Figure 7.9. AOI with surmised best and worst treatments in best environment.
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Figure 7.10. AOI and a variety of treatments in the best environment.
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Does this AOI pattern (Figure 7.10) persist in the worst environment? The answer is in
the affirmative. This is shown in Figure 7.11, the analog of Figure 7.10, in the worst
environmental condition.
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Figure 7.11. AOI with a variety of treatments in the worst environment.
Findings
The simulations suggest that different configurations of the controllable
variables influence the dependent variable in the direction that is
consistent with our understanding of the decision situation.
- Moreover, these different configurations of the controllable variables
influence the dependent variable under different environmental
conditions such that the observed results are also consistent with our
understanding of the environmental uncertainties.
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7.4 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter was a repeat of the experiment of Chapter 5 using a different corporate
decision. The objective was to determine whether the findings from Chapter 5 would
persist with a different corporate decision. We find that the answer is in the affirmative.
The data from this chapter's tests suggest that our controllable and uncontrollable
variables influence AOI, the dependent variable, in the direction that is consistent with
our understanding of the problem. The outcomes of the dependent variable AOI, under
very different environmental conditions, are also consistent with our understanding of
the problem. These tests suggest the existence of a non-random causal linkage between
the independent and dependent variables. Putting all this together, we infer that the ADI
surrogate has construct and face validity for the outcome of AOL.
Having a valid surrogate for AOI, we are now ready to test our decision analysis
method for the AOI decision. That is the subject of our next chapter.
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8.0 AOI Decision-Analysis Using the Company Surrogate
8.1. Introduction.
Using a different corporate decision, this chapter will repeat the decision analysis of
Chapter 6. Here the decision is: to maximize annual operating income (AOI). This
chapter is a sequel to Chapter 7 where we show support for the surrogate's construct
and face validity for AOL. However, as in Chapter 6, we need data to support the
explanatory and predictive power of the controllable variables of our DOE-based
method. We also need data to support our belief that using our DOE-based decision
analysis method we will be able to design a treatment that yields the maximum AOL.
And we need support that results, from different experimental designs*, but for the same
treatment, are consistent and are not so widely divergent that they are not meaningful.
And we do need evidence that any results produced are statistically meaningful. We
address these questions in this chapter using our DOE-based decision analysis method
for the ADI corporate objective of AOL. Because the approach to the analyses is
identical to that of Chapter 6, we limit ourselves to the presentation of results. Details
are presented in the appendices to this chapter.
8.2 Testing Protocol
We follow the same testing protocol outlined in Chapter 6. We execute a progression of
experimental designs, from the most complex to the simplest (Table 8.1). Experiments
are costly to run and interpret. We want to know whether simple experiments can
produce results that are as equally effective as complex experiments. (Chapter 6
elaborates on this theme.) This chapter answers in the affirmative and discusses the
conditions under which this is true.
Table 8.1. Progression of experiments for DOE testing.
experimental design complexity
L8 1(34,23+1) full factorial high
L27(3-2 high resolution medium
L9(34 2,2+ 1) low resolution simple
AOFAT adaptive hill-climbing very simple
We refer to all the treatments within a designated array structure as a design. Different array
structures represent distinct designs.
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8.3. L81(3',2 3+1) Data Set
The L8 1(34,23+1) data set is in Appendix 8.1 for the time period t=12, i.e. 12 months out.
(The data sets for t=12, 18, and 24 are available from the author.) The maxima revealed
by L81(34,23+1) for the three time periods are shown in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2. L81(3 423 +1) maximum AOI for t=12, 18, and 24.
period max AOI treatment AOI by inspection
t=12 1,3,1,3 $64.53 M
t=18 1,3,1,i3 $ 57.94 M
t=24 1,3,2,3 $ 48.88 M
The ANOVA tables for Ls 1(34,23+1)* for t=12, 18, and 24 are in Appendix 8.2. Table
8.3 is a summary. And Table 8.4 is a summary of the statistics about the interactions.
We have three 2-factor interactions (2-fi) and one 3-factor interaction (3-fi). They are
all statistically significant with p<<0.05 with one exception, the 3-fi at t=1 8.
Table 8.3. L81(3 423+1) summary for AOI for t=12, 18, and 24.
L81(34,23+1)
t=12 t=18 t=24
factors
Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
R&D 4.575 0.000 30.933 0.000 54.908 0.000
yield 176.807 0.000 132.016 0.000 100.264 0.000
COGS 173.763 0.000 139.429 0.000 88.34 0.000
prod. price 456.162 0.000 454.179 0.000 419.899 0.000
yield*COGS 1.905 0.000 7.013 0.000 15.615 0.000
yield*price 0.906 0.000 5.609 15.686 0.000
COGS*price 0.552 0.000 3.533 0.004 12.242 0.000
yield*COGS*price 0.115 0.013 0.492 0.758 2.563 0.025
error 0.042 0.796 1.045
total 814.827 - 774.00 - 710.562 -
We removed treatment #7 (1,3,1,3) from our L81, it had a standardized residual of 7.5 in our
ANOVA. From Appendix 8.1, we note that it gives the highest for AOI at t=12, $64.5M and at
the same time it has the largest stdev of 7.8. For all 81 treatments the AOI is in [44.5,64.5] and
the stdev is in [2.7,7.8]. Treatment #7 is at the extreme end of both intervals. The reason we
omitted this treatment is because with its inclusion it confounds the 2-fi such that p>>0.05. With
its exclusion we get Table 8.3, which give us more insight into the problem we are trying to
study. We therefore judged this was appropriate.
146
L81(34,923+1)
Table 8.4. L8 1(3 423 +1) interactions for AOI for t=12, 18, and 24.
L8 1(3 4,23+1)
2-factor and t=12 t=18 t=24
3-factor % of % of % of3-acor Adj. MS f Adj. MS f Adj. MS ~ointeractions total total total
total interactions 3.48 0.43% 16.65 2.2% 46.11 6.5%
The collective contributions of the interactions increase with time although they remain
small (Table 8.4). We posit that the explanation lies in the complex system behavior of
ADI. One of the hallmarks of complex systems is that the aggregate of stocks and flows
determine the behavior of the system (e.g. Sterman 2000). The presence of stocks
creates delays and smoothes the responses of the system variables. The empirical data
of the interactions of our experiment suggests this is the phenomenon of the increasing
contribution of the interactions. For example, between yield and price there are a set of
complex causal relations involving stocks and flows. We illustrate this below. There are
many more variables than shown along the path from yield to price. We limit ourselves
to a single chain of events to simplify our argument. (x-+y indicates y-f(x))
yield-+M Cost of Work of Finished Good-+M Cost of Goods Sold->
->Cost of Goods Sold-Total per Unit Cost->
-+Perceived Total Per Unit Cost->Target Price-+Price.
Between yield and price there are three stocks, which contribute to the delay of the
interactions, but the interactions are revealed as time rolls forward.
Findings
- All the controllable variables are strong predictors of the AOI outcome.
They all have p<<0.05.
- The collective contribution of the interactions to the outcome is small.
- The 2-fi and 3-fi are present. They are strong predictors of the outcomes
(p<<0.05) except for one case of the 3-fi at t=18.
- The experiment exhibits the properties of the hierarchy, sparsity, and
inheritance.
The data for the controllable variables vis a vis AOI suggest they are strong predictors
of the AOI outcome. We now ask whether the uncontrollable variables are also
statistically significant predictors of AOL. We "rotate" our L81(3 42 3+1) array, i.e. swap
inner and outer arrays to examine the ANOVA statistics of that construct. The summary
statistics for this new construct are shown in Table 8.5. (The ANOVA tables for the
time periods of t=12, 18 and 24 are in Appendix 8.3.)
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Table 8.5. L81(3 423+1) summary for AOI for t=12, 18, and 24.
Rotated L81(34,23+1)
t=12 t=18 t=24
factors
Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
Ind. demand growth 6.76 0.036 45.76 0.002 100.04 0.001
ADI orders 336.08 0.000 593.7 0.000 592.22 0.000
compet. attractiveness 70.59 0.001 205.67 0.000 298.72 0.000
error 0.7 - 0.81 - 1.46 -
total 414.13 845.940 992.44 -
Findings
All uncontrollable variables have p<0.05 and exert a strong influence
on the outcome of AOL.
Summary of the L81(34,23+1) testing
We populated the full factorial L81(3 423+1) orthogonal array and we also used a full
factorial noise array to be able to address the uncertain environments of the decision.
We analyzed the L81 arrays for the time periods of t=12, 18, and 24. The ANOVA tables
for both the controllable variables and uncontrollable variables support our belief that
they are predictors of the output of AOL. The data indicate that 2-fi and 3-fi are present
for the controllable variables are statistically significant (except for the 3-fi at t=18), but
they contribute a small percentage to the outcome of AOL. They are therefore ignored.
For decision-making, we are able to find the treatment that yields the maximum AOI by
inspection for each of the time periods of t=12, 18, and 24. In addition, we know
precisely the extent to which each controllable and uncontrollable variable contributes
to AOL.
8.4. L27(34~1,2 3 +1) Data Set
The data set for L27(3 4- ,2 3+1) for t=12 is in Appendix 8.4 and the orthogonal array
L2 7(34 ,23+1) is in Appendix 8.5. (The data sets for t=12, 18, 24 are available from this
writer). The L27(3 4- ,2 3+1) orthogonal array gives us enough dof's to address 2-fi
(Appendix 8.5). Table 8.6 summarizes the ANOVA statistics. All factors are strong
predictors of the outcome of AOI with p<<0.05. We have three 2-fi and they have
p<<0.05 in all time periods. Table 8.7 presents the summary statistics about the
interactions. Their contributions are small and they can, therefore, be ignored.
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Table 8.6. L27(34 1 ,23+1) summary for AOI for t=12, 18, and 24.
L 2 7 (3 4- ,2 3+1)
t=12 t=18 t=24
factors
Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
R&D 2.228 0.000 8.064 0.002 18.854 0.003
yield 63.032 0.000 51.66 0.000 35.263 0.001
COGS 60.5 0.000 54.178 0.000 34.704 0.001
product price 156.84 0000 166.258 0.000 156.48 0.000
yield*COGS 0.715 0.003 2.728 0.017 8.346 0.014
yield*price 0.269 0.029 2.02 0.033 7.085 0.021
price*COGS 0.19 0.060 1 1.907 0.038 5.097 0.044
error 0.046 - 0.368 - 1.053 -
total 283.82 - 287.183 - 266.882 -
Table 8.7. L27(34~ ,23+1) interactions for AOI for t=12, 18, and 24.
t=12 t=18 t=24
three 2-fi Adj. MS Adj. MS Adj. MS tttotal d.total d. S tof
1.17 0.41 % 6.6 2.32% 20.53 7.69%
As in the case of L27(3 -1,2 3+1), the intensity of the interactions increase over time in
our L2 7(34~ ,23+1). We discussed this phenomenon in section 8.3 and we offered the
presence of stocks in the system as a possible explanation.
Findings
- All the p values of the controllable variables indicate they are statistically
significant.
- L27 reveals three 2-fi, which are statistically significant with one exception
at t=12. However, total contribution of all the 2-fi are small.
- The interactions can be ignored.
- Product price is the most important contributor and R&D is the least
important contributor to the AOI outcome.
Using our L27(3 4- ,2 3+1), we can design the treatment that yields the maximum AOI and
derive its value. For that we need the response tables for t=12, 18, and 24 (Appendix
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8.7) and they are plotted in Appendix 8.8. The maxima are shown in Table 8.8 together
with a comparison against the maxima revealed by L81(34,23+1). The I%A L2 7 vs. L8 1
are small. At t=24 the treatment for the maximum AOI (1,3,1,3) derived from our
L27(34-1 ,2 3+1) is not the same as the one revealed by L81(3 4,2 3+1). However, they are
"close." How close? The MAE (e.g. Mahmoud 2001) is 3.05%. This is sufficiently
close that they are within each other's 95% confidence interval. This is shown in the last
row of Table 8.8. The desirable property of AOI equifinality between L27 and L8 1 is
maintained at the 95% confidence level.
Table 8.8. AOI for t=12, 18, and 24, L2 7 vs. L8 1.
max AOI treatment derived AOI max AOI by
period _ _ _ inspection L27 vs. L81
L2 7(341 ,23+1) L81(34 3 +1) L27(34 2±1) L81(34 23+1) AOI
t=12 13,1,3 1,3,1,3 $ 65.39 M $ 64.53 M 1.3%
t=18 1,3,1,3 1,3,1,3 $ 59.89 M $ 57.94 M 3.4%
t=24 1,3,1,3 1,3,2,3 $ 51.27 M $ 48.88 M 4.9%
+ I I
for t=24 95 % confidence interval (46, 56) (48, 57)
Findings
Using the L27(34 ,2 +1) we are able to design the decisions (treatments)
that yield the maximum AOI. They are derived values that are all within
each other's 95% CI.
The data for the controllable variables vis 'i vis AOI suggest construct validity. We
want to know whether the same is true for the uncontrollable variables. As before, we
swap (rotate) the inner and outer arrays of the L27(34-1 ,23+1) and examine the ANOVA
statistics (Appendix 8.9). A summary is shown in Table 8.9.
Table 8.9. L27(34- 1,23+1) AOI for t=12, 18, and 24.
Rotated L27(34-1,23+1)
t= 12 t=18 t=24
factors Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
Long term growth 6.42 0.033 45.76 0.001 100.04 0.001
ADI orders 338.13 0.000 593.7 0.000 592.22 0.000
compet. attractiveness 71.92 0.000 205.67 0.000 298.72 0.000
error 0.63 0.81 1.46 -
total 417.1 845.940 992.44 -
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Findings
- All the p values of the uncontrollable variables indicate they are strong
predictors of the outcome of AOL.
Summary of the L27(3 4-1,2 ) testing
We populated the L27(3 4- ,2 3+1) orthogonal array using a full factorial noise array to be
able to address the uncertain environments of the decision. The ANOVA tables for both
the controllable variables and uncontrollable variables support our belief that they are
strong predictors of the output of AOL. The data indicate the presence of three
statistically significant 2-fi of controllable variables (with only one exception in t=12),
but their total contribution to the outcome of AOI is small. For decision-making, we are
able to design the decision (i.e. treatment) that yields the maximum AOI for each of the
time periods of t=12, 18, and 24. Except for t=24, using the L27(34 1 ,23+1), the
treatments that yield the maximum AOI are identical to the one revealed by the L81 full
factorial array. At t=24, although the treatments are different, their AOI values are
within each other's 95% CL. The desirable property of AOI equifinality between L27 and
L81 is maintained. In addition, we know precisely the extent to which each controllable
and uncontrollable variable contributes to AOL. And we find that each variable's
(controllable and uncontrollable) relative contribution to AOI remains consistent
between L81 and L27 and the time periods t=12, 18, and 24.
8.5. L9(34 2 3+1) Data Set
The structure of this section follows that of the preceding section, 8.4. The data set for
t=12 is in Appendix 8.10. We want to know whether analysis of the L9(34-,2 3+1) will
continue to support the predictive power of the controllable variables.
An L9(34-2 ,23+1) does not have enough degrees of freedom to obtain the F statistic and
therefore the p values for our four controllable variables. Therefore, we add two
treatments to our L9(34 2 ,23+1) array as in Appendix 8.10. We identify this new array as
L' 9(34- 2+2,23+1), i.e. an L9(3 4-2 ,23+1) that has been extended by two treatments. Table
8.10 summarizes the ANOVA statistics. Details are in Appendix 8.11.
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Table 8.10. L'9(3 4-2 +2,23+1) summary for AOI for t=12, 18, and 24.
L'9(34-2 2,23 +1)
t=12 t=18 t=24
factors
Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
R&D 1.415 0.085 6.37 0.050 22.317 0.058
yield 21.68 0.006 16.445 0020 11.824 0.104
COGS 23.784 0.006 23.632 0.014 22.697 0.057
product price 55.067 0.002 56.854 0.006 36.524 0.036
error 0.132 - 0.337 - 1.375 -
total 102.078 - 103.638 94.737 -
Findings
- At t=12,
At t=18,
R&D is not a good predictor of AOI, p>0.05.
all variables are strong predictors of AOL.
At t=24, R&D, COGS and product-price are adequate predictors of the
outcome. Yield is not, p>0.05.
- If we relax a to a =0.10, the controllable variables can be judged to
predict the outcome of AOI in all three time periods.
- Product price is the most important contributor and R&D is the least
important contributor to the AOI outcome.
We derive the maximum AOI* treatments (Appendix 8.13). These are shown in Table
8.11. Note that using our array L9(34-2,23+1) for t=24, we derive the identical treatment
(1,3,2,3) revealed by L81(34 ,23+1). Recall that the revealed maximum of L81(34,23+1)
and the derived maximum from L27(3 -1,2 3+1) are different but within each other's 95%
CI. The derived value from the L9 (34 , 23+1) for the maximum AOI is "close" to its
counterparts L27 and L81. The desirable property of AOI equifinality between L9, L27
and L8 1 is maintained.
Table 8.11. AOI for t=12, 18, and 24, L9 vs. L27 and L81.
value |Amax treatment derived values $M by n p I
___ __ ___ __ ___ __ ___ __ ___ __ byzinsp. Op. Inc. vs. L81
L9 L27 L81 L9 L27 L-81 L9 L-27
t=12 1,3,1,3 1,3,1,3 1,3,1,3 $65.75 $65.39 $64.53 1.9% 1.3%
t=18 1,3,1,3 1,3,1,3 1,3,1,3 $60.56 $59.89 $57.94 4.5% 3.4%
t=24 1,3,2,3 1,3,1,3 1,3,2,3 $52.42 $51.27 $48.88 7.2% 4.9%
for t=24 95 % confidence interval (46,62) (46,56) (48,57)
* Note we now revert to our L9(34- 2 ,23-l). L'9(34-2+2,23+1) is used only once for interactions.
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Findings
At t=12 and 18, using the L9(34-2,2 +1) we are able to design the decision
(treatment) for maximum AOI. The treatments are the same as the one
derived from our L27 array and revealed by our L81 full factorial array.
- Although at t=24, the L9 derives a treatment that is different than the L27
maximum AOI treatment, they are all within each other's 95 % CI.
- The desirable property of AOI equifinality between L9, L27 and L81 is
maintained for all three time periods of t=12, 18, and 24.
We ask whether the uncontrollable variables in our L9(3 4-2,2 3+1) array have strong
predictive power wrt AOI. As before, we swap inner and outer arrays and examine the
ANOVA statistics (Table 8.12). Data for t=12, 18 and t=24 are in Appendix 8.13.
Table 8.12. L9(3 4- 2 3+1) summary for AOI for t=12, 18, and 24.
Rotated L9(34 -2 9_3+1_
t=12 t=18 t=24
factors Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value Adj. MS p value
Long term growth 6.93 0.027 43.30 0.001 125.72 0.002
ADI orders 337.58 0.000 599.85 0.000 647.40 0.000
compet. attractiveness 70.31 0.000 214.59 0.000 271.60 0.000
error 0.60 - 0.68 - 2.20 -
Findings
- All the p values of the uncontrollable variables indicate they are strong
predictors of the outcome of AOI.
- ADI orders have the strongest impact on AOI, and Industry-demand
growth has the least impact on the AOI outcome.
Summary of the L9(3 4- 2 3+1) testing
We populated the L9(3 4-2,23+1) orthogonal array using a full factorial noise array to
address the uncertain environments of our decision. The ANOVA tables for both the
controllable variables and uncontrollable variables support our belief that they are
predictors of the output of AOI in the time periods t=12 and t=18. At t=24 price is the
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only strong predictor of the outcome of AOL. However, at a=0. 10 level, there is support
for all the controllable variables as predictors of the AOI outcome.
Using the L9(34-2 ,23+1) we are able to design the decision (treatment) that yields the
maximum AOI at t=12, 18, and 24. At t=24, the treatment that yields the maximum AOI
is identical to the one revealed by the L81 arrays but different from the one derived using
our L2 7. However, their derived values from L9, L2 7, and revealed by L81 are within each
other's 95% confidence interval. The desirable property of AOI equifinality between L9,
L27 and L81 is maintained for all three time periods of t=12, 18, and 24.
8.6 Adaptive One-Factor-At-A-Time
We try Frey's (Frey 2003a, 2003b) Adaptive One-Factor-At-a-Time (AOFAT)
procedure to find the treatment for maximum AOL. We begin the procedure with BA U
(2,2,2,2). Why? AOFAT is a hill-climbing process. By starting with BAU, we hope to
improve our position. The procedure is as follows (Frey 2003b):
- "begin with a baseline set of factors levels and measure the response.
- For each experimental factor in turn change the factor to each of its levels that
have yet been tested, keeping all other experimental factors constant."
- Repeat until done.
The results from the AOFAT procedure using the results from our Ls 1(3 4 23+1) are
shown in Table 8.13 below. (The results using our L27 and L9 to derive the values for
our AOFAT treatments are shown in Appendix 8.14.) We find that by inspection of our
LgI and by AOFAT using our L27 and L9 arrays to derive the values of the treatments,
we identify the same maximum treatment of (1,3,1,3) for t=18, and 24. But for t=12, our
L81 reveals the maximum at (1,3,2,3) (Table 8.14).
Table 8.13. AOFAT for AOI for t=12, 18, 24.
treatment t=12 treatment t=18 treatment t=24
2,2,2,2 56.28 2,2,2,2 51.54 2,2,2,2 45.79
2,2,2,3 59.62 2,2,2,3 54.30 2,2,2,3 47.46
2,2,2,1 51.34 222,1 46.40 2,2,21 39.75
2,2,3,3 57.21 2,2,3,3 52.48 2,2,3,3 46.6
2,2,1,3 61.92 2,2,1,3 55.87 2,2,1,3 47.75
2,3,1,3 64.08 2,3,1,3 57.25 2,3,1,3 47.92
2,1,1,3 59.97 2,1,1,3 54.63 2,1,13 47.50
1,3,1,3 64.53 1,3,1,3 57.94 1,3,1,3 48.58
3,3,1,3 63.63 3,3,1,3 53.07 3,3,1,3 47.67
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Table 8.14. AOI for t=12, 18, and 24, OFAT L9 vs. L2 7 and L81.
L8 1(34 3 +1) AOFAT L27  AOFAT L9  I%AI I%AI
max
.2 axAOFAT AOFATtreatment AOI by AOI AOI
inspection AOFAT AOFAT L27 vs. L8 i L9vs. L81
t=12 1,3,1,3 $ 64.53 M $ 65.39 M $ 65.75 M 1 % 2 %
t=18 1,3,1,3 $ 57.94 M $ 59.89 M $ 60.56 M 3% 5 %
1,3,1,3 - $ 51.27 M $ 52.42 M 5 % 7 %*
t=24 1,3,2,3 $ 48.88M - - -
*relative to (1,3,2,3)
Findings
- For t=12, and 18, AOFAT procedure finds the same treatment for the
maximum AOI as the one derived using our L27 and the one revealed
by the L81 orthogonal array.
- For t=24, the AOFAT procedure derives the maximum treatment that is
identical to the one revealed by L27. It is different from the derived
maximum of L81.
- For t=24, although the derived maximum from L9 is different from the
revealed maximum of L81, the maximum AOI value from L81 is within
the 95% Cl of the L9 treatment for the maximum AOI (Table 8.11).
Summary of the AOFAT testing
We ran the AOFAT procedure using derived values from our L27 and L9 orthogonal
arrays to find the maximum AOI for the time periods of t=12, 18, and 24. Except for
t=24, we find that the OFAT approach finds the same treatment that is revealed by the
full-factorial L81 and derived from our L2 7. At t=24, although the AOFAT maximum
AOI treatment is different from the L81 revealed maximum, it is close (Table 8.14).
And the derived AOI from OFAT for t= 12 and t= 18 are also close to our gold standard
of L81 (Table 8.14).
8.7 Summary
The objective of this chapter was to repeat our decision analysis method of Chapter 6
using a different decision - to maximize AOL. The goal was to determine whether there
is additional support for our method by testing it using a different corporate decision
and also to determine whether the findings of Chapter 6 can be sustained.
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To find support for the predictive power of the controllable variables and for our DOE-
based decision analysis method, we proceeded through a progressive series of tests
using L81, L27, L9 orthogonal arrays, and Frey's AOFAT procedure. Our
L81(34 ,23+1) full factorial array served as our "gold standard." The L27(34-1,2 3+1) is a
high resolution array and our L' 9(34-2+2,23+1) is a low resolution array. Table 8.15
presents the p values for the independent variables and their interactions. The data
suggests that the controllable variables and the interactions shown have predictive
power for AOL. The exceptions are R&D at t=12, the 3-fi at t=18, and yield at t=24.
Table 8.15. p values for controllable factors for AOI for t=12, 18, and 24.
controllable factors' p values
L81  L27 U9
t=12 t=18 t=24 t--12 t-18 t-24 t=12 t--18 t-24
R&D 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.085 0.050 0.058
yield 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.020 0.104
COGS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.014 0.057
prod. price 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.036
yield*COGS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.017 0.014 - - -
yield*price 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.033 0.021 - - -
COGS*price 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.060 0.038 0.044 - -
yield*COGS* 0.013 0.758 0.025 - - -
price
Table 8.16 shows that the % contributions of the interactions are small.
Table 8.16. % contribution of interaction to AOI.
% contribution of interactions to the outcome of AOI
L81  L27 L9
t=12 t=18 t=24 t=12 t=18 t=24 t=12 t=18 t=24
interactions 0.43% 2.2% 6.5% 0.41% 2.3% 7.7% - - -
We also tested the statistical significance of the uncontrollable variables on our AOI
outcome (Table 8.17). Data indicate that the uncontrollable variables do create
significant uncertainty conditions that have a strong influence on AOL.
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Table 8.17. p values for uncontrollables for AOI for t=12, 18, 24
uncontrollable factors' p values for AOI outcome
L81 L27 L9
t= 12 t=18 t=24 t=12 t=18 t=24 t=12 t=18 t=24
ind.demand 0.033 0.001 0.001 0.027 0.001 0.002 0.027 0.001 0.002
ADI orders 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
compet'nes 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
The data from these analyses suggest that the controllable and uncontrollable variables
have strong predictive power on AOL. We summarize our findings for AOI maxima for
each of the time periods in our progression of experimental designs in Table 8.18*.
Table 8.18. AOI for t=12, 18, and 24, OFAT-L9 vs. L2 7 and L8 1.
4 31 AOFAT | AOFAT
, L81(34,2+1) L92 L%AI %Al
. mx 2 9 AOFAT AOFAT
AOI by AOI AOI L2 7 vs. L81  L9 vs. L81
inspection AOFAT AOFAT
t=12 1,31,3 $ 64.53 M $ 65.39 M $ 65.75 M 1 % 2%
t=18 1,3,1,3 $ 57.94 M $ 59.89 M $ 60.56 M 3% 5%
1,3,1,3 - $ 51.27 M $ 52.42 M 5 % * 7 %
t=24 1,3,2,3 $ 48.88M - - - -
*relative to (1,3,2,3)
8.8 Conclusions
The conclusions that follow are nearly identical to those of chapter 6. Consistent with
our goal of making each surrogate experiment description self-contained, the conclusion
are repeated here. These results suggest to us that the findings from chapter 6 are not
just simply fortuitous. They suggest to us that our DOE-base decision analysis method
has validity. In Part III of this thesis, we will test whether this validity is persistent in
the field with real company experiments.
We infer that:
*
This is the same table as Table 8.14 and repeated here for completeness.
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" The system dynamics model of ADI is a valid company surrogate for the decision-
analysis situation to maximize AOL.
- Our controllable and uncontrollable variables have strong explanatory and predictive
power for our outcome of annual operating income (AOI).
- At the scale of our decision analysis, the interactions among the controllable variables
are small.
" From a very small sample (L9) of the entire solution space (L81), we can design a
decision that yields the maximum outcome. The L9 statistics reveal consistent relative
importance of the controllable and uncontrollable variables to the outcome vis d vis
results obtained from our L27 and L81. The desirable property of AOI equifinality
between L9, L27 and L81 is maintained for all three time periods of t=12, 18, and 24.
" With a larger sample (L27) we can also find the influence of 2-fi. Moreover, the
derived maxima are identical to the one revealed by the full-factorial space specified
by our L81 array; in the one exception though the maxima are different, the values are
within the 95 % Cl.
" The outcomes can be analyzed over the entire uncertainty space.
" The Adaptive One-Factor-At-A-Time method is economical and efficient in finding a
treatment that yields a maximum outcome that is very consistent with the revealed
maxima of the L81 full factorial space.
The data from our ADI-surrogate simulations of our AOI corporate decision suggest
there is support for our DOE-based method for decision analysis. Our method is able to
parametrize the system behavior of the corporation for the AOI outcome. It is also able
to parametrize the set of uncontrollable uncertainties it faces. Therefore, using our
DOE-based method, we can explore the entire solution space over the entire space of
environmental uncertainty. The data show that the interactions are small and their
contribution to the outcome is small. Therefore the data show that system behavior of
the corporation for the AOI outcome is "nearly-decomposable" (Simon 1997) at our
scale of analysis (Bar-Yam 1997), which says that we can represent that emergent
system behavior with a linear model.
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Appendix 8.1. L81(34,23+1) data set for t=12.
Annual Operating Income in $M
uncontrollable variables
-ind.same llower ower lower lower higher higher higher higher deand
<-ADI
same weaker weaker stronger stronger weaker weaker stronger stronger orders
<-Com
same weaker stronger weaker stronger weaker stronger weaker stronger petitive
000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
current worst best AOI
case case $M
1 1,1,1,1 55.050 47.810 41.030 59.820 54.730 49.550 45.210 62.030 56.560 52.421
2 1,1,1,2 60.500 53.060 45.270 64.420 60.050 55.020 46.890 66.910 61.430 57.061
3 1,1,1,3 63.820 56.150 48.260 68.390 63.300 58.440 50.010 70.570 65.020 60.440
4 1,1,2,1 51.900 44.500 38.180 55.830 51.770 46.330 39.620 57.900 53.440 48.830
5 1,1,2,2 57.980 50.360 42.760 61.240 57.140 52.200 44.420 63.780 58.490 54.263
6 1,1,2,3 61.490 53.740 45.810 65.310 60.640 55.880 47.580 67.910 62.160 57.836
7 1,1,3,1 53.680 50.910 50.040 56,240 55.300 51.180 50.200 56.420 55.580 53.283
8 1,1,3,2 54.970 47.150 40.110 57.490 54.090 48.970 41.730 59.970 55.440 51.102
9 1,1,3,3 56.930 51.180 43.300 62.200 57.760 53.180 45.090 64.920 59.280 54.871
10 1,2,1,1 57,120 50.080 43.160 62.430 56.980 51.810 44.580 64.640 58.840 54.404
11 1,2,1,2 62.330 54.910 47.290 66.780 62.220 56.920 48.850 69.010 63.740 59.117
12 1,2,1,3 65.580 57.910 50.270 70.630 65.350 60.260 51.930 72.290 67.290 62.390
13 1,2,2,1 54.770 47.340 40.810 59.250 54.540 49.040 42.260 61.410 56.310 51.748
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14 1,2,2,2 60.220 52.650 45.060 63.930 59.830 54.560 46.660 66.400 61.150 56.718
15 1,2,2,3 63.510 55.740 48.060 67.910 63.060 57.970 49.750 70.130 64.730 60.096
16 1,2,3,1 51.870 44.290 38.240 55.640 51.870 46.080 39.650 57.670 53.500 48.757
17 1,2,3,2 57.910 50.130 42.770 61.050 57.210 51.910 44.390 63.550 58.500 54.158
18 1,2,3,3 61.390 53.510 45.800 65.120 60.670 55.590 47.530 67.880 62.150 57.738
19 1,3,1,1 59.300 52.360 45.480 65.180 59.400 54.100 46.830 67.210 61.180 56.782
20 1,3,1,2 64.340 56.920 49.540 69.400 64.530 58.990 51.020 71.020 66.321 61.342
21 1,3,1,3 67.540 59.890 52.490 73.110 67.600 62.280 54.060 74.170 69.620 64.529
22 1,3,2,1 57.370 50.220 48.470 62.580 57.350 51.890 44.860 64.740 59.140 55.180
23 1,3,2,2 62.5 54.97 47.61 66.9 62.54 56.95 49.11 69.05 64.05 59.298
24 1,3,2,3 65.710 51.940 51.520 60.260 65.630 60.260 52.150 72.290 67.550 60.812
25 1,3,3,1 55.310 47.800 41.430 59.870 55.230 49.420 42.840 61.990 56.970 52.318
26 1,3,3,2 60.630 52.960 45.620 64.390 60.500 54.810 47.150 66.790 61.770 57.180
27 1,3,3,3 63.880 55.990 48.590 68.350 63.630 58.190 50.210 70.390 65.320 60.506
28 2,1,1,1 54.790 47.380 40.750 59.430 54.290 49.210 42.210 61.650 56.120 51.759
29 2,1,1,2 60.000 52.600 44.970 63.980 59.560 54.540 46.570 66.480 60.930 56.626
30 2,1,1,3 63.280 55.670 47.970 67.890 62.770 57.930 49.670 70.080 64.480 59.971
31 2,1,2,1 51.440 44.070 37.890 55.440 51.320 45.900 39.310 57.520 52.990 48.431
32 2,1,2,2 57.480 49.890 42.460 60.800 56.650 51.720 44.090 63.350 58.000 53.827
33 2,1,2,3 60.950 53.240 46.480 64.810 60.110 55.360 47.240 67.420 61.620 57.470
34 2,1,3,1 47.880 40.690 34.860 51.460 47.950 42.570 36.220 53.390 49.480 44.944
35 2,1,3,2 54.460 46.680 39.800 57.060 53.600 48.490 41.390 59.540 54.940 50.662
36 2,1,3,3 58.380 50.670 42.960 61.710 57.220 52.650 44.730 64.440 58.730 54.610
37 2,2,1,1 56.670 49.660 42.890 62.040 56.540 51.380 44.290 64.260 58.400 54.014
38 2,2,1,2 61.840 54.460 47.010 66.330 61.740 56.440 48.530 68.570 63.250 58.686
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57.440 49.970 70.130 64.830 59.750 51.60039
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41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
2,2,1,3
2,2,2,1
2,2,2,2
2,2,2,3
2,2,3,1
2,2,3,2
2,2,3,3
2,3,1,1
2,3,1,2
2,3,1,3
2,3,2,1
2,3,2,2
2,3,2,3
2,3,3,1
2,3,3,2
2,3,3,3
3,1,1,1
3,1,1,2
3,1,1,3
3,1,2,1
3,1,2,2
3,1,2,3
3,1,3,1
3,1,3,2
3,1,3,3
65.050
54.310
59.720
62.980
51.410
57.400
60.850
58.860
63.860
67.020
56.920
62.010
65.190
54.860
60.140
63.350
54.130
59.500
62.740
50.970
56.970
60.390
47.400
53.940
57.820
46.920
52.190
55.250
43.860
49.660
53.010
51.960
56.490
59.450
49.800
54.520
57.480
47.380
52.500
55.500
46.980
52.180
55.240
43.660
49.450
52.790
40.270
46.220
50.200
40.530
44.760
47.750
37.950
42.470
45.480
45.220
49.270
52.200
43.200
47.320
50.260
41.150
45.330
48.280
40.520
44.720
47.710
37.650
42.200
45.220
34.620
39.530
42.690
58.860
63.490
67.410
55.260
60.620
64.420
64.790
68.950
72.610
62.190
66.460
70.240
59.480
63.950
67.850
58.990
63.480
67.350
55.000
60.300
64.260
51.030
56.560
61.150
71.800 66.750
54.100
59.340
62.540
51.430
56.710
60.130
58.960
64.050
67.090
56.910
62.060
65.110
54.790
60.010
63.110
53.820
59.060
62.230
49.700
56.130
59.560
47.470
53.070
56.660
48.610
54.080
57.450
45.640
51.430
55.070
53.670
58.530
61.790
51.460
56.470
59.750
48.990
54.340
57.670
48.680
54.070
57.450
45.450
51.230
54.840
42.130
47.990
52.120
161
41.960
46.340
49.410
39.340
44.070
47.180
46.540
50.720
53.750
44.570
48.800
51.820
42.540
46.830
49.880
41.950
46.300
49.400
39.050
43.810
46.950
35.950
41.100
44.430
61.020
65.960
69.640
57.280
63.120
67.190
66.830
70.580
73.680
64.350
68.620
71.800
61.610
66.350
69.900
61.210
65.980
69.550
57.090
62.850
66.870
52.960
59.050
63.890
55.870
60.660
64.190
53.060
58.010
61.600
60.740
65.830
69.090
58.700
63.560
67.020
56.630
61.280
64.780
55.640
60.410
63.920
52.520
57.460
61.040
49.000
54.410
58.150
61.924
51.353
56.282
59.624
48.359
53.721
57.214
56.397
60.920
64.076
54.233
58.869
62.074
51,937
56.748
60.036
51.324
56.189
59.510
47.899
53.378
56.880
44.537
50.208
54.123
64 3,2,1,1 56.220 49.280 42.660 61.600 56.08 50.940 44.040 63.820 57.930 53.619
65 3,2,1,2 61.340 54.060 46.760 65.840 61.25 55.990 48.270 68.070 62.730 58.257
66 3,2,1,3 64.520 57.030 49.720 69.590 64.3 59.300 51.330 71.250 66.200 61.471
67 3.2.2.1 53.850 46.520 40.290 58.420 53.63 48.170 41.700 60.590 55.390 50.951
68 3.2.2.2 59.210 51.770 44.520 62.990 58.840 53.600 46.070 65.460 60.130 55.843
69 3.2.2.3 62.430 54.820 47.490 66.870 62.000 56.970 49.120 69.080 63.630 59.157
70 3,2,3,1 50.940 43.440 37.710 54.820 50.950 45.200 39.080 56.850 52.580 47.952
71 3,2,3,2 56.890 49.220 42.210 60.120 56.200 50.940 43.780 62.620 57.480 53.273
72 3,2,3,3 60.290 52.560 45.220 64.070 59.580 54.550 46.890 66.640 61.030 56.759
73 3,3,1,1 58.410 51.590 45.000 64.350 58.520 53.260 46.310 66.380 60.280 56.011
74 3,3,1,2 63.370 56.110 49.030 68.460 63.570 58.110 50.470 70.080 65.330 60.503
75 3,3,1,3 66.500 59.050 51.950 72.070 66.580 61.360 53.480 73.140 68.560 63.632
76 3,3,2,1 56.460 49.410 42.980 61.750 56.460 51.030 44.330 63.910 58.220 53.839
77 3,3,2,2 61.510 54.130 47.080 65.970 61.560 56.020 48.540 68.110 63.050 58.441
78 3,3,2,3 64.650 57.070 50.000 69.700 64.590 59.300 51.550 71.250 66.470 61.620
79 3,3,3,1 54.400 46.980 40.920 59.040 54.330 48.550 42.280 61.170 56.050 51.524
80 3,3,3,2 59.630 52.080 45.080 63.450 59.210 53.860 46.570 65.850 60.760 56.277
81 3,3,3,3 62.800 55.080 48.020 67.310 62.570 57.200 49.500 69.350 64.220 59.561
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Appendix 8.2 ANOVA Tables for L8 1(34,23 +1) at t=12, 18, 24.
General Linear Model: L.,(3 4,23+1) Op. Inc. t=12
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 21.123 9.150 4.575 109.52 0.000
yield 2 314.615 353.614 176.807 4232.55 0.000
cogs 2 320.463 347.527 173.763 4159.69 0.000
price 2 908.881 912.325 456.162 10919.99 0.000
yield*cogs 4 6.967 7.620 1.905 45.60 0.000
yield*price 4 3.384 3.623 0.906 21.68 0.000
cogs*price 4 2.178 2.209 0.552 13.22 0.000
yield*cogs*price 8 0.918 0.918 0.115 2.75 0.013
Error 51 2.130 2.130 0.042
Total 79 1580.660
S =0.204385 R-Sq =99.87% R-Sq(adj) =99.79%
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General Linear Model: L81(32 3+1) AOl t=18
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 61.866 61.866 30.933 38.87 0.000
yield 2 264.031 264.031 132.016 165.88 0.000
cogs 2 278.859 278.859 139.429 175.19 0.000
price 2 908.297 908.297 454.149 570.63 0.000
yield*cogs 4 28.051 28.051 7.013 8.81 0.000
yield*price 4 22.435 22.435 5.609 7.05 0.000
cogs*price 4 14.132 14.132 3.533 4.44 0.004
yield*cogs*price 8 3.938 3.938 0.492 0.62 0.758
Error 52 41.385 41.385 0.796
Total 80 1622.995
S 0.892113 R-Sq = 97.45% R-Sq(adj) = 96.08%
residuals of op inc t= 18 with 2fi L81
Normal
60 Mean 7.017706E-16
StDev 0.7192
50- N 81
>-40-
Z 30-C-
LL 20-
10-
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
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General Linear Model: L81(34 23+1) AOI t=24
Analysis of Variance
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 109.815 109.815 54.908 52.55 0.000
yield 2 200.528 200.528 100.264 95.96 0.000
cogs 2 176.609 176.609 88.304 84.51 0.000
price 2 839.797 839.797 419.899 401.87 0.000
yield*cogs 4 62.460 62.460 15.615 14.94 0.000
yield*price 4 62.744 62.744 15.686 15.01 0.000
cogs*price 4 48.967 48.967 12.242 11.72 0.000
yield*cogs*price 8 20.508 20.508 2.563 2.45 0.025
Error 52 54.333 54.333 1.045
Total 80 1575.761
S = 1.02218 R-Sq = 96.55% R-Sq(adj) = 94.70%
Appendix 8.3 ANOVA L81(3 4,23+1) for uncontrollable variables,
t=12, 18, t=24
In this appendix we show the ANOVA tables for the uncontrollable variables. We note that
the uncontrollable variables all have p<<0.05 indicating that they are statistically
significant as predictors of the outcomes AOL. When we examine the residuals, we note
that we must reject the hypothesis that they are normal by the Anderson-Darling test.
There are only eight points; the sample size is not large enough. However, since the mean
is zero, there is no bias. We infer that the uncontrollable variables are random because
they have practical significance (Montgomery 2001).
............................................................................................................................................................
Analysis of Variance. AOl L81(34,23+ t12
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 6.76 6.76 6.76 9.67 0.036
ADI orders 1 336.08 336.08 336.08 480.84 0.000
Competitor 1 70.59 70.59 70.59 101.00 0.001
Error 4 2.80 2.80 0.70
Total 7 416.22
S = 0.836030 R-Sq = 99.33% R-Sq(adj) = 98.82%
............................................I...........................................................................................................................
uncontrollables residual L81 t=12
Normal
99- Mean -2.66454E-15
95. StDev 0.6320
N 8
80 .AD 0.584
70 P-Value 0.085
6306
20-.
1 0........
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
residuals
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Analysis of Variance. AOI L81 (3t2 3 +1) t=18
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 45.79 45.79 45.79 56.55 0.002
ADI orders 1 593.70 593.70 593.70 733.25 0.000
Competitor 1 205.67 205.67 205.67 254.01 0.000
Error 4 3.24 3.24 0.81
Total 7 848.40
S = 0.899824 R-Sq = 99.62% R-Sq(adj) = 99.33%
......................................................................................................................................................................
uncontrollables residuals L81 t=18
Normal
99- Mean 3.552714E-15
95 -StDev 0.6802
901 N 8
80AD 0.983
C P-Value 0.007
u50
60
-2 -1 0 1 2
residuals.
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General Linear Model: AOI L81(34 23+1) t=24 uncontrollable variables
Analysis of Variance.
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 100.04 100.04 100.04 68.36 0.001
ADI orders 1 592.22 592.22 592.22 404.72 0.000
Competitor 1 298.72 298.72 298.72 204.15 0.000
Error 4 5.85 5.85 1.46
Total 7 996.84
S = 1.20966 R-Sq = 99.41% R-Sq(adj) = 98.97%
uncontrollables residuals L81 t=24
Normal
99.
Mean 3.108624E-15
95 - StDev 0.9144
90 N 8
80 . AD 0.668
S70 P-Value 0.05060--$ 50- 0
S40-
a 30-
20- 0
10
1
-2 -1 0 1 2
residuals
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Appendix 8.4 Data set for L27(3 4-1 ,2 3+1) AOI for t=12
uncontrollable variables
-S4-
AOI
1 ,,1 55.0 47.8 41.0 59.8 54.7 49.5 45.2 62.0 56.5 52.4
2 1,L,2,2 57.9 50.3 42.7 61.2 57.1 52.2 44.4 63.7 58.4 54.2
3 1,1,3,3 56.9 51.1 43.3 62.2 57.7 53.1 45.0 64.9 59.2 54.8
4 1, 2,1,2 62.3 54.9 47.2 66.7 62.2 56.9 48.8 69.0 63.7 59.1
5 1,2,2,3 63.5 55.7 48.0 67.9 63.0 57.9 49.7 70.1 64.7 60.0
6 1,2,3,J 51.8 44.2 38.2 55.6 51.8 46.0 39.6 57.6 53.5 48.7
7 1, 3,11,3 67.5 59.8 52.4 73.1 67.6 62.2 54.0 74.1 69.6 64.5
8 1, 3,2, 1 57.3 50.2 48.4 62.5 57.3 51.8 44.8 64.7 59.1 55.1
9 1,93,i3,2 60.6 52.9 45.6 64.3 60.5 54.8 47.1 66.7 61.7 57.1
10 2,1 ,1,2 60.0 52.6 44.9 63.9 59.5 54.5 46.5 66.4 60.9 56.6
11 2,1,2,3 60.9 53.2 46.4 64.8 60.1 55.3 47.2 67.4 61.6 57.4
12 2,1,3, 47.8 40.6 34.8 51.4 47.9 42.5 36.2 53.3 49.4 44.9
13 2,2,1,3 65.0 57.4 49.9 70.1 64.8 59.7 51.6 71.8 66.7 61.9
14 2,221 54.3 46.9 40.5 58.8 54.1 48.6 41.9 61.0 55.8 51.3
15 2.2.3.2 57.4 49.6 42.4 60.6 56.7 51.4 44.0 63.1 58.0 S' 7
16 2,3,1,1 58.8 51.9 45.2 64.7 58.9 53.6 46.5 66.8 60.7 56.3
17 2,3,2,2 62.0 54.5 47.3 66.4 62.0 56.4 48.8 68.6 63.5 58.8
18 2,3,3,3 63.3 55.5 48.2 67.8 63.1 57.6 49.8 69.9 64.7 60.0
19 3,11,3 62.7 55.2 47.7 67.3 62.2 57.4 49.4 69.5 63.9 59.5
20 3,1,2,1 50.9 43.6 37.6 55.0 49.7 45.4 39.0 57.0 52.5 47.8
21 3,1,3,2 53.9 46.2 39.5 56.5 53.0 47.9 41.1 59.0 54.4 50.2
22 3,2,1, 56.2 49.2 42.6 61.6 56.0 50.9 44.0 63.8 57.9 53.6
23 3.2.2.2 59.2 51.7 44.5 62.9 58.8 53.6 46.0 65.4 60.1 55.8
24 3,2,3,3 60.2 52.5 45.2 64.0 59.5 54.5 46.8 66.6 61.0 56.7
25 3,3,J,2 63.3 56.1 49.0 68.4 63.5 58.1 50.4 70.0 65.3 60.5
26 3,3,2,3 64.6 57.0 50.0 69.7 64.5 59.3 51.5 71.2 66.4 61.6
27 3,3,3, 54.4 46.9 40.9 59.0 54.3 48.5 42.2 61.1 56.0 51.5
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Appendix 8.5 Data structure for L27(3 4-12 3+1) orthogonal array
co ~ w I
__ ___.J ii __ _ __U
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
1,1,11
1,1,2,2
1,2,1,2
1,2,2,3
1,3,1,3
1,3,2,1
2,1,1,2
2,1,2,3
2,1,3,1
2,2,1,3
2,2,2,1
2,3,1,1
2,3,2,2
2,3
3,1,1,3
3,1,2,1
3,3,1,2
3,3,2,3
3,3,3,1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1
21
2
2
2
3
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
33
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
2
3
1
3
1
2
1
2
3
2
3
1
3
1
2
1
2
3
2
3
1
3
1
2
1
2
3
2
3
1
3
1
2
2
3
1
3
1
2
1
2
3
3
1
2
2
3
2
3
1
F1=R&D, F2=yield, F3=COGS, F4=product price
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Appendix 8.6 ANOVA for L,,(3 41,2 3+1) for t=12, 18, 24
Analysis of Variance. AOI L27(34 ,23+1) t=12
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 4.457 4.457 2.228 48.36 0.000
yield 2 126.065 126.065 63.032 1367.96 0.000
cogs 2 121.000 121.000 60.500 1313.00 0.000
price 2 313.681 313.681 156.840 3403.82 0.000
yield*cogs 4 2.860 2.860 0.715 15.52 0.003
yield*price 4 1.078 1.078 0.269 5.85 0.029
cogs*price 4 0.762 0.762 0.190 4.13 0.060
Error 6 0.276 0.276 0.046
Total 26 570.178
S = 0.214657 R-Sq = 99.95% R-Sq(adj) = 99.79%
op inc residuals with 3 2fi t= 12
Normal
99-
Mean 1.052656E-15
95. StDev 0.1031
90- N 27
80 AD 0.186
.70 P-Value 0.896j 60-U 50-y 40-
a.30-<
20-
10-
5-
1 ,
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
residuals
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Analysis of Variance. AOI L27(34 ,23+1) t=18
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 16.127 16.127 8.064 21.89 0.002
yield 2 103.321 103.321 51.660 140.25 0.000
cogs 2 108.357 108.357 54.178 147.08 0.000
price 2 332.517 332.517 166.258 451.36 0.000
yield*cogs 4 10.914 10.914 2.728 7.41 0.017
yield*price 4 8.080 8.080 2.020 5.48 0.033
cogs*price 4 7.628 7.628 1.907 5.18 0.038
Error 6 2.210 2.210 0.368
Total 26 589.153
S = 0.606917 R-Sq = 99.62% R-Sq(adj) = 98.37%
op inc residuals with 3 2fi t=18
Normal
99- Mean 3.421132E-15
95- StDev 0.2916
90 N 27
80- AD 0.228
70--4
.0 .. P-Value 0.793
a. 30
20-
10
5
4e300
1
residuals
Analysis of Variance. AOI L27(34-12 3 +1) t=24
Source
r&d
yield
cogs
price
yield*cogs
yield*price
cogs*price
Error
Total
S = 1.02638
DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS
2 37.707 37.707 18.854
2 70.527 70.527 35.263
2 69.407 69.407 34.704
2 312.960 312.960 156.480
4 33.383 33.383 8.346
4 28.342 28.342 7.085
4 20.388 20.388 5.097
6 6.321 6.321 1.053
26 579.035
R-Sq = 98.91%
F
17.90
33.47
32.94
148.54
7.92
6.73
4.84
R-Sq(adj) = 95.27%
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P
0.003
0.001
0.001
0.000
0.014
0.021
0.044
op inc residuals 3 2fi t=24
Normal
99 Mean 9.210739E-16
95 StDev 0.4931
90 N 27
80 . . AD 0.212
70 P-Value 0.838
S60:
50
40-
a. 30
20f
10
-1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
residuals
.....................................................................................................................................................$................................................................................................................................
.................... .... ... .......... ..... ........................................................-.." . . .-- . . . . .---- .+. ."--. .". . . . . . " " . . . " . . . .". "". .".." .""""..."..".""""..".."....".."..*..".""..."""..
Appendix 8.7. L27(34 ,2 3 +1) Response Tables, t=12, 18, 24
Response Table for Means t=12
Level r&d yield cogs price
1 56.27 53.13 58.29 51.34
2 55.70 55.69 55.84 56.26
3 55.28 58.43 53.11 59.65
Delta 0.99 5.29 5.18 8.30
Rank 4 2 3 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations t=12
Level r&d yield cogs price
1 7.331 7.163 7.531 7.060
2 7.390 7.412 7.297 7.372
3 7.309 7.455 7.202 7.598
Delta 0.080 0.291 0.329 0.539
Rank 4 3 2 1
Response Table for Means t=18
Level r&d yield cogs price
1 51.40 47.94 52.72 45.73
2 50.23 50.51 50.61 51.23
3 49.53 52.72 47.83 54.21
Delta 1.87 4.79 4.89 8.47
Rank 4 3 2 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations t=18
Level r&d yield cogs price
1 10.91 10.65 10.57 10.56
2 10.63 10.63 10.65 10.57
3 10.31 10.57 10.63 10.72
Delta 0.61 0.07 0.09 0.16
Rank 1 4 3 2
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Response Table for Means t=24
Level r&d yield cogs price
1 45.24 41.60 45.32 39.02
2 43.33 43.83 44.16 44.87
3 42.41 45.55 41.49 47.09
Delta 2.84 3.95 3.83 8.07
Rank 4 2 3 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations t=24
Level r&d yield cogs price
1 12.36 12.11 10.94 11.90
2 11.60 11.50 11.72 11.65
3 10.90 11.25 12.20 11.31
Delta 1.47 0.86 1.26 0.59
Rank 1 3 2 4
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Appendix 8.8 L27(3 ',2 +1) Plots of Response Tables for t=12,
18,24
main effects t=12
E-- r&d yield
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a)- cogs price
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Appendix 8.9. AOI ANOVA Tables L27(3 4-1 ,2 3+1) t=12, 18, 24 for
uncontrollable variables
In this appendix we show the ANOVA tables for the uncontrollable variables. We note that
the uncontrollable variables all have p<<0.05 indicating that they are statistically
significant as predictors of the outcomes AOL. When we examine the residuals, we note
that we must reject the hypothesis that they are normal by the Anderson-Darling test.
There are only eight points, the sample size is not large enough. However, since the mean
zero, there is no bias and that is a positive indicator of "randomness".
Analysis of Variance. AOl L27(3 3+1) t=12, uncontrollable variables
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 6.42 6.42 6.42 10.26 0.033
ADI orders 1 338.13 338.13 338.13 539.80 0.000
Competitor 1 71.92 71.92 71.92 114.82 0.000
Error 4 2.51 2.51 0.63
Total 7 418.98
S = 0.791447 R-Sq 99.40% R-Sq(adj) = 98.95%
uncontrollables residuals L27 t=12
Normal
99-
Mean 1.776357E-15
95 StDev 0.5983
90 N 8
80- AD 0.677
70 P-Value 0.047
v 6 0 - ....*... ....U 50 9
e 40
m, 30-
20-
10-
5-
1
-1 .5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
residuals
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Analysis of Variance. L27( 3+1) t=18, uncontrollable variables
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 42.51 42.51 42.51 64.07 0.001
ADI orders 1 599.48 599.48 599.48 903.54 0.000
Competitor 1 217.22 217.22 217.22 327.39 0.000
Error 4 2.65 2.65 0.66
Total 7 861.87
S = 0.814545 R-Sq = 99.69% R-Sq(adj) = 99.46%
op inc uncontrollables residuals L27 t= 18
Normal
Mean -2.66454E-15
95 StDev 0.6157
90 N 8
80 AD 0.884
w 70 [P-Value 0.012I60-
50
40
a5 30
20
10
5
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
residuals
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Analysis of Variance. . L27(3 12) t=24, uncontrollable variables
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 96.20 96.20 96.20 61.77 0.001
ADI orders 1 586.63 586.63 586.63 376.69 0.000
Competitor 1 296.40 296.40 296.40 190.33 0.000
Error 4 6.23 6.23 1.56
Total 7 985.46
S 1.24793 R-Sq 99.37% R-Sq(adj) = 98.89%
....................................................................................................................................................................
op inc uncontrollables residuals L27 t=24
Normal
99 - Mean 2.220446E-15
95 StDev 0.9433
90 N 8
80 AD 0.678
'/70 . P-Value 0.047
Us 50-
40 - ... .
30--
20-
10-
5
1 iI
-2 -1 0 1 2
residuals
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Appendix 8.10. Data set for L9(34-2 2 3+1) for t=12
Annual Operating Income in $M
uncontrollable variables
same lower lower lower lower higher higher higher higher (-ind. demand
same weaker weaker stronger stronger weaker weaker stronger stronger E-ADI oders
-Competitive
same weaker stronger weaker stronger weaker stronger weaker stronger ness
current 000 001 010 011 100 101 110 111
current worst best AOI
case case $M
1,1,1,1 55.050 47.810 41.030 59.820 54.730 49.550 45.210 62.030 56.560 52.421
1,1,2,2 57.980 50.360 42.760 61.240 57.140 52.200 44.420 63.780 58.490 54.263
1,1,3,3 56.930 51.180 43.300 62.200 57.760 53.180 45.090 64.920 59.280 54.871
1,2,1,2 62.330 54.910 47.290 66.780 62.220 56.920 48.850 69.010 63.740 59.117
1,2,2,3 63.510 55.740 48.060 67.910 63.060 57.970 49.750 70.130 64.730 60.096
1,2,3,1 51.870 44.290 38.240 55.640 51.870 46.080 39.650 57.670 53.500 48.757
1,3,1,3 67.540 59.890 52.490 73.110 67.600 62.280 54.060 74.170 69.620 64.529
1,3,2,1 57.370 50.220 48.470 62.580 57.350 51.890 44.860 64.740 59.140 55.180
1,3,3,2 60.630 52.960 45.620 64.390 60.500 54.810 47.150 66.790 61.770 57.180
2,1,2,3 60.950 53.240 46.480 64.810 60.110 55.360 47.240 67.420 61.620 57.470
2,1,3,1 47.880 40.690 34.860 51.460 47.950 42.570 36.220 53.390 49.480 44.944
*Rows 10, 11 only used for L'9(3 +2,3 2+1 ), a one-time use array to obtain F and p values for controllable variables.
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Appendix 8.11. ANOVA L,(34-,2 3+1) t=12, 18, 24 for
uncontrollable variables
Analysis of Variance. AO L4(3-2 12
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 1.572 2.829 1.415 10.70 0.085
yield 2 40.110 43.361 21.680 164.06 0.006
COGS 2 35.022 47.568 23.784 179.97 0.006
price 2 110.133 110.133 55.067 416.69 0.002
Error 2 0.264 0.264 0.132
Total 10 187.101
S = 0.363529 R-Sq = 99.86% R-Sq(adj) = 99.29%
residuals op inc L9 t=12
Normal
09 Mean 1.291896E-15
95 StDev 0.1626
90 N 11
80 AD 0.210
. 70 P-Value 0.812
p60-
S50
S40
o. 30
20-
10-
5-
-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
residuals
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We show the ANOVA tables for the uncontrollable variables- for the specific time
period t=1 8. We note that the uncontrollable variables all have p<<0.05 indicating that
they are statistically significant as predictors of the outcomes AOI. When we examine
the residuals, we note that we must reject the hypothesis that they are normal by the
Anderson-Darling test. There are only eight points; the sample size is not large
enough. However, since the mean zero, there is no bias and that is a positive indicator
of "randomness".
............................................................................................................................................................
Analysis of Variance. AOl L9(34 ,23+) t=1 8
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 10.462 12.741 6.370 18.89 0.050
yield 2 29.960 32.890 16.445 48.76 0.020
COGS 2 34.383 47.264 23.632 70.08 0.014
price 2 113.709 113.709 56.854 168.59 0.006
Error 2 0.674 0.674 0.337
Total 10 189.188
S =0.580720 R-Sq =99.64% R-Sq(adj) =98.22%
....................................................................................................................................................................
uncontrollables residuals L9 t= 18
Normal
99-
Mean -1.77636E-15
95 StDev 0.6235
90 N 8
80 AD 1.054
* 70 P-Value <0.005
U)60-
~50-
y 40
o. 30
20
10
5
1
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
residuals
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Analysis of Variance. AO L9(34 2 23 1) t=24
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
r&d 2 42.195 44.634 22.317 16.23 0.058
yield 2 19.899 23.648 11.824 8.60 0.104
COGS 2 37.780 45.394 22.697 16.51 0.057
price 2 73.048 73.048 36.524 26.56 0.036
Error 2 2.750 2.750 1.375
Total 10 175.672
S 1.17266 R-Sq = 98.43% R-Sq(adj) 92.17%
residuals op inc L9 t= 24
Normal
95
90
80
4w 70-
40-
0. 30
10
100
-1,0 -0.5 0.0 0.5
residuals
1,0 1.5
Mean 1.291896E-15
StDev 0.5244
N 11
AD 0.309
P-Value 0.506
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Appendix 8.12. AOI Response Tables L,(3 -2 ,2+1) t=12, 18,
24
........................................................................................................................................................
Response Table for Means t=12
Level r&d yield COGS price
1 56.55 53.37 58.27 51.54
2 55.58 55.52 56.01 55.95
3 55.17 58.42 53.02 59.82
Delta 1.38 5.06 5.25 8.28
Rank 4 3 2 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations t=12
Level r&d yield COGS price
1 7.383 7.070 7.409 7.086
2 7.320 7.347 7.403 7.316
3 7.283 7.569 7.174 7.584
Delta 0.100 0.499 0.235 0.498
Rank 4 1 3 2
Response Table for Means t=18
Level r&d yield COGS price
1 51.88 48.28 52.54 46.14
2 49.92 49.96 51.15 50.55
3 49.27 52.83 47.38 54.38
Delta 2.61 4.55 5.16 8.24
Rank 4 3 2 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations t=18
Level r&d yield COGS price
1 11.02 10.72 10.54 10.62
2 10.55 10.50 10.71 10.45
3 10.25 10.59 10.56 10.74
Delta 0.77 0.22 0.17 0.28
Rank 1 3 4 2
.. ... ..... .... .. .... ...... .. .. .. ...... ...... ... .... ... .. . ..... ... .... ...... ...... ..... .. .. .. .... .. .. .. .. ... ... ...... .. .. .. ... ... .. .... .... .. .. .... .... .
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Response Table for Means t=24
Level r&d yield COGS price
1 46.03 42.19 44.31 39.98
2 42.92 42.10 45.29 43.70
3 41.10 45.76 40.45 46.37
Delta 4.92 3.67 4.83 6.39
Rank 2 4 3 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations t=24
Level r&d yield COGS price
1 12.40 12.23 12.97 12.24
2 11.63 13.18 11.56 11.56
3 12.64 11.26 12.14 12.88
Delta 1.02 1.92 1.41 1.32
Rank 4 1 2 3
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Appendix 8.13. AOI Plots of Response L9(3 4- 2 3+1) for t=12,
18,24.
main effects t=12
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Appendix 8.13. ANOVA AOI L9(3 4- 2 3+1) for t=12, 18, 24 for
uncontrollable variables
Analysis of Variance. AOI L9(34 92 3+1 t12
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 6.93 6.93 6.93 11.59 0.027
ADI orders 1 337.58 337.58 337.58 564.11 0.000
Competitor 1 70.31 70.31 70.31 117.49 0.000
Error 4 2.39 2.39 0.60
Total 7 417.22
S = 0.773580 R-Sq = 99.43% R-Sq(adj) = 99.00%
residuals for L9 MVF uncontrollables ANOVA t= 12
Normal
Mean -1.42109E-14
95. StDev 7.185
90- N 8
80. AD 0.364
40-S30 -
20-
10-
1.
-20 -10 0 10 20
residuals
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Analysis of Variance. AOI L9(3 - ,2 +1) t=18, uncontrollable variables
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 43.30 43.30 43.30 63.64 0.001
ADI orders 1 599.85 599.85 599.85 881.69 0.000
Competitor 1 214.59 214.59 214.59 315.41 0.000
Error 4 2.72 2.72 0.68
Total 7 860.46
S = 0.824829 R-Sq = 99.68% R-Sq(adj) = 99.45%
....................................................................................................................................................................
We show the ANOVA tables for the uncontrollable variables for the specific time
period t=1 8. We note that the uncontrollable variables all have p<<0.05 indicating that
they are statistically significant as predictors of the outcomes AOL. When we examine
the residuals, we note that we must reject the hypothesis that they are normal by the
Anderson-Darling test. There are only eight points; the sample size is not large enough.
However, since the mean is zero, this indicates that there is no bias. We infer that the
uncontrollable variables are random because they have practical significance
(Montgomery 2001).
u ncontrotlables residuals 19 t= 18
Normal
99 - __ _ _ _ _ Mean -1.77636E-15
95- StDev 0.6235
90 -. N 8
AD 1.054
S70- P-Value <0.005S60
1509
40-40
CL 30 ... .
20-'
10-~
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
residuals
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42 3Analysis of Variance. AOI L9(3 -,2 +1) t=24
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
LT growth 1 125.72 125.72 125.72 57.02 0.002
ADI orders 1 647.40 647.40 647.40 293.66 0.000
Competitor 1 271.60 271.60 271.60 123.20 0.000
Error 4 8.82 8.82 2.20
Total 7 1053.54
S = 1.48480 R-Sq = 99.16% R-Sq(adj) = 98.54%
..................................................................................................................................................................
uncontrollables residuals L9 t=24
Normal
99- Mean -2.22045E-15
95 StDev 1.122
90 N 8
80 AD 0.487
70 P-Value 0.157
60-
40
20
10-
1
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
residuals
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Appendix 8.14. AOFAT results using L27 and L9 data
by derivation
t=12 t=18 t=24
treatment treatment t--- treatment
$M $M $M
2,2,2,2 56.25 2,2,2,2 51.42 2,2,2,2 44.40
2,2,2,3 59.63 2,2,2,3 54.39 2,2,2,3 46.64
2,2,2,1 51.33 2,2,2,1 45.92 2,2,2,1 38.63
2,2,3,3 56.90 2,2,3,3 51.61 2,2,3,3 43.74
2,2,1,3 62.08 2,2,1,3 56.51 2,2,1,3 47.77
2,3,1,3 64.82 2,3,1,3 58.72 2,3,1,3 49.53
2,1,1,3 59.53 2,1,1,3 53.93 2,1,1,3 45.34
1,3,1,3 65.39 1,3,1,3 59.89 1,3,1,3 51.27
3,3,1,3 64.39 3,3,1,3 58.01 3,3,1,3 48.49
by derivation
t=12 t=18 t=24
treatment treatment treatment
2,252,2 55.75 2,2,2,2 50.50 2,2,2,2 43.95
2,2,2,3 59.62 2,2,2,3 54.33 2,2,2,3 46.62
2,2,2,1 51.34 2,2,2,1 46.09 2,2,2,1 40.23
2,2,3,3 56.63 2,2,3,3 50.57 2,2,3,3 41.79
2,2,1,3 61.88 2,2,1,3 55.73 2,2,1,3 45.65
2,3,1,3 64.79 2,3,1,3 58.6 2,3,1,3 49.31
2,1,1,3 59.73 2,1,1,3 54.05 2,1,1,3 45.74
1,3,1,3 65.75 1,3,1,3 60.56 1,3,1,3 52.42
3,3,1,3 64.38 3,3,1,3 57.95 3,3,1,3 47.50
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PART III. In situ Company Experiments
9.0 Protocol for in situ Company Experiments
9.1 Introduction
Part III of this dissertation is about the planning, execution, and findings from two
company experiments using our decision-analysis method. Recall that in Part II, we
tested our ADI system-dynamics model and found support for its role as a company
surrogate. We also tested our DOE-based decision analysis method with two corporate
decisions using the ADI surrogate wherein we also found support for our decision-
analysis method. In the next two chapters of PART III, we will report on two in situ
company experiments, one with an American manufacturer and another with a Japanese
services company. This chapter sets the stage for the remainder of PART III where we
report our findings and conclusions on our field experiments. To that end, we begin
with the objectives for our field work. This is followed by a presentation of the protocol
we defined and used. The discussion of the protocol includes a survey of the literature
that guided us in its development. We distilled four principles from the work of scholars
and embodied them into our protocol.
9.2 Objectives of the experiments
Our objectives are to learn from the practice of our decision-analysis method and to
evaluate the experiments' validity and reliability. For the first objective, learning, we
follow Keeney (1992b) and Howard (2001) and specify two kinds of lessons and
findings: findings and lessons from our client* and about our protocol. For our second
objective, validity and reliability, we subject our experiments to tests specified by Yin
(2003), Hoyle, Harris, Judd (2002). We now summarize each of these objectives.
Lessons and findings from our client. We want to know whether the decision makers
find our process useful and as a result take action on the outcomes of the process.
Lessons and findings about our decision analysis protocol. We want to know what
worked well and what should be improved. We elicit input from our client team using a
questionnaire shown in Appendix 9.1.
* "Client" in this dissertation is a short hand for the decision-maker, the decision-maker's
working group, or the company of which they are a part. The meaning will be clear from the
context in which the term is used. Strictly speaking, they are not clients since our research
subjects did not pay us.
193
Lessons and findings about the experiment. We want to know whether or not our
experiment and method are valid and reliable. We subject our experiment to three tests
of validity: construct, internal, and external validity, and one test of reliability. For
construct validity, we need to demonstrate that we have a conceptual framework for our
experiment that can be operationalized with accurately specified independent and
dependent variables. For internal validity, we need to demonstrate that we can draw
conclusions about the causal effects of the independent variables on the dependent
variables. And we need to address whether the conclusions that can be drawn are
plausible and credible, i.e. does the experiment have face validity? For external validity,
we need to demonstrate that we can generalize from this experiment to a larger and
more general population and/or broader settings. And finally, for reliability we need to
show that the procedures can be repeated and that they produce consistent results. For
reliability, we use the Gage R&R method from Measurement System Analysis (MSA
2002).
9.3 Criteria for experiment selection
We specified three criteria for our experiments: a technology company, a corporate or
business unit decision, and a senior executive stake in the decision. We wanted a high
technology company because of our own professional experience. We anticipated that
this background would facilitate the interactions with company executives and with the
interpretation of the data from our experiments.
Secondly, we wanted an example of an organizational decision (e.g. Shapira 1997,
March 1988, Thompson 2004) at the corporate or business unit level. These kinds of
decisions motivated this thesis (See Chapter 1, Motivation). These types of decisions
are non-programmable, i.e. unstructured and abstract (Simon 1965). They tend to be
"messy" (Ackoff 1979, 1981), i.e. not easily or readily solvable by any one fix; they
also tend to be "wicked" (Rittel and Webber 1973), i.e. multiple stakeholders must
agree to the form and goals of the problem (e.g. Cyert and March 1963, de Neufville
and Keeney 1972). And for these agreements political coalitions are formed (March
1994). The decisions require consideration of hard and soft variables (Mintzberg 1994)
and recognition that a commitment to action is a criterion of decision quality (Howard
2001).
Thirdly, we wanted a decision with senior executive stake. Having their attention, we
anticipated that it would be easier to mobilize key people to participate and work with
us. Moreover, action as a result of our work would indicate that our analysis was useful.
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9.4 Protocol for industry experiments
A protocol contains the "procedures and general rules to be followed" (Yin 2003) for a
case study. Our protocol follows a six step procedure (Table 9.1). We note its
consistency with the canonical model of Chapter 2. We have seen the application of this
protocol in PART II, but we now explain each step in more detail.
Table 9.1. Experimental protocol
Experimental Protocol
Objective
the problem - Specify the decision situation, goals and objectives.Framing Speci the problem in DOE normal form
Forecast the BAU case
Establish the base line m Document rationale for why forecasts are valid and invalid
- Record confidence level of forecasts
Forecast the sample space - Forecast the sample space in three uncontrollableF environments
- Present summary statistics of the data and variables
Analyze the data Determine consistency of test treatmentsA Determine repeatability and reproducibility using Gage
R&R
Analyze alternatives - Construct and analyze alternatives
- Summarize findings and lessons learned from the client,
Learning about the about the protocol, and the experiment.
decision - Analyze validity of the experiment
- Analyze the decision's quality
9.4.1 Framing the problem
The objective of this process is to understand the decision situation and the client's
goals and objectives with clarity and specificity so that it can be documented for
stakeholders and accepted by them as valid. The output of the process is a specification
of the decision in DOE normal form (e.g. Table 5.2) with a complete specification of
the variables (e.g. Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5).
Decision situation, goals, and objectives. Keeney (1992b) presents a comprehensive
approach for understanding and exploring the circumstances of a business problem.
This is the diagnostic phase of the protocol. It has been shown that there is a causal
linkage between success and failure in business problem-solving and the frequency of
diagnosis and the extent to which they precede action (Lipshitz and Bar-Ilan 1996).
Moreover, problems also present opportunities (Keeney 1992b). He notes that having
such a complete view is necessary for a decision situation to be properly framed. The
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importance of framing is well known and articulated in the literature (e.g. Kalneman
and Tversky 2000, Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Russo and Schoemaker 1990,
Bazerman 2002). We put this into practice by saying that we need to understand the
"decision situation." A decision situation is a description of an executive dilemma, its
genesis in context, and potential opportunities that the problem may also be presenting
(e.g. Section 5.2.1). Once this is understood, we are ready to state the goals and
objectives. A goal is the superordinate reason for achieving an objective. For example,
in Chapter 5, the ADI objective was to increase the Market Value of the Firm. The goal
was to impede a hostile takeover by sharks in Wall Street, and the opportunity was to
demonstrate to Wall Street and its employees that the executives were capable of
turning the company around. Objectives are specified as outcome metrics, viz. useful
indicators that show that the solution to the problem and actions towards an opportunity
are on track. To guide us, we found it useful to use Keeney's (1996) and Smith's (1989)
guidelines for conceptualizing business problems and specifying objectives (Appendix
9.2). Specifically, we chose to think in terms of "gap statements".
Controllable variables. These are the variables that management can directly control
and have an impact on the output. They are also called factors, parameters, or inputs.
Controllable factors can be set by management, provided they have the will and the
resources to do so, to produce distinct levels of performance of the objective (or
outcome) metric. Controllable variables can be continuous or categorical. Closing or not
closing a manufacturing plant is an example of a categorical variable. Discrete settings
of a factor are called levels. We need to discuss three questions about the variables:
what factors shall we consider? How many? How will their levels be set?
Recall that our hypothesis is that corporate problems and their potential consequences
depend on the behavior of corporate business systems and processes. Thus to find the
controllable variables, we should focus on the variables that affect the system behavior
and the outputs, which are visible to the executives. This means that the controllable
factors must be at a consistent level of abstraction for the decision situation and the
objectives that are being studied. In other words, for the specific decision situation the
controllable factors must have a consistent scale. Scale is a system parameter that
determines the level of detail that is visible to the observer. At a higher scale, less detail
is visible and less description of the systems processes is necessary for the observer. At
a lower scale, more detail and more descriptions of the system behavior are visible
(Bar-Yam 2005). And paraphrasing Simon (2000, 9), looking from the top down, on a
large scale, we can say that the behavior of the units at any given scale does not depend
on the details of structures at a lower scale below, but only upon the steady state
behavior, in which the detail can be replaced by a few aggregated variables.
Our protocol requires a three-point specification for the controllable variables. One is a
point that denotes the current operational condition assuming no change. We call this
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the "business-as-usual" condition (BAU). The highest setting is at the "maximum" level
where management is still in control. Operating at the maximum should be doable only
with a very strong effort, but not impossible. To find this maximum requires domain
expertise and operational knowledge of the firm's business processes. The "lowest"
level should be a performance that is no longer acceptable. (Note that there is nothing
that says BAU cannot be the highest or lowest level. Indeed it can be at any level. It
depends on the problem being studied.) Why three points? This is a compromise
between just two points and four or five or more points. With two points we cannot get
a picture of any potential curvatures in the response. But there will be cases where two
levels are appropriate. With more than three points, we risk making the forecasting too
complex and complicated for people to work with.
How many controllable variables do we need? First, it is important to point out that
"experts are good at picking out the right predictor variables and at coding them in a
way that they exhibit a conditionally monotonic relationship with the criterion (Dawes
1979)". Klein (1999) reports that in naturalistic environments, like in combat, line
officers "rely on just a few factors - rarely more than three." Isenberg (1988) writes
that "... senior managers I studied were preoccupied with a very limited number * of
quite general issues, each of which subsumed a large umber of specific issues." A study
of number of factors to predict heart failure identified five factors (Ska'n6r, Y., L.E.
Strender, and J. Bring 1988, Hoffman, Slovic and Rorer 1986). A study of a $150 M
investment of a pesticide-product development and manufacturing decision shows that
seven variables were used for the decision (C.S. Sta6l von Holstein 1973). Corner and
Corner (1995) in a large survey of decision analysis report that 73% of the cases use 8.8
attributes (decision variables), and that only 6.1 alternatives are considered. These
studies support Miller's (1956) "magical" 7±2 for the number of controllable factors to
use, but these empirical studies offer no explanation why. Ashby's principle of
"requisite complexity" from the theory of cybernetics (Ashby 1957) illuminates this
problem. Translated into the domain of decision analysis (Bar-Yam 2003), it states that
decision makers should consider only as many variables as they need and can address.
The variables must be appropriate to the level of abstraction that the decision maker can
handle and also consistent with the decision objective and the decision situation.
In summary, our protocol offers the following rules, specify...
- only as many controllable variables as the decision-maker needs and can address,
which are at a consistent scale and level of abstraction.
- three levels for each of the controllable variables.
" the maximum level as one that requires great effort, but is not impossible.
- the minimum level that is the lowest level of acceptable performance.
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* italics are mine.
Uncontrollable variables. These are the secular variables that management cannot
control, or are so costly to control that they are in effect uncontrollable, and which have
a direct and strong influence on the outcome objectives of the decision. The two
questions of number of variables and their levels apply here as well, in a simpler way.
The levels for the uncontrollable variables represent the extreme but realistic conditions
of the secular variables that can influence the outcomes (Otto and Wood 2001). The
protocol requires only two levels for the uncontrollable variables, the extreme points.
The same rules as for the number of controllable variables apply here. For example,
Lempert (2002) reports that in a policy study for climate-abatement strategies that of 60
possible uncontrollable variables, only 6 were found to produce meaningful scenario
differences.
Constructing the Arrays. We modify the classical Taguchi approach (e.g. Taguchi, G.,
S. Chowdury, S. Taguchi. 2000, Otto and Wood 2001). For the inner array, we extend
the number of treatments by 20-25% to include high-leverage supplemental treatments,
which are obtained using the Hat matrix (Montgomery 2001). We call them "test
treatments" because we use them to analyze the reliability of the elicited forecasts. The
size of the inner orthogonal array is a compromise between having a minimal set of
treatments and having enough additional treatments to analyze interactions. Therefore,
we use an inner array that is comprised of a frugal orthogonal array combined with the
smallest number of additional treatments required to test the "most important"
interactions (Phadke 1989). What is "most important" is determined by the decision-
maker and the working team based on their domain expertise.
Data Collection. An example of the instructions and the process for data collection for
our company experiments are attached in Appendix 9.3. March (1997) writes that
decisions are about "two guesses": one about the future consequences of the decision,
and another guess about the future preference for those consequences. A forecast is the
guess about future consequences. To simplify forecasting, people routinely use
heuristics that introduce a class of systematic errors known as bias (e.g. Tversky and
Kahneman 1974, Baron 2000, Jones and Sugden 2001, Resnick 1987, Russo and
Schoemaker 1992)*. Scholars recognize that one of the most serious forecasting biases
is overconfidence. Plous (1993) writes that "no problem in judgment and decision
making is more prevalent and more potentially catastrophic than overconfidence". R. de
Neufville (1990) observes that overconfidence is the "root cause of the common types
of biases" and points to Ascher's work (1978) that reports on bad forecasting. It is
therefore surprising that there is "... little evidence that debiasing techniques are
frequently employed in actual practice (Yates, Veinott, Patalano 2003)". For these
reasons, we pay special attention to overconfidence in our protocol.
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* See chapter 2, section 2.2.2.
How do you debias overconfidence? Work from scholars suggests four principles:
clarity, counter-argumentation, experimentation, and feedback.
The principle of clarity is adopted from Howard (1992) who writes that clarity is
present to the extent that "distinctions" (Howard 1992) in the decision situation are
unambiguous, in kinds of distinctions and degrees of distinction. We have applied this
rule to the decision variables (Stewart 2001, Harvey 2001) and their levels (Howard
1992) (controllable and uncontrollable (Taguchi et al 2000)), and to the vocabulary and
method for data elicitation (Teigen and Brun 2002, Soll and Klayman 2002, Sushil
2000, Fowler 1995, 2002). Our approach to problem definition and specification of
variables were intended to meet the principle of clarity.
Principle of counter-argumentation (Russo and Schoemaker 1992) recognizes the
danger of group think (Janis 1992, Carroll and Johnson 1990), narrow framing (Tversky
and Kahneman 1974, Russo and Schoemaker 1989), and false anchoring (Baron 2000).
The remedy for these systematic biases is to insist on explicit articulation of the reasons
why a forecast might be correct and why it might not be correct (Fischoff 1999, Russo
and Schoemaker 1992, Arkes 2001, Koriat, Lichtenstein, and Fischoff 1980). Search for
disconfirmatory information in group decisions has a debiasing effect and improves
accuracy (Kay and Galinsky 2003). Our "blind Delphi" approach insists on counter-
argumentation without disclosure of the forecast figures so that "concentering" (Barkoll
1983, Roth 1995) takes place without peer pressure to produce a false convergence
forecast (Mest and Plummer 2003, Hanson 1998, Boje and Mirninghan 1982). This
approach also improves the team's effectiveness in problem solving by enriching team
members' individual mental models (Kray and Galinsky 2003, Mohammed and
Dumville 2001, Lerner and Tetlock 2003). Winquist and Larson (1998) show that
information pooling of shared and unshared information improves decision quality and
the ability to conceptualize alternatives. Real consensus is important because in some
cases it is positively related to accuracy (e.g. Ashton 1984, Dawes and Mulford 1996,
Winquist and Larson 1998)). Another aspect of counter-argumentation is having
diversity in the group that is doing the decision analysis (Cummings 2004, Cummings
and Cross 2003) so that rich arguments are brought to the table.
The principle of experimentation recognizes the importance of being able to explore
alternatives from the entire solution space even under extreme uncertainties. Russo and
Schoemaker (1992) argue that analyses of these "paths to trouble and to the future"
should be mandatory explorations in order to manage overconfidence and reduce errors.
They propose scenario analysis (e.g. Ringland 2002, Schoemaker 1997) as a way to
avoid being trapped in a local region of the solution space. Almquist and Wyner (2001)
write about an example of a successful marketing decision that uses experiments.
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The principle of feedback states that action and feedback, in tandem, effect learning
(Arkes 2001) and reduce overconfidence. Feedback enriches the knowledge base of the
forecaster, and "the richer the knowledge base from which to build alternative
structures, the less the tendency toward overconfidence (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff,
Phillips 1999)". Feedback is important because the forecasting work is complicated.
Scholars have shown that feedback improves performance, particularly in groups
(Hastie and Kameda 2005, Hastie 1986).Research shows that providing feedback on
difficult tasks improves accuracy, but interestingly, doing so for easy tasks makes
accuracy worse (Petrusic and Baranski 1997).
9.4.2 Establishing the Base-Line
Anchoring is the bias that results from using an invalid reference point (e.g. Baron
2000, Kahneman and Tversky 2000). BAU in the current environment is the base-line
for our forecasts. And to debias our forecasts, we rely on counter-argumentation and our
modified "blind Delphi" approach. Our debiasing processes are an adaptation of Lerner
and Tetlock's (2003) framework. It is designed to "activate integratively-complex
thought that reduce biases" (Appendix 9.4). The framework:
"predicts that integratively-complex and open-minded thought is most likely to be
activated when decision makers learn prior to forming any opinions that they will be
accountable to an audience (a) whose views are unknown, (b) who is interested in
accuracy, (c) who is reasonably well informed, and (d) who has legitimate reason
for inquiring into the reasons behind participants' judgments/choices (Lerner and
Tetlock 2003)."
One way we introduce accountability, "integratively-complex and open-minded"
thought is by means of counter-argumentation and learning through feedback. We do
two forecasting rounds of the BAU case. Counter-argumentation is done at the end of
the first round before proceeding to the next one (forms used are in Appendix 9.5). This
is followed by a discussion session where the counter-arguments are disclosed and
openly discussed. We then proceed to the second round of BAU forecasting. We ask the
participants to record their individual confidence level at the end of each round. We
want to know the effect on confidence as a result of the new information disclosed by
counter-argumentation. Note that at no time are the actual forecast figures disclosed to
anyone in the group. This is the hallmark of our blind-Delphi approach.
9.4.3 Forecast the sample space
Recall that the orthogonal arrays are already defined. Now, we ask the team to forecast
the outcomes for all of the treatments in three compounded uncontrollable conditions -
current, worst, and best (e.g. Fowlkes and Creveling 1995).
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9.4.4 Analyze the data
The following table summarizes the kinds of analyses we perform on the data (Table
9.2). We concentrate now on Gage R&R.
Table 9.2 Summary of statistical tests on the data
Analysis objectives are to determine and evaluate ...
BAU forecasting 
- confidence as a proxy for learning and forecasting accuracy
confidence
A statistical significance of controllable variables
*% contribution of each controllable variable to the outcome
ANOVA *normality of the residuals
- the presence of and the strength of interactions
Analysis of test I comparisons forecast values of test treatments vs. derived
treatments forecasts as a test of forecast consistency
- forecasting process
Gage R&R - repeatability and reproducibility of forecasts
- % contribution of variation of part-part vs. measurements
Gage R&R. Analysis of test treatments gives us an indication of forecasting
consistency. But how can we tell whether they are "good enough?" To explore this
question, we apply another engineering method, Measurement System Analysis (MSA
2000). MSA is a way to analyze the sources of variation in a measurement system
(Figure 9.1 next page). We consider the team members who are forecasting, their
knowledge, data bases, formal and informal procedures, and their network of contacts
as a measurement system. From MSA we adopt the terminology of "operator" and
designate each team member as an operator. Instead of measuring a manufactured part,
each operator is making a forecast, i.e. "measuring" a treatment. There are three key
metrics of a measurement system: reproducibility, repeatability, and part-part variation.
Reproducibility. Analysis of the individual forecasts for a given treatment by different
operators can give us an indication of reproducibility across operators, i.e. for a given
treatment, are different operators able to reproduce a forecast?
Repeatability. The question is whether an operator is able to repeat the forecast value
for a given treatment. We can perform tests of statistical significant for these variations
and make inferences about the quality of the measuring system (forecasting system).
The third measure is part-part variation. This is the inherent variation of the parts
themselves without the introduction of human measurement or instrumentation errors.
The framework for the Gage R&R method is:
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actual variation part 2
g total part-part repeatability rpt
overall variation over all treatments variation in forecast by
variation in one operator
measurements measurement G meas. sys. for a given treatment
(forecasts) systemb 2
variation reproducibility G rpd
Gaze R&R variation in forecasts
of different operators
for a given treatment
Figure 9.1 Sources of variability for forecasts
9.4.5 Analyze alternatives
"The classical view of rationality provides no explanation where alternate courses of
action originate; it simply presents them as afree gift to the decision markers."
H. Simon
Analysis Using Orthogonal Arrays. Since we have a sample consisting of an orthogonal
array from the entire solution space, we are able to derive the outcome of any factor-
level configuration of the controllable variables under a wide variety of different
conditions. The ability to systematically construct alternatives that cover the entire
solution space and derive results under uncertainty is particularly useful feature for
decision makers who wish to explore what-if scenarios. Our company experiments will
explore whether the ability to construct a wide range of alternatives is as useful as we
anticipate.
Adaptive-One-Factor-At-A-Time. Frey (2003a, 2003b) presents a one-factor-at-a-time
procedure to derive a treatment that will produce a maximum output. This approach is
very efficient. We will use this procedure in our company experiments to determine its
relative advantages and disadvantages in practice.
9.4.6 Learning about the Decision
The findings and lessons from this experiment are of three kinds: findings and lessons
from our client, about our protocol, and about our experiment. The first summarizes our
findings from our client, the decision maker, and secondarily, the working team. What
did they tell us and what did we learn from them? The second presents our findings
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about the protocol used during this experiment. What worked well and what should be
improved? The third presents findings about our experiment. We want to know whether
our method produces a valid experiment. Here we follow the literature (Yin 2003,
Hoyle, Harris, and Judd 2002) and subject our experiment to tests of validity (construct,
internal, and external validity) and to one test of reliability.
For internal validity, we need to demonstrate that we can draw conclusions about the
causal effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables. And we need to
address whether the conclusions that can be drawn are plausible and credible, i.e. does
the experiment have face validity? For external validity, we need to demonstrate that we
can generalize from this experiment to a larger and more general population and/or
broader settings. And finally, for reliability we need to show that the procedures can be
repeated and that they produce consistent results.
9.5 Summary
This chapter serves as an introduction for the next two chapters where we report our
findings and conclusions of in situ company experiments. To that end, we began by
identifying explicit goals for our experiments and followed that with a detailed
discussion of our protocol for use in the field with actual companies. Our description of
the protocol included a survey of the literature that helped us ground its development on
the work of scholars. Our protocol is distinctive because it gives us the ability to
systematically construct alternatives that cover the entire solution space and to derive
results under conditions of uncertainty. This feature is particularly useful for decision
makers who wish to explore unconstrained "what if' questions. Our protocol is also
distinctive because it offers an actionable and new approach to debiasing forecasts and
makes a contribution to overcome the "... little evidence that debiasing techniques are
frequently employed in actual practice (Yates, Veinott, Patalano 2003)."
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Appendix 9.1 Feedback Form
This the form used for counter-argumentation. Examples of research partner input are
shown in Section 10.7.1 and 11.9.1 followed by discussions on their implications.
Feedback on this process
What was particularly useful:
Problems:
Suggestions for improvements:
Would you use this process again? Why or why not:
Other comments:
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Appendix 9.2 Corporate Problems and Objectives
Appendix 9.2.1. Keeney's techniques for identifying objectives
The table below is taken directly from Keeney's (1996) article on this subject. This is
not a recipe for finding the objectives for a decision problem, but it is an approach to
explore the thinking of the decision maker. A process of synthesis to distill the findings
from this process is still required.
Type of Objective I Questions
W What do you want? What do you value?
_ish list Wa g y at* hat should ou w nt?
- What is the perfect alternative, a terrible alternative,
Alternatives some reasonable alternative?
*What is good about each?
- What is right or wrong with your organization?
Problems and Shortcomings * What needs fixing?
*What has occurred that was good or bad? What might
ConsequencesarbConseqencesoccur that you care about?
- What are your aspirations?
Different perspectives * What limitations are placed upon you?
*What are your ultimate objectives?
Strategic Objectives - What are your values that are absolutely
fundamental?
*What objectives do you have for your customers,
employees, your shareholders, yourself?
What environmental, social, economic, or health and
safety objectives are important?
- Follow means-ends relationships: why is that
objective important, how can you achieve it?
Structuring Objectives * Use specification: what do you mean by this
obective?
- How would you measure achievement of this
obj ective?Quantifying objectives ective?Why is objective A three times as important as
_______________________ 
objectiveB?
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Appendix 9.2.2. Smith's approach to conceptualizing objectives
The table below is taken from Smith's article (1989). We note that all eight
conceptualizations are different types of "gaps." To show what we mean, we restate his
examples as a "gap statement." Discovering corporate gaps is where we begin in our
field experiments with our executive interviews. Simultaneously we try to learn as
much as possible about the conditions and historical situation that led to these identified
gaps. From this we distill corporate objectives we want to study. Then the background
of the gap becomes what we call "the decision situation," which gives the context of the
corporate problem and objectives senior executives want to achieve. This is how we
frame our decision situation.
Conceptualization Description Example Gap Statement
comparing "Sales are $150,000
Gap Specification existing and under budget." same
desired states
Identifying factors "It's tough competing, "The differencesDifficulties and inhibiting goal given our limited between our
Constraints achievement experience in this experience and what is
aheeet market." required are..
Stating the final "We need to convince "We need to showUltimate Values ends served by a management that this +x% more
and Preferences solution. is a profitable profitability to our
market." management."
Goal State Identifying the "This year's sales "Current sales are $x
Specification state to be target of $5.2 million M, a shortfall of $YM
achieved, must be met." from target of $5.2M."
Means and Specifying how a "We have to hire more "We are short of +xx
Strategies achieved, salespeople." salespeople."
Identify the "The real problem is "Our promotional
Causal Diagnosis cause(s) of the our ineffective material is ineffective
problematic state. promotional material." n the following areas
"Our product is six "Our product is six
Stating facts and years old; our years old; ourKnowledge beliefs pertinent to competitors out-spend competitors out-spend
Specification the problem us on advertising; us on advertising by
etc." x% per y unit sales...
etc."
Adopting an "Since the market isn't "We need to gain
Perspective appropriate point- growing, we're in a share of x% from ourof-view on the zero-sum game with ,,
situation. our competition." competitors ...
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Appendix 9.3 Data Collection for Orthogonal Arrays
Part A. Data collection for orthogonal arrays
Part B. Data Set Structure
PART A. Procedures.
Entry criteria.
The decision has been specified in DOE normal form.
Have orthogonal arrays of controllable and uncontrollable factors.
All levels for the factors have been specified.
Have the three compound environmental conditions specified, current, best, and worst.
Work Product
Calculations to predict:
(i) profit outcomes under "current", "worst", and "best" environmental conditions
for any factor-level configurations
(ii) the % contribution of each factor to profit outcome
Exit criteria.
Completely populated data set (data set shown in 2.0 of this Appendix)
BAU forecasting rationale documented
Confidence recorded for two rounds of BAU
Confidence recorded for final forecasting of all treatments
Feedback sheets completed
Step 1. Obtain the BA Uforecasts.
- Each working group member will be asked to consider the BAU case under the 3
environments: "current," "worst," and "best." In our case for HiTEM, BAU is
characterized by (2,2,2,1,2,2); in other words: "SGA" at level 2, "COGS" at level 2,
"plant capacity" at level 2, "portfolio" at level 1, "sales" at level 2, and "financing" at
level 2. The format for the request looks like:
BAU
-- - ------..---. current environment
controllable factors
SG&A COGS plantSG&A c iCOGS portfolio sales finance worse current best
capacity
level level level level level level
2 2 2 1 2 2 forecast forecast forecast
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The task of each working group member (WGM) is to fill each of the cells marked
'forecast" with a value that represents their best professional judgment of a profit
forecast. The forecast is an estimate of the profit HiTEM can have by YE 2005 as a
result of these set of strategic initiatives under the environmental conditions of "worse,"
"current," and "best." [The WGM's experience in HiTEM in combination with their
managerial and functional expertise makes them very qualified to provide a forecast that
is based on their professional judgment.] For example, a judgment could be profit of
$0.9 M under the "current" environment, $1.3 M in the "best" condition, and - $0.3 M
in the "worst" environment.
- Each WGM is to work independently. It is requested that the WGMs do not disclose
their forecasts to each other. The goal is not consensus, but thoughtful, and
independent professional judgment.
- However, each WGM member is encouraged to consult non-WGM colleagues, or
subject matter experts to arrive at these forecasts.
- There is no such thing as a "right" forecast, or a "wrong" forecast. It is a forecast.
" Note that the interval lengths between "worst" and "current" and "current" and "best"
are unlikely to be of equal length. WGM's should not try to make symmetric
intervals around "current." In fact, it will be very unusual that they are symmetric.
There is no reason to believe that "current" is a center point. In our example, [current-
worst]=[0.9-(-0.3)]=$1.2M, and [best-current]=[1.3-0.9]=$0.4 M.
Step 2. Summarize the rationale for the BA Uforecasts
- Each WGM is also requested to summarize, for the BAU experiment as a whole: (i)
three reasons why the forecasts are accurate, (ii) three reasons why the forecasts
might not be inaccurate. To do this, it is helpful to think of the assumptions and/or
uncertainties that apply. Short reasons are good; the whole thing should not exceed
300 words.
- We do not want any of the names of the WGM that produced the above information.
We want to preserve their complete anonymity.
- We use this information to learn from each other in an open and penalty free
environment. The group learning obtained from this phase should improve the
subsequent data collection processes. It will also be useful for retrospective reviews
in the future.
" Each WGM is now requested to place a mark to record their confidence of their
forecasts. This is shown below:
not
confident not so toss-up confident very
at all confident confident
This is an example of someone who is somewhat confident about their forecasts.
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Step 3. Calculate the BA Uforecasts. Using the data from each of the WG members, I
average the WGMs input to produce the forecasts for each of the "current," "worst,"
and "best" forecasts, but will not disclose to the WGMs. We do not want peer pressure
to produce a false convergence.
- Suppose there are 5 WG group members. There will be 5 numbers for "current,"
say, 1.3, 1.8, 0.95, 1.1, 1.85.
- I average these five numbers to get the BAU forecasts for "current," to get:
(1.3+1.8+0.95+1.1±1.85)/5= 1.4
- I repeat this process for "worst," and "best" environments. Suppose that the results of
those calculations are 0.33 and 2.7, respectively. The overall result for "profit" in this
case, is: (0.33+1.4+3.2)/3= 1.64
Step 4. BA U Rationale Review and Reflection.
- The rationales documented in Step 2 are disclosed to the WGMs.
- A discussion period follows for the group to learn from each other about each others'
reasons, not the actual forecasts.
- Using the documented rationales as a whole, we ask that each WGM review, reflect,
and decide whether they want to adjust their individual forecasts in light of this new
information. The adjustments will be done individually.
- Each WGM is reminded that we are not seeking consensus numbers; rather their
improved judgment in light of new information. There is no evaluative judgment or
penalty because the forecasts will differ from person to person. The differences
reflect distinct domain expertise and tacit knowledge each WGM applied to obtain
their forecasts. A false or forced consensus would not be reflective of each WGM's
individual best judgment.
- I collect the revised forecasts.
- For the second time, each WGM is now requested to place a mark to record their
confidence of their forecasts. This is shown below:
not
confident not so toss-up confident very
at all confident confident
This is an example of someone who is quite confident about their forecasts.
- As before, we want complete anonymity. I collect all the new forecasts, rationales,
and confidence estimates. Ready to proceed to Step 5.
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Step 5. Forecast all remaining treatments. Having done the previous exercise for BAU
in the previous steps, each WGM has now hands-on experience on how to forecast the
numbers for the remaining treatments.
- Upon completion of Step 5, we have: all the forecasts for all the treatments of the
orthogonal array under the three environmental conditions (current, best, worst).
- Each WGM is now requested to place a mark to record their confidence of their
forecast.
Step 6. Calculate the predictions and discuss findings.
- I will do the calculations to predict:
(i) factor-level configuration that yields the highest profit under
"worst," and "best" environmental conditions,
(ii) the % contribution of each factor to customer satisfaction
- We hold a meeting to discuss these findings.
" Request WGM individually to fill-in feedback worksheet. As before,
complete anonymity. The feedback worksheet asks:
(i) what is useful about this process,
(ii) what are the problems with this process,
(iii) suggestions for improvement,
(iv) would you use it? Why or why not?
"'average,"
we want
Step 9. Closing meeting.
" I will summarize all the feedback present to the group.
- Group discussion.
- I commit to a date to provide a written document for review and comments.
Step 10. Present to sponsoring executive
- I will present findings to the sponsoring executive
- I will run any special cases requested by the sponsoring executive or team member
" Obtain feedback from sponsoring executive
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f uncontrollable
controllable factors uncontrollable factor levels factors
4-
level 2 1 level I level 3 <- cust.1demand
level 2 level 2 level 3 senior exec.
Ct level 2 level I level 3 <:-- banker actions
U level 2 level I level 3 <-' critical skills
current worst best
BAU 2 2 2 1 2 1 a b c BA U treatment
.......................... ....................................................... ......................... .......................... ......................... 
.....................................................
L18treatment I
.......................... ....................................................... .............................................................................. 
.....................................................
2 1 2 2 2 2 2 L18treatment 2
.................................................................................. .............................................................................. 
.....................................................
3 1 3 3 3 3 3 L18treatment 3
.......................... ....................................................... .............................................................................. 
.....................................................
4 2 1 1 2 2 3 L18treatment 4
.......................... .......................... I ............ ..........................................................................................................
......................... 
18trea 
tm en 
t
5 2 2 2 3 3 1 L
.......................... ....................................................... ......................... .......................... ......................... .....................................................
6 2 3 3 1 1 2 L18 treatment 6
.......................... ....................................................... ......................... .......................... ..................... ............ I ........................................
7 3 1 2 1 3 2 L18treatment 7
.......................... ....................................................... ......................... .......................... ................................................................................
8 3 2 3 2 1 3 L18treatment 8
.................................................................................. ......................... ......................... 
.....................................................
9 3 3 1 3 2 1 L18treatment 9
.......................... ....................................................... ..........................................................................................................
10 1 1 3 3 2 2 L18treatment 10
.......................... ....................................................... ......................... ......................
I 1 1 2 1 1 3 3 L18treatment 11
.......................... ....................................................... .............................................................................. 
.....................................................
12 1 3 2 2 1 1 L18treatment 12
.......................... ....................................................... .............................................................................. 
.....................................................
13 2 1 2 3 1 3 L18treatment 13
.......................... ....................................................... ......................... .................................................... 
.....................................................
14 2 2 3 1 2 1 L18treatment 14
.......................... 16 ....................................................... ......................... ......................... ......................... .....................................................
15 2 3 1 2 3 2 L18treatment 15
.......................... ....................................................... ......................... .......................... ......................... 
.....................................................
16 3 1 3 2 3 1 L18 treatment 16
.......................... ....................................................... ......................... ..................... ......................... 
.....................................................
17 3 2 1 3 1 2 L18treatment 17
.......................... 6 ....................................................... ......................... ......................... ......................... .....................................................
18 3 3 2 1 2 3 L18treatment 18
.......................... ....................................................... .................................................. ......... ......... *,**** .... .. .... ..........
19 3 1 3 1 1 3 test treatment # I
.......................... ....................................................... .................................................... ......................... .....................................................
20 1 3 1 3 3 3 test treatment # I
.......................... ....................................................... ......................... .......................... ......................... 
.....................................................
21 1 3 3 1 1 3 test treatment# 3
.......................... ....................................................... ......................... .......................... ......................... .....................................................
22 3 2 3 3 1 1 test treatment# 4
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PART B. Array structure
Appendix 9.4 Data Collection for Orthogonal Arrays
This debiasing procedure is from Lemer and Tetlock (2003).
no
anchoring bias likely
I yes
4F
4F
yes
no
yes
yes
Integratively-complex and open-minded
thinking I
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Do the forecasters learn of accountability before
encoding forecasting variables, controllable and
uncontrollable, factors and levels?
Do the forecasters learn of accountability before
committing to a forecast?
no
confirmatory bias
likely
Are the senior executives' and peer forecasters'
preferences for the treatment configurations
known?
yes
false convergence
likely
Are the senior executives' and peer forecasters
interested in the "accuracy" and quality of the
forecasts?
no simplistic thinking,
i.e. discarding cues
likely
Do the senior executives' and peer forecasters
have a legitimate reason for requesting
forecasting rationales?
no
reinforcement of
biases likely
Appendix 9.5 Counter-argumentation Form
Appendix 11.2 shows examples of forecast rationale from the eSvcs company.
BAU forecast rationale
why the data are accurate.
why the data are not accurate.
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[blank]
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10.0 Experiment 3. Electronics Manufacturing Company
10.1 Introduction
We will discuss in this chapter our experiment with an electronics manufacturing
company. We begin with a brief sketch of the company, follow that with a description
of the decision situation, and continue with the details of our experiment. We close with
our findings and the lessons-learned; findings and lessons from our client, about our
protocol, and about our experiment; tests of experimental validity, and an analysis of
the quality of the decision. The structure for this chapter follows our experimental
protocol below.
Table 10.1. Experimental protocol
Experimental Protocol
Framing the problem
Establish the base line
Forecast the sample space
Analyze the data
Analyze alternatives
Learning about the decision
- Understand the decision situation, goals and objectives.
Specify the problem in DOE normal form
Forecast the business-as-usual (BAU) case
- Forecast the sample space in three uncontrollable
environments
- Analyze summary statistics and test treatments
- Analyze gage statistics
Construct and analyze alternatives
- Summarize findings and lessons learned from the
client, about the protocol, and the experiment
- Analyze validity of the experiment
- Analyze the decision's quality.
10.2 Framing the Problem
This step includes the discovery process for the decision situation and the framing of the
decision in DOE normal form. Forming the work team and creating a management
system to review progress of the work are also part of this process.
10.2.1 The firm and the decision situation
To preserve the anonymity of the company, we will call it High Tech Electronics
Manufacturing Inc., HiTEM. Its core business is manufacturing for firms that outsource
this function. HiTEM has many world class companies as its customers. The majority of
them are in the communications, computer, industrial equipment, medical, and defense
industries. HiTEM also has strong technical capabilities - FDA compliant factories,
Class 10,000 clean rooms, development and manufacturing of Class I, II, and III
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medical products. It has 15 plants in the US, Asia, and Europe. HiTEM also provides
product design, automation and test, and manufacturing fulfillment functions. HiTEM's
recent performance is poor (Figure 10.1). As a result, its board has replaced the
president with the VP of manufacturing. The new president has been charged to produce
a profit, however modest, in six months. He has been empowered to take strong
measures to turn around HiTEM.
net income
2000. 2001
... . . . . ... .
.... . . . . - .1... . ... . -
.... . . ... . ... . . .
1.1 . ... . . .. . .. I .-
... .. . .. . ... . . . .. .. . .. .. . .. . . 
... . . . - .. .. . . ... .. .
Figure 10.1. HiTEM net income
The new president joined the firm as a founding member and has a very strong sense of
obligation to its employees. He agreed to participate in this experiment because he
wanted the following:
- a critique of the turnaround strategy he has just launched
" more insight into his strategy, its implications, and potential alternatives
- to understand the potential impact of the uncontrollable variables
10.2.2 Objectives of the experiment
After a number of planning meetings with the president and many working sessions
with his operations executive, we set the following objectives for our experiment.
- Identify levers that result in corporate profitability within six months.
Identify those within the control of the executive team
Identify those outside the control of the executive team
- Determine the influence of these variables on profitability
- Create a set of sample scenarios that can be used to predict profitability
Construct alternative solutions to estimate and contrast profitability against the
business-as-usual (BAU) case and under the worst, and best environments
- Show that an analytical model could be used to quantify decision making under the
best and worse case environments.
- Present our findings.
216
.4
10.2.3 The team and information used
With this understanding in place, the president appointed his team, charged to work as a
task force. The president became the ex officio sponsoring executive for the project.
HiTEM's Business Strategy and Operations executive became the team leader and the
representative of that function as well. The other four team members were senior
managers from manufacturing, marketing, finance, and operations. We used annual
reports, SEC filings, board of directors' reports and analyses, and company confidential
models from manufacturing, finance, marketing, and key geographies. Team members
by virtue of their position in the firm had access to line managers and other staff to
obtain detailed and specific information on-demand.
10.2.4 Framing decision in DOE normal form
Following working meetings with the president and the operations executive, spanning
a period of four days, we framed the decision in "DOE normal form" (Table 10.2).
Table 10.2. Framing of HiTEM's decision situation in DOE normal form
problem survival
outcomes profitability in 6 months
1. SG&A 4. customer portfolio mix
controllable 2. COGS 5. Sales
variables 3. Capacity Utilization 6. Financing
1. customer base changes
uncontrollable 2. senior management interactions
variables 3. banker actions
4. loss of critical skills
Through team work-sessions and iterative reviews with the president, we arrived at a
three-level specification that bracketed the limits of controllability for each of the
decision variables (Table 10.3). "Level 3" was deemed doable, albeit with effort, and
"level 1" the lowest level of acceptability. Team members were free to consult with
their staffs or run models to help them determine these limits. The entries, with an
asterisk, in Table 10.3 represent HiTEM's current level of operations, i.e. business-as-
usual (BAU). The SG&A, COGS, and sales entries are the usual expense, cost, and
revenue items. A portfolio-analysis of the customer base showed that their profit
contribution varied by the kind of work HiTEM performed. The new strategy was to
shed customers that did not meet a designated level of profit contribution, specifically:
product-design customers with <10%, assembly & test (A&T) with <6%, and
manufacturing with <4% level of profit contribution. The most aggressive action is
shown in column "level 3". The plants in Mexico and China were unprofitable and
unlikely to improve. Losses and business practices in China made that factory a very
serious problem. Divestiture was the strategy for these two plants, which would yield
one-time cash flows (Table 10.3).
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Table 10.3. Controllable factors and levels.
controllable level 1 level 2 level 3factors ___________________
SG&A $54 M±+10% $54M* $54 M -10%
COGS $651M+2% $651 M* $651M -2%
plant capacity 40% utilization 60% utilization * 80% utilization
development < 10% development < 20%
current mix * A&T < 6% A&T < 12%
.... imanufacturing <4% manufacturing < 8%
..................................... ................ ......................................................................... I. . .. . ..
sales $690 M - 5% $690.M $690 M + 5%
cash shortfall * Divest Mexico plant. Divest China plant.
financing of $10 M annualized yields $12M yields $25M
annualized annualized
* BAU
In a similar fashion, working with the team and the president, we were able to elicit the
levels for the uncontrollable variables (Table 10.4).
Table 10.4. Uncontrollable factors and levels.
uncontrollable level 1 level 2 level 3
factors worse condition current state better condition
customer/demand lose customer and/or gain customer and/or
demand and lose no change * demand and gain
>5% gross profit >5% gross profit
Senior executives
rarely confront or Senior executives
deal openly with deal openly with
differences of differences of
senio exective Level and level 2 aresenorct the same * opinion; rarely opinion; they
nteractions request, get, or give routinely request, get
honest feedback. & or give honest
End-runs are routine feedback. Strong
and disruptive. Weak management unity.
management unity
US banks terminate US banks cooperate
banker actions business with no change * with HiTEM and
HiTEM relax terms
change in critical lose ;3 from critical gain I or 2 highly
skills skills list no change * qualified skills
*BAU
Notation: We have six controllable factors.
factor-level we use an ordered 6-tuple, e.g.
For a specific configuration of controllable
(2,1,2,2,3,2) will mean factor I at level 2,
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factor 2 at level 1, factor 3 at level 2, and so on. Since, we have four uncontrollable
factors; we use a 4-tuple for a specific uncontrollable factor-level configuration.
For HiTEM's current decision situation, BAU, is specified as [(2,2,2,1,2,1);(2,2,2,2)]
(Table 10.5).
Table 10.5 HiTEM's BAU situation.
controllable factor level value
SG&A 2 $54M
COGS 2 $651M
plant capacity 2 60%
customer portfolio current
mix state
sales 2 $690M
financing 1 -$10M
uncontrollable level value
customer/demand 2 no change
change
weak
senior exec wa
siorexens 2 managementinteractionsunt
unity
banker actions 2 no change
critical skills 2 no change
Protocol Findings
-This framing procedure took more effort and time than anticipated.
-From start to finish, to specify the objectives of the experiment and to
develop the contents of Tables 10.2 through 10.4, took one work-week
to complete.
10.3 Establish the base-line
During this step the team will forecast profit six-months out for the BAU case in all
three environments. This process is also a learning step. Included is a procedure
designed to diminish information-asymmetry within the group. And to avoid false
convergence, forecasting figures are held private and disclosure is prohibited. A record
of their forecasting confidence is made for subsequent analysis.
10.3.1 Experimental data set structure
We have six controllable factors of three levels. We chose an L18(21, 37) orthogonal
array of 18 treatments. To these, we add BAU (2,2,2,1,2,1) and four "test" treatments,
(3,1,3,1,1,3), (1,3,1,3,3,3), (1,3,3, I11,3), and (3,2,3,3,1,11). These four are high-leverage
treatments obtained using the Hat matrix (Montgomery 2001). These 23 treatments
form the inner array for our data set. For the outer array of uncontrollable variables, we
use compounded noise factors, i.e. current (2,2,2,2), worst (1,2,1,1), and best (3,3,3,3)
environments. Li8 data is sufficient to derive the outcomes of any treatment from the
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entire full-factorial set of 36=729 treatments and for the whole solution space of
729*3=2187 cases.
Table 10.6 shows the data set structure. The first column lists the sample treatments for
our experiment. Treatments 1 through 18 are the L18(21,37) treatments with columns 1
and 8 deleted (e.g. Taguchi, Chowdhury, Taguchi 2000). Treatments 19 through 22 are
our supplemental test treatments. This is our inner array. The outer array is comprised
of four rows and three columns under the rubric "uncontrollable factor levels."
Table 10.6. Data set structure for the HiTEM experiment.
controllable uncontrollable
factors factor levels
level 2 level 1 level 3
0 level 2 level 2 level 3
00o M U 1 level 2 level 1 level3
level 2 level 1 level 3
current worst best
BAU 2 2 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 2 2 2 2
3 1 3 3 3 3 3
4 2 1 1 2 2 3
5 2 2 2 3 3 1
6 2 3 3 1 1 2
7 3 1 2 1 3 2
8 3 2 3 2 1 3
9 3 3 1 3 2 1
10 1 1 3 3 2 2
11 1 2 1 1 3 3
12 1 3 2 2 1 1
13 2 1 2 3 1 3
14 .2 2 3 1 2 1
15 2 3 1 2 3 2
16 3 1 3 2 3 1
17 3 2 1 3 1 2
18 3 3 2 1 2 3
19 3 1 3 1 1 3
20 1 3 1 3 3 3
21 1 3 3 1 1 3
22 3 2 3 3 1 1
a b c
.............................................................................................. 
........................ ...... ...................... 
................  .... ...... ..... ..  .............
............. .................. ...... -
...................... ...................
................................................................................. 
................... ........................   
uncontrollable
factors
<- cust./demand
change
senior exec.
interactions
' banker actions
<- critical skills
BA U treatment
L18 treatment 1
L18 treatment 2
L18 treatment 3
L18 treatment 4
L18 treatment 5
L18 treatment 6
Lis treatment 7
LM8 treatment 8
L18 treatment 9
L18 treatment 10
L18 treatment11
L18 treatment 12
L18 treatment 13
L18 treatment 14
L18 treatment 15
L18 treatment 16
L18 treatment 17
L18 treatment 18
test treatment #1
test treatment #
test
test
treatment # 3
treatment #4
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10.3.2. Establishing the base line: Forecast BAU
To prepare the team for the work of populating the entire data set, we first asked each of
them to independently forecast profit for the BAU treatment (first entry of Table 10.6)
6-months out for our three uncontrollable environments, current, worst, and best. These
data are placed in cells a, b, c in Table 10.6. We asked them not to show each other
their forecast figures. We did not want any peer pressure that could lead to false
convergence in the forecasts. Each team member was then asked to record their
confidence-level on a form we provided (Appendix 9.3 chapter 9).
We then requested each team member to write three reasons why their forecast was
accurate, and three reasons why their forecast was not accurate. (This is based on our
principle of counter-argumentation to reduce bias in the forecasts. The literature on
which this debiasing approach is grounded is discussed in chapter 9, section 9.4.1.)
This gave us a total of 15 reasons why the forecasts were considered to be accurate and
15 opposing reasons. We asked all the team members to first read everyone's reasons
and then to discuss and debate them together. At the end of this discussion, the team
was directed to again forecast the BAU treatment and to record their confidence level
once more. Our goal for this iterative procedure was to promote organizational learning.
Simon (1991) writes that: "... an important component of organizational learning is
internal learning - that is, transmission of information from one organizational member
or group of members to another."
Table 10.7 is a summary of the data from the above procedure (details are in Appendix
10.1). Note that the dispersion of the data from round 1 to round 2 declines.
Table 10.7. BAU forecasts dispersions decline between round 1 and round 2.
profit forecast
BAU average profit $M stdev
round 1 round 2 round 1 round 2
current environment -5.5 -5.5 1.3 1.2
worst environment -10.9 -9.75 i 2.7 0.5 i 4
best environment -4.28 -5.13 2.5 1.0 4
The average of the team member's confidence rises between round 1 and round 2, from
3.3 to 3.9 (Table 10.8). A "3" is specified as a "toss-up", and a "4" is specified as
"confident." And the stdev of the scores between round 1 and round 2 declines (Table
10.8). (Details are presented in Appendix 10.2.)
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Table 10.8. Confidence rises between round 1 and round 2.
confidence
average of team' forecasts stdev
round I round 2 round I round 2
current environment 3.3 3.9 0.84 0.55
Protocol Findings
BAU forecasting and rationale discussion took longer than anticipated,
about half a day to perform.
The team welcomed the opportunity to understand each other's forecasting
rationales and to debate their reasons.
From Table 10.7 and 10.8 we infer that the group learned from each other.
10.4 Forecast of the sample space
During this step of the protocol, each team member is asked to populate the entire data
set. Each participant was given a form that was similar to Table 10.6, but where all the
treatments are in a different random order. Each team member made 23*3=69 forecasts
(23 treatments in three environments). The entire team made 69*5=345 forecasts. We
reminded them not to disclose their forecast figures. But they were free to consult and
discuss with their staffs or people in their personal network. The completed data set is
shown in Appendix 10.3.
Protocol Findings
We anticipated that 69 forecasts per team-member would be an excessive
workload.
Unexpectedly, the team did the job in about one working-day.
10.5 Analysis of the data
The objective of this step is to analyze the summary statistics of the data set and to also
analyze the team's forecasting capability. In other words, are the data we have
something we can use and learn from?
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10.5.1 ANOVA summary statistics
Table 10.9 is the ANOVA table for the forecast data for the current environment. Four
variables have p<0.000, one has p<0.06, and another has p 50.02. This suggests that the
controllable variables are predictors of the profit outcome. Moreover, the residuals are
N(O,1.5) with p>0.05 (Figure 10.2).
Table 10.9. ANOVA Table for team forecasts for current environment.
Analysis of Variance for current environment
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
sg&a 2 56.902 56.902 28.451 11.14 0.000
cogs 2 569.289 569.289 284.644 111.44 0.000
capacity 2 15.132 15.132 7.566 2.96 0.059
portfolio 1 71.297 71.297 71.297 27.91 0.000
sales 2 51.545 51.545 25.773 10.09 0.000
financing 1 26.850 26.850 26.850 10.51 0.002
Error 61 155.802 155.802 2.554
Total 71 946.817
S = 1.59816 R-Sq = 83.54% R-Sq(adj) = 80.85%
BAU residuals in current environment
Normal
99.9 Mean 9.837810E-16
99 StDev 1.466
95 N 72
90 AD 0.310
80 P-Vake 0.548
0- 20
10T
5
0.1
-5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
residuals
Figure 10.2. Half Normal plot of residual of forecasts in current environment.
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A summary of the ANOVA statistics for the three environments, current, worst and best
is shown in Table 10.10
Table 10.10. ANOVA for team forecasts for current, worst, and best environments.
ANOVA for profit forecasts
current environment worst environment best environment
adj % p adj % p adj % p
MS MS MS
SG&A 56.82 7.6 0.000 73.8 9.1 0.000 56.6 8.3 0.001
COGS 569.3 76.2 0.000 622.8 76.6 0.000 532. 78. 0.000
capacity 14.6 2. 0.017 36.9 4.5 0.001 8.33 1.2 0.204
portfolio 37.1 5. 0.000 26.6 3.3 0.000 36.4 5.3 0.002
sales 51.5 6.9 0.000 28.2 3.5 0.003 37.3 5.5 0.009
financing 13.5 2.1 0.006 21.7 2.7 0.001 6.5 1.0 0.283
error 2.4 0.3 - 3.0 0.4 5.1 0.7
total 747.1 100% 813.1 100% 682.2 100%_
R2 R 2 adj 81.7% R2 81.9% R2 adj R2 69.3% R 2 adj
83.8% 79.6% 65.4%
COGS is the dominant controllable variable in every environment. HiTEM's 2004
income statement shows that gross profit is 5% and COGS is 95% of the revenue line.
That COGS is dominant is not surprising. In the best environment, capacity and
financing have p>0.05 indicating that they are not predictors of the outcome. This is
also an indication of the team's difficulties to forecast for the best environment. This
pattern persists (Table 10.12). This fact was not a problem to the executives of HiTEM.
To them, the current and the worst environments dominated their thinking.
Experiment Findings
Small number of variables predicts the profit outcome.
All controllable variables are all statistically significant, with exceptions
for capacity and financing in the best environment.
Table 10.10 suggests that the team selected an appropriate set of
controllable variables for the current and worst environments.
We now turn our attention to interactions between the controllable variables. The array
L18(21,3 7) has a unique property. The interactions between all pairs of columns, except 1
and 2, are confounded partially with the remaining columns (e.g. Phadke 1989). We
resort to using Table 10.6, which although an unbalanced array, it gives us the
additional dof's to find interactions (Table 10.11).
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Table 10.11. Interactions
current worst best
environment environment environment
2 factor interactions
dadj MS adjMS
COGS*sales 1.97% 0.079 - --
COGS*capacity utilization - 1.16% 0.08 - -
customer portfolio*sales - - 0.9% 0.05 - -
customer portfolio*capacity - - - 1.31% 0.008
R2 90.16% R2 97.61 % R2 89.24%
R 2 adj 88.91 % R2 adj 97.21 % R2 adj 87.64 %
Experiment Findings
- The data suggests that the interactions are small.
- Only customer portfolio *sales at t=18 and customer portfolio *capacity
at t=24 are statistically significant with p<0.05. The others COGS*sales and
COGS*capacity utilization are marginally significant p<0.09.
10.5.2 Analysis of Test Treatments
We had four high-leverage test-treatments, (3,1,3,1,1,3), (1,3,1,3,3,3), (1,3,3,1,1,3), and
(3,2,3,3,1,1). Forecasts from the L18 orthogonal array are sufficient to derive the
outcome of profit for all treatments. Therefore, we can compare the values forecast for
BAU and the test-treatments by the team against the derived values to obtain a measure
of forecasting consistency. We get Table 10.12.
Table 10.12. Comparison of team forecasts versus derived forecasts.
profit $ M I%IA
aeraeastsaverage derived forecasttreatments forecasts
from the team from L18 data vs. derived
current worst best current worst best current worst best
2,2,2,1,2,1 -5.20 -9.80 -4.10 -5.23 -9.08 -4.30 1 8 5
3,1,3,1,1,3 -5.76 -9.76 -3.20 -5.74 -9.59 -3.10 0 2 3
1,3,1,3,3,3 1.94 -2.28 4.06 2.47 -2.17 4.85 22 5 17
1,3,3,1,1,3 -1.14 -5.16 1.70 -1.16 -5.04 1.30 2 2 31
3,2,3,3,1,1 -0.14 -4.34 2.60 0.0 -3.64 2.90 - 20 10
average 6 7 13
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For most cases, I%A between the team forecast and the derived forecast is reasonably
small. We can infer that the forecasts are fairly "consistent." (We will make the notion
of consistency more precise in section 10.7.) Some treatments exhibit a large %
difference, e.g. (1,3,3,1,1,3) in the best environment. This appears to be a case of over
optimism. Cost of Goods Sold is low, plant capacity is high, the China plant has been
divested (which releases new funds) and the customer-mix has not changed. All of this
is good news. Although SG&A is high, and sales are sluggish, the high forecast
suggests that best environment is probably casting a positive glow to this forecast.
Experiment Findings
The comparisons of the forecasts against the derived values of the
supplemental forecasts suggest a degree of "consistency."
This suggests that the team's forecasts were not arbitrary.
10.5.3 Analysis of the Process
Table 10. 12 suggests that the team's forecasts are consistent. But how can we determine
whether they are "good enough?" To explore this question, we apply another
engineering method, Measurement System Analysis (MSA) (NIST/SEMATECH 2006).
MSA is a way to analyze the sources of variation in a measurement system (Figure
10. 13). To that end, we consider the team members who are forecasting, their
knowledge, data bases, formal and informal procedures, and their network of contacts
as a measurement system. From MSA we adopt the terminology of "operator" and
designate each of team member as an operator. Instead of measuring a manufactured
part, each operator is making a forecast, i.e. "measuring" a treatment. We have,
G 2total G 2 part + &meas.sys. - 2 part + Y2rpt + O2 rpd
2
part 2
2 actual variation Gart
( total part-part repeatability rpt
overall variation over all treatments variation in forecast by
variation in --- A 2 one operator
measurements G meas. sys. for a given treatment
(forecasts) measurement
/system2
variation reproducibility rpd
Gaze R&R variation inforecasts
~ of different operators
for a given treatment
Figure 10.3. Sources of variability for forecasts
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Reproducibility
The individual forecasts for a given treatment by different operators give us an
indication of reproducibility across operators. That is to say, for a given treatment, are
different operators able to reproduce a forecast? Figure 10.4 shows the forecasts for five
treatments (in the current and best environments) by our five operators. It is apparent
that operator 4's forecasts show a positive bias. (See also appendix 10.4). Forecasts
from the other operators are "closer," they show more reproducibility. What is visually
apparent (Figure 10.4) is summarized in Table 10.13.
operator 4 0--
Figure 10.4 Sources of variability for forecasts
Table 10.13. Sources of variability for forecasts
current environment worst environment best environment
with op. 4 withouto-p. 4 with op. 4
without
op. 4 with op. 4
without
op. 4
mean -2.0 -3.3 -6.3 -7.1 0.4 -1.3
variance 19.4 9.1 14.9 6.3 28.1 14.0
Repeatability
To give us an indication of repeatability, we can plot the individual forecasts for the
five different treatments for a given operator along with the values for the same
treatments derived from the operator's other forecasts. In other words, is an operator
able to repeat the forecast value for a given treatment? For example, on the LHS of
Figure 10.5, we show a comparison of five of operator #1's forecasts versus the derived
values for each of the treatments shown as derived from operator #1's other forecasts.
The RHS of Figure 10.5 are the corresponding data for operator #2. The graphs are
"close" to each other; they suggest repeatability. In practice, in the manufacturing
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forecasts of current environment
10.0
5.0 -
0.0-
131333 1 1311 11
-5.0 -
-10.0 .
treatments
forecasts of best environment
15.0 -
10.0 -
5.0
-5.0 - 31333 13311 1 
1 11
-10.0
treatments
domain, these types of data are obtained from replications. We did not go through that
procedure because it would have required a great deal of time and effort. Therefore, we
use the derived value for the treatments using L18 sample data. Also it is quite possible
that our operators would have recognized that we were asking them to make a forecast
of the same treatment more than once, and simply copied the earlier forecast.
operator 1
10.0
5.0
0.0-
-5.0 -
-10.0-
operator 2
10.0-
5.0 -
0.0-
-5.0-
-10.0
Figure 10.5 Sources of variability for forecasts
forecasts
derived
We get the following ANOVA table for our Gage R&R statistics, without operator #4.
Table 10.14. ANOVA for measurement variances
Gage R&R Study - ANOVA Method
Two-Way ANOVA Table With Interaction
Source
treatment
operator
treatment * operator
Repeatability
Total
DF
4
3
12
20
39
SS
299.099
25.009
23.455
15.719
363.281
74
8
1
0
MS
.7746
.3363
.9546
.7859
F
38.2558
4.2650
2.4870
P
0.000
0.029
0.035
Gage R&R
Source
Total Gage R&R
Repeatability
Reproducibility
operator
operator*treatment
Part-To-Part
Total Variation
VarComp
2.0084
0 . 7859
1.2225
0.6382
0.5843
9.1025
11.1109
(of VarComp)
18.08
7.07
11.00
5.74
5.26
81.92
100.00
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131333 13 222121 313113 3311 131333 13 222121 313113 32 11
4-
The p values for treatment, operator, operatorxtreatment, and repeatability are
statistically significant at the 96+% level. Of the total variation, 7.07% is from
repeatability, 11.00% from reproducibility, and 81.92% from part-part variation (i.e.
treatment-treatment). A graphic of the total variation and its elemental components is
shown in Figure 10.6. The column on the LHS depicts the variations from the
measurements without operator 4. The column on the RHS depicts the variations from
the measurements including operator 4's measurements. The impact of operator 4 on
the Gage R&R statistics is non trivial. We discuss the bias of operator #4 in more detail
in Appendix 10.4. 2
total
actual variatio
variation over
overall
variation in 2 meas. sys.
measurements
(forecasts) measurement
-system
variation
Gage R&R
2
n part-part a part
all treatments
a rpt
repeatability 82.%
variation in forecast by
one operator
for a given treatment
2
a 2rpd-
reproducibility
variation inforecasts 11%
of different operators
for a aiven trpatmpnt 
- 7
without
op. 4
48. %
49.%
with
op. 4
Figure 10.6. Sources of variability for forecasts
ASQC and AIAG have guidelines for measurement system statistics (AIAG 2002).
Table 10.14 statistics fall short of AIAG benchmarks. One AIAG heuristic is that the
Gage R&R variation should be <10% and the part-part should be >90%. With this 10:90
split, the discriminatory capability of the measurement system is 4. This is considered
"coarse, " and the recommended number is >4. Discriminatory capability is the number
of distinct categories of parts that a process is able to discriminate. It is obtained by:
(number of distinct categories) = I[Var(part-to-part)/Var(total gage R&R)]x12.
Our system is able to distinguish 3 categories (19.1 0/2.01)* 2=3.). With operator 4,
the number of categories is only 1. In a conventional team oriented forecasting effort of
this kind, all data from all the operators (usually experts) would have been considered in
the analysis. With gage R&R we are able to be more selective, excluded operator 4, to
improve the discriminatory power of our forecasting system. We were also able to
improve the dispersion of the forecasts by means of our blind-Delphi approach (Table
10.7 and chapter 9 section 9.42). How to produce more dramatic improvements in the
discriminatory power of our measurement system is a subject for further research.
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We note that the Gage R&R specifications and standards were co-developed by the
ASQC, AIAG, Ford, GM, and DaimlerChrysler. It is safe to estimate that hundreds of
person-centuries of manufacturing expertise and historical data went into this effort. We
have not found any literature to tell us whether the manufacturing measurement
standards apply in equal measure to forecasting. This appears to be an open area for
further exploration.
However, we must put Gage R&R in proper context. Although there remain many
unanswered questions, the Gage R&R has also given us new insights. The method has
given us an analytic approach to determine the capabilities of a forecasting group,
individually and as a "composite". By "a composite", we mean the ensemble, their
knowledge, data bases, formal and informal procedures, and network of contacts. This
is consistent with our engineering approach of this dissertation. We can consider the
forecasting composite as a measurement system. We now have rigorous metrics derived
from gage theory with which we can assess important properties of the forecasts and of
the composite. We have concentrated on the properties of repeatability, reproducibility,
and gage R&R metric. We were able to obtain a measure of the discriminatory power of
the composite, the sources of forecasting variations, and pinpoint the individuals that
were contributing the most bias to the measuring system. The use of Gage theory and
MSA in forecasting for exploring related management issues appears to be a useful area
for research.
Experiment Finding
- MSA appears to be useful as a measuring method for forecasting quality.
S Repeatability, reproducibility, and Gage R&R appear to be useful concepts
to determine the quality of forecasts by a group of experts.
Using gage statistics we can pinpoint the lower quality forecast(s).
Much more work is required in this area.
10.5. Forecasting confidence
Upon completing the forecasts for the data set, the team recorded their confidence level
(Table 10.15). The final round's confidence score is 3.3. Recall that a "3" is specified as
a "toss-up", and a "4" is "confident" (Appendix 9.3). Although the final confidence
level reverted to the level of round 1, its standard deviation declined substantially to
0.27. Forecast performance improved. These data suggest the value of this process.
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Table 10.15 Confidence rises between round 1, round 2, and final round.
confidence
average stdev
current round 1 round 2 final round 1 round 2 final
environment 3.3 3.9 3.3 0.8 0.6 0.27 4-
10.6 Analysis of alternatives
The objective of this step is to analyze various decision alternatives: alternatives from
HiTEM senior executives. Our DOE-based approach to decision-analysis offers the
ability to construct alternative solutions over the entire solution space. This capability
unconstrains the range of "what if' questions that can be posed by a decision maker. We
illustrate this in Appendix 10.6 with two examples of algorithmic construction of
alternatives. One of these is an adaptation of Frey's (2003a, 2003b) AOFAT approach.
10.6.1 Response Tables
The response Table 10.16 is obtained from the forecast data set structure. The top panel
shows the main effects for profit, the bottom panel shows the response table for
standard deviations. "Rank" is an ordering of the variables by "Delta," the difference
between the highest and lowest responses. (Appendix 10.5 shows the tables for the
worst and best environments.) Plots are shown below in Figure 10.7.
Table 10.16. Response Tables for Means and Stdev in Current environment.
Response Table - Means for current environment
sales
.45417
.49167
.38333
.07083
4
financing
-4.15417
-3.51667
-2.65833
1.49583
5
Response Table - Standard Deviations for current environment
financing
1.379
1.612
1.738
0.358
5
Level
1
2
3
Delta
Rank
Level sg&a cogs capacity portfolio sales
1 1.593 1.834 1.262 1.572 1.307
2 1.531 1.648 1.613 1.349 1.430
3 1.605 1.247 1.854 1.808 1.992
Delta 0.073 0.586 0.593 0.459 0.685
Rank 6 3 2 4 1
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sg&a
-4.50000
-3.50417
-2.32500
2.17500
3
cogs
-6.87083
-3.47500
0.01667
6.88750
1
capacity
-4.05417
-3.32500
-2.95000
1.10417
6
portfolio
-4.80417
-3.15833
-2.36667
2.43750
2
-4
-3
-2
2
main effects t=1 2
sg&a -- coqs - capacity
-0 02
30-3.5 -
-6.9
1 2 3 1a2es - fn
30 portfolio sales financing
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
standard dev. t=12
2- sg&a cogs capacity
U1
0
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3~
~ portfolio sales - financing
2.0
1 e 1.4
1.3
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Figure 10.7. Response plots of Means and Stdev in current environment.
10.6.2 Analysis of Alternatives
10.6.2.1 Business-As-Usual (BAU) base line alternative
For BAU in the three environments we get the following derived values:
Table 10.17. Derived predictions for BAU.
derived profit $ M
treatment current worst environment best environment
environment
BAU (2,2,2,1,2,1) -$5.5 M -$9.4 M -$2.89 M
That BAU would not produce profit was, of course, no surprise; but the substantial
losses even in the best environment had a sobering effect on the president and the
working team.
10.6.2.2 Analysis of alternatives of senior executive interest
The president told us that some of his peers were questioning the need for a
"complicated" turnaround strategy. They were urging him to improve BAU by
improving one single additional strategic factor. The reasoning was to "do a few things
well, rather than many poorly." We were asked to determine the merits of this
argument. BAU is specified as (2,2,2,1,2,1); therefore, the set of potential solutions are
232
A
as shown in Table 10.18 for "BAU with one factor improvement", i.e. boost that factor
by a single level.
Table 10.18. Derived predictions for peers' strategic alternatives
derived profit $ M
peers' strategic alternatives vs. BAU environment
current worst best
(2,2,2,1,2,1) BAU -5.54 -9.40 -2.89
(3.2.2.1.2.1) BAU + (SG&A +) -4.35 -8.28 -1.68
(2,3,2,1,2,1) BAU + (COGS +) -2.04 -5.90 +0.43
(2,2,3,1,2,1) BAU + (capacity utilization +) -5.16 -8.43 -2.72
(2,2,2,2,2,1) BAU + (customer portfolio+) -3.99 -7.73 1.15
(2,2,2,1,3,1) BAU + (sales+) -4.43 -8.27 -1.90
(2,2,2,1,2,2) BAU + (financing +) -4.90 -8.17 -2.41
The data show that the strategic alternatives of "BAU and one-factor improvement" do
not produce profit in any environment except for a single case in the best environment.
Recall that COGS contributes 76.2% to the profit outcome (Table 10.10) and it is
ranked first in the main effects table (Table 10.16), though dominant, it cannot by itself
make HiTEM profitable.
If "BAU and one-factor improvement" does not work, will a "BAU and a two-factor
improvement" work? Tables 10.10 and 10.16 show that COGS, SG&A, sales, and
customer portfolio make the biggest contribution to profit. From these data, we consider
two factors at a time, for a total of six combinations as shown in Table 10.19 and derive
the profit outcomes. The data for these treatments show that this strategy is not effective
in the current environment, but it is in the best environment. At the time of the
experiment, there was no indication that the environment would improve. Therefore
acting on BAU and even on two dominant controllable variables was still not sufficient
to make HiTEM profitable.
Table 10.19. Derived predictions for peers' strategic alternatives
derived profit $ M
peers' strategic alternatives vs. BAU environment
current worst best
2,2,2,1,2,1 BAU -5.54 -9.40 -2.89
2.3.2.2.2.1 BAU + (COGS +) + portfolio+ -0.40 -4.24 2.18
3,3,2,1,2,1 BAU + (COGS +) + SG&A+ -0.86 -4.79 1.65
2,3,3,1,2,2 BAU + (COGS +) + sales+ -0.93 -4.78 1.43
2,3,3,1 3,1 BAU + (COGS +) + finance+ -1.40 -4.67 1.82
3,2,2,2,2,1 BAU + (portfolio+) + SGA+ -2.71 -6.61 0.07
2,2,2,2,3,1 BAU + (portfolio+) + sales+ -2.78 -6.60 .0.15
3,2,2,1,2,2 BAU + (sales +) + SG&A+ -3.25 -7.15 -0.68
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Realistic Strategy
The president had formulated a "realistic strategy," which he had put into action. He
reduced the sales force and associated expenses to improve SG&A expenses. As a result
of this action he expected a decline in sales, which was exacerbated by the fact that the
corporate sales executive was not performing to expectations during this crisis. By
further reductions in manufacturing labor, the president judged he could improve costs
and impact COGS. However, he did not think that plant capacity utilization would be
dramatic enough to influence profitability. Nor did he think that with a reduced sales
force he could take effective action on the customer-mix issue. Finally to mitigate the
anticipated cash shortfall of $1 OM, he was prepared to sell land HiTEM had acquired
for plant expansion. This realistic strategy is specified as (3,2.5,2,2,1.5,1.5). We were
asked to look at this alternative and discuss its implications to him. We thought this
would be a useful exercise to determine the usefulness of the method to construct
alternatives and to determine whether derived results would have face validity.
Calculations yield the following (Table 10.20).
Table 10.20. Response for variations of realistic strategy.
derived profit $ M
variations of Realistic Strategy vs. BAU environments
current worst best
(2,2,2,1,2,1) BAU -5.54 -9.40 -2.89
(3,2.5,2,2,1.5,1.5) realistic -1.13 -4.46 1.59
(3,2.5,2,2,1.5,3) realistic±China divestiture 0.05 -3.20 2.38
(3,2.5,2,2,2,3) realistic+China divestiture+(sales+) 0.53 -2.99 2.77
(3,3,2,2,1.5,1.5) realistic+(COGS +) 0.62 -2.71 3.26
The data show that the realistic strategy will outperform BAU in every environment.
Why is this so? From BAU (2,2,2,1,2,1) to the realistic strategy (3,2.5,2,2,1.5,1.5), the
factors that improve are SG&A, COGS, customer portfolio, e.g. COGS moves from
level 2 to level 2.5. The % contribution of these factors is 89%, 89%, and 92%
respectively for the current, worst, and best environments. Sales went down, from level
2 to level 1.5 and so did financing. These factors only contribute 9%, 6%, and 7%
respectively for current, worst, and best environments. We told the president that he was
acting on the variables that impact most forcefully on profit. But the realistic strategy
will not turn the company around except in the best environment. And there were no
indicators that would support a belief that the environment would become favorable.
The data show that divestiture of the China plant combined with the realistic strategy
can make HiTEM break even.
We were also asked to estimate the results of the combination of "realistic, China
divestiture, and boosting sales". Our derived forecast shows that this is expected to
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produce $.53M of profit. COGS+ is an one level improvement from level 2 to level 3. A
half level improvement (to level 2.5) was the limit of their ability to improve. So the
alternative of "realistic + COGS+" produces attractive figures, but it cannot yield results
in a short time frame. Cost of materials is negotiated with suppliers and it is also a
function of volume, neither of which were quickly or easily elevated to level 3.
10.7. What actually happened?
We were on site with HiTEM in the April-May 2005 time-frame. HiTEM has filed to
the SEC its financial results for the final quarter of 2005, which coincides with the six-
month forecast period of our experiment. They have officially reported (which we
cannot reference for reasons of confidentiality) a net income of $1M, which compares
very favorably to a loss of about $1x million for a comparable period last year. Table
10.21 summarizes HiTEM's financial performance and the actions that have led to these
results in the fourth quarter of 2005. Their plan was to implement the president's
''realistic strategy" with the hopes of successfully taking action on either the Mexico or
China plant. Those plans though in motion have not been completed. Recall that our
derivations show that the "realistic" strategy would not be profitable (-$1.13M). Their
actual performance improved on two factors as shown in Table 10.21 and under
performed in two other factors. Our derived profit for "actual performance" is $0.41M
versus their reported financial performance of $1 M.
Table 10.21. HiTEM's performance: actual versus plan
controllable "realistic strategy" plan actual performance
factors level values at level level values at level vs. "realistic" plan
SGA3 $54 M-10% 3 $54 M-10%-
COGS 2.5 $651 M -1% 2.5 $651 M - 1% =
plat tiiztin 6 %25 70 % 4
portfolio actions 2 no change 2.5 improved mix
sales 1.5 $9 -25% 1 $9M5
financing 1.5 shortfall ~$5 M 1 shortfall ~$5 M
reported to SEC $ IM
results
derived $ -1.13M derived $ 0.41 M
10.7. Findings from this experiment
The findings and lessons from this experiment are of three kinds: from our client, about
our protocol, and about our experiment. Therefore this section is organized into three
subsections. The first summarizes ourfindingsfrom our client, the decision maker, and
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secondarily, the working team. What did they tell us and what did we learn from them?
The second subsection presents our findings about the protocol used during this
experiment. What worked well and what should be improved? The third subsection
presents findings about our experiment. We want to know whether or not our method
produces a valid experiment. Here we follow the literature (Yin 2003, Hoyle, Harris,
Judd 2002) and subject our experiment to "tests" of validity (construct, internal, and
external validity) and one test of reliability. We want to know whether our findings
suggest that our experiment is endowed with the qualities of validity and reliability.
10.7.1 Findings from our client
The president was enthusiastic about the analysis and the work done by his team. He
found the BAU alternatives, the variations of his realistic strategy, and knowledge of
the % contribution of each of the controllable variables as the most useful results of this
work. He took immediate action and presented the findings to his board of directors.
The operations executive found the ability to construct alternatives and the ability to
derive forecasts from the L18 data to be the most useful aspects of this experiment.
Written feedback from the team members suggests that they found the experiment
useful as well. The following are examples of what they found useful.
"the debate created by having to validate or disprove our actions."
"relatively easy to understand and use."
"excellent, rational ... Understand risk with factors cannot control."
"approach will make better decisions."
"the value of this process is in the process not the conclusions."
We also received suggestions on ways to improve the process:
documentation of each factor and what is meant by them."
"more discussion around each of the variables, what is meant by them, and
the meaning and significance of the upper and lower limits."
"better knowledge transfer between the executives and the working group."
"the company executives need to do this exercise."
Taken as a whole, we find that the president and the team found the experiment to be
useful, but they also recommended areas to improve. We will address the latter in the
next section where we will itemize our findings and lessons.
10.7.2 Findings about the protocol
A protocol contains the "procedures and general rules to be followed" (Yin 2003). A
protocol is a process specification. This section will summarize the results of effective
and ineffective procedures in our protocol. It will also address omissions and ways to
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improve future experiments. Table 10.22 summarizes our findings and lessons about
our protocol.
Table 10.22. Summary of findings and lessons about our protocol.
Protocol Findings
Frame the problem
Findings > effort & time than anticipated. Took about a week of briefings & meetings
Lesson Should have developed a detailed procedure for this step.
Establish the base line
Findings The 2-rounds BAU forecasting and discussion process works well, dispersions
decline and confidence increases. Team considers this procedure useful.
Takes > time than anticipated, took about half a day to complete BAU case.
Lesson Procedure works and should be used for the other forecasts.
Forecast the sample space
Findings << effort and << time than anticipated, took about one day to complete 22 cases.
Suggests that the team has learned how to forecast complex treatments and has
the patience and discipline to forecast a large number of treatments.
Should have done one additional round of counter argumentation during the
forecasting of the treatments from the orthogonal array.
Lesson Can consider more complex orthogonal arrays in the future.
Analyze the data
Findings Data show all controllable variables have p<0.05 with rare exceptions, they are
strong predictors of the outcome according to our orthogonal arrays.
Data show that at our scale of abstraction the interactions are found to be small.
Lesson Team aided by the protocol appears to be able to identify the appropriate variables
Findings The Gage R&R method is useful to analyze the team's ability to forecast.
Can analyze repeatability and reproducibility of forecasts.
Can analyze the discriminatory power of the team's forecasting capabilities
Lesson Need to find more ways to improve discriminatory power of forecasts
Analyze alternatives
Findings Able to analyze and derive forecasts of all alternatives posed by senior executives
Able to construct and analyze other meaningful sets of alternatives.
Lesson The DOE approach appears to be effective for decision analysis.
Learning about the decision
Findings President enthusiastic about the analysis and findings.
Went to his board of directors with our analysis and findings.
Lesson The protocol appears to be effective and it can be improved.
Taken altogether the findings and lessons from Table 10.22, we surmise that the
protocol was an effective blueprint for our experiment. However, several areas stand out
for improvement: (i) strengthen the front-end by developing a detailed procedure for
framing the problem, add more senior executive interactions with the working group
and more discussions for the factor-level specifications, (ii) perform two rounds of
counter argumentation with discussions as in the BAU procedure, (iii) include Gage
R&R in the protocol to prepare for deeper and broader exploration of this method.
237
10.7.3 Findings about our method
What can we point to that suggests that we have a valid experiment? We follow the
literature and subject our experiment to four tests: construct, internal, and external
validity tests, and one test of reliability (Yin 2003, Hoyle, Harris, and Judd 2002). We
will discuss how and whether our findings support these tests of validity and reliability.
These tests can be summarized as follows:
- Construct validity: demonstrate that we have a conceptual framework for our
experiment, which can be operationalized with accurately specified independent and
dependent variables.
- Internal validity: demonstrate that we can draw conclusions about the causal effects
of the independent variables on the dependent variables. Address whether the
conclusions that can be drawn are plausible and credible, i.e. does the experiment
have face validity?
- External validity: demonstrate that we can generalize from this experiment to a larger
and more general population and/or broader settings.
- Reliability: demonstrate that the procedures can be repeated and that they produce
consistent results.
Construct validity
The genesis of our conceptual framework is in DOE and the p-diagram from chapter 3
(Figure 10.8). The independent variables are the six controllable and the four
uncontrollable variables; the dependent variable is the profit response (section 10.2.4).
The concept is rendered operational by its detailed specification (Tables 10.2, 10.3,
10.4) and the DOE procedures.
The ANOVA summary in Table 10. 10 shows that all the controllable variables are
strong predictors (p<<0.0 5) of the profit outcome except for capacity and financing in
the best environment. However, the collective contribution to the outcome of the latter
two variables is only 2.2%.
uncontrollable variables uncontrollable variables
1. customer base changes
2. senior management interactions
3. banker actions
4. loss of critical skills
controllable variables HiTEM Inc. 
profit
1. SG&A
2. COGS
3. capacity utilization
4. customer portfolio mix
5. sales controllable variables
6. financing
Figure 10.8 Conceptual construct of our experiment
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The response tables of Tables 10.16, their plots in Figure 10.7, and Appendix 10.5 show
that the independent variables exert their influence on the dependent variable (profit) as
one would expect. The average response for the controllable factors, -$3.44M, -$6.99M,
-$1.00M in each of the three environments, current, worst, and best respectively, show
that that the uncontrollable variables do exert their influence on the response (profit) as
one would expect. In other words, the average profit is worse in the worse environment
than in the current, and it is better in the best environment than in the current
environment. To the president of HiTEM and the working team these tables and charts
were judged to be qualitatively consistent with what they would expect as domain
experts. This is a test of face validity (Hoyle, Harris and Judd 2002).
The experiment is based on a DOE-based conceptual framework, and a model that is
defined with controllable and uncontrollable variables. The model is made operational
with a protocol and an experiment that shows they behave as expected. Taken all
together, our findings suggest construct validity for our experiment.
Internal validity
The interval validity tests are about whether the causal effects of the independent
variables on the dependent variables are credible. In particular, whether experts judge
these causal effects to be consistent with domain knowledge and the phenomenon being
studied (Hoyle, Harris and Judd 2002). Section 10.6.2, Analysis of Alternatives,
presents inferences and conclusions (Tables 10.16 through 10.21) drawn from the
causal relationships of our variables. We have pointed out that these findings were
judged to be qualitatively consistent with what the president and his working team
would expect. This suggests internal validity of our experiment.
External validity
We need to demonstrate that this method can be generalized to a larger population and
broader settings. With the ADI surrogate simulations of Chapter 4 and the experiment
of this chapter, we have three experiments. The next chapter will present another in situ
experiment. We believe that these cases are sufficiently general to suggest that these
types of experiments are applicable to other corporate decisions. Clearly more
experiments and more research are called for.
Reliability
The test of reliability is whether the procedures can be repeated to produce consistent
results. In section 10.3.2 we used two rounds of forecasts for BAU. We found that the
results were reasonably consistent (Table 10.7). In Section 10.5.3, using the Gage R&R
method we obtained measures for repeatability, reproducibility, and part-part variation.
We noted that they would fall short of AIAG benchmarks. But our protocol improved
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the dispersion of the forecasts, and by analyzing the statistics from each of the teams,
we were able to identify the operator which contributed the most to bias. Subsequent
Gage R&R analysis verified that by eliminating this contribution, it improved the
reproducibility substantially. We noted that the Gage R&R quality heuristics were
developed for manufacturing systems. And we noted that we have not found any
literature to tell us whether AIAG benchmarks apply in equal measure to forecasting.
We observed that Gage R&R in the realm of forecasting is a potential area for more
research. In the next chapter of this dissertation we will present another experiment.
Results and findings from that experiment will give us additional information about
reliability.
10.8. Quality of the Decisions
In the previous section we argued that the experiment appears valid according to
criteria for this type of experiment. Here we apply Howard's (2001) criteria to evaluate
HiTEM's decisions by its president. We discussed these criteria earlier in chapter 2
section 2.4. Here we present our interpretation of Howard's criteria.
7. A committed decision-maker. Is the decision-maker (DM) ready to take action and
reallocate resources to effect the preferred outcomes?
8. A right frame. Is the discovery process leading to and including the formulation in
DOE normal form sufficiently complete so that the DM is not solving the wrong
problem? Well posed means that the problem, its context and opportunities are
clear, the objectives are unambiguous, and the controllable and uncontrollable
factors are sufficient to the task. And is the problem framed at an appropriate scale
to be studied and acted upon?
9. Right alternatives. Has the DM and the DM's team explored the solution space
under key uncertainty conditions with a sufficient set of alternatives that have been
constructed and analyzed? Has this exploration been truncated prematurely?
10. Right information. Does the organization have the data, models, and processes to
provide the insights that help the DM achieve the desired outcomes? Can the quality
of the data, model, and processes be measured? Are the data elicitation procedures
designed to diminish bias and promote learning?
11. Clear Preferences. Has the DM communicated a set of consistent decision rules to
make a reasoned choice among alternatives? Do the preference rules consider
uncertainty and explicitly made tradeoffs?
12.Right decision procedures. Has the process produced an experiment that has
construct and internal validity? Are the processes consistent? Consistency means
adherence to generally accepted standards of decision analysis such as Keeney's
axioms (see chapter 2 appendix 2.3), rules that characterize a rational process. The
same rules are presented with more detail in chapter 2 appendix 2.2.
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Howard (2001) uses a spider-diagram to illustrate an evaluation. We choose to present it
in table form (Table 10.23) for it gives us an opportunity to note comments about the
HiTEM decision in question.
Table 10.23. HiTEM decision quality
criterion notes
committed T he DM was committed. He took our analysis and findings todecision-maker his board of directors and took actions based on our findings
framed as a turnaround opportunity for HiTEM and to show
right frame that the president is taking control of the problem situation.
framed with controllable and uncontrollable variables
thoroughly discussed with key executives
right alternatives addressed the executive's key "what if" questions under a
number of uncertainty conditions
- forecasting protocol appeared to work well.
- Gage R&R identified the most troublesome forecasts and
right information guided us in improving the analysis 0
- Need to find ways to improve the discriminatory power of the
Gage R&R (this is a potential research area)
- executive very clear on decision rules and communicated them
to his direct reports and peers
clear preferences - it appears that ability and aptitude for statistical thinking is not
pervasive with corporate executives
- concept of variance reduction and trading off performance for
robustness was a difficult concept for the client
right decision - construct and internal validity is discussed in section 10.7
procedures - we used HiTEM profitability as performance index, adherence 0
to rational and consistency rules is observable.
* completely true 0 largely true ® toss up 0 not so true 0 not true
In summary, we infer that the president of HiTEM made a quality decision.
10.9. Summary and Conclusions
In this section we begin with a summary of our findings and the results of the tests for
the decision quality. We close with our observations about our initial hypothesis - that
as in an engineering system, corporate problems and their potential consequences
depend on the behavior of systems and processes under uncertainty. That as in
engineering systems, the behavior of a company's business systems, although complex,
can be studied with real or simulated experiments. Finally that DOE and gage R&R
present us with useful methods to perform valid experiments and generate quality
decisions about corporate problems.
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10.9.1 Summary of Findings
Findings from our client. The president of HiTEM and his working team found the
experiment to be useful. Our method uncovered insights about their "realistic strategy".
This caused them to modify the strategy they presented to their board of directors.
Findings about the protocol. Our protocol was effective, for us and the client, in the
planning and the execution of this field experiment. Our blind-Delphi forecasting
method was able to reduce the dispersion of the BAU forecast. This is important
because the BAU case is used as the forecasting baseline. Our debiasing principles and
their embodiment in our data collection protocol resulted in improved forecasting
confidence and consistency. From first hand experience in using the protocol, the
working team suggested that more time should be spent in the front-end for team
discussions and executive communications.
Findings about our method. For construct validity, we demonstrated that using our
controllable and uncontrollable variables, and our forecasting procedures, we are able to
operationalize our DOE-based method. Feedback from the clients and analysis of the
data from our experiment show that we can draw inferences and draw conclusions about
the causal effects, which are credible and useful to the client. This suggests the face
validity of our method. In search of statistical support for our constructs, we have relied
on the ANOVA statistics of our constructs. In order to demonstrate a degree of external
validity, we have taken our method into the field and worked with an actual company.
For reliability, we used the Gage R&R method to asses our forecasting procedure and
found that the forecasts are reasonably consistent. Our BAU forecasting process using
the blind Delphi-method is also an example of reliability.
In conclusion, the findings suggest that we have a valid experiment using the tests from
Yin 2003, Hoyle, Harris, and Judd 2002. In the next chapter, we present another in situ
field experiments and show that we get very similar findings which strengthen our
belief in the conclusion just stated.
10.9.2. Summary of Decision Quality
Recall that in section 2.4 we presented the view that there is a distinction between a
good decision and a good outcome (e.g. Howard 1983, Baron 1988, Hazelrigg 1996).
The actual outcome is not a valid evaluation factor for the quality of a decision because
any decision can produce bad results given the stochastic nature of events. We adopted
Howard's six criteria (Howard 2001) to evaluate the quality of HiTEM's turnaround
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decision These have been discussed in chapter 2, section 2.4 and in this chapter in
section 10.8. We concluded that the president of HiTEM's made a quality decision.
10.9.3. Conclusions
The objective of this chapter has been to report on the validity of a field experiment
with a real company using our DOE-based decision analysis method. The company,
HiTEM, is an electronics manufacturing company. The president of the company
wanted to know whether his strategic initiatives would be able to turn the company
around.
We followed our experimental protocol that we had used with the ADI surrogate. We
wanted to know whether the same approach that was useful in the laboratory with
surrogate simulations would be as effective in the field. In section 10.7 we have shown
that there is support for our experiment as being valid. The experimental data from our
HiTEM field experiment suggest there is support for our DOE-based method for
decision analysis. Overall, the experimental protocol was an effective blueprint for the
planning and execution of the experiment. The data also suggest that the forecasting
protocol and the debiasing procedures were able to improve the quality of the forecasts.
Equally important, the team judged the procedure to be useful. Using the Gage R&R
method we were able to identify quantitative metrics to analyze the quality of the data
that were entered into the model, as well as, the quality of the data that were produced
by the model.
Our method is able to parameterize the system behavior of HiTEM for the outcome
specified by its president. It is also able to parameterize the set of uncontrollable
uncertainties it faces. Using our DOE-based method, we were able to explore the key
"what-if' questions posed by the president and his key executives without imposing
constraints on the range of hypothetical questions they could ask. This is a direct result
of the DOE method, which enables us to explore the entire solution space over a wide
space of environmental uncertainty. The alternative potential decisions for this
exploration can be easily and readily constructed using the controllable and
uncontrollable variables. The experimental data show that the interactions and their
contribution to the outcome are small. Therefore the data show that the system behavior
of HiTEM for the specified outcome is "nearly-decomposable" (Simon 1997) at our
scale of analysis (Bar-Yam 1997), which says that we can represent that emergent
system behavior with a linear model. We have already raised the issue of scale and its
implications on the requirement of how much to know about the detailed behavior of a
system's elemental parts (See the summary of chapter 6 and 8). Dawes (1979) first
pointed out the "robust beauty" of linear models in decision making, on the ability of
experts to identify the predictors of outcome, and to code them in a monotonic
relationship with respect to the outcome criterion. Research from the descriptive school
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of decision theory sheds more light on this subject. Early studies from Slovic and
Lichtenstein (1971) suggest that people's verbally reported weights were substantially
overstated the importance of minor facts. They undertook to find "configural" judges
(Goldstein and Hogarth 1997) (professional experts) who exhibit non-linearity, i.e. the
weights they assign to variables are not a constant but in fact depend on other variables.
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) found that configural judges' ANOVA statistics showed
significant interaction terms. And, "despite their significance, however, these
interactions rarely accounted for much judgmental variance ... judges were not
necessarily mistaken when they claimed to use information configurally, but that linear
models provided such good approximations to nonlinear processes that the judges'
nonlinearity was difficult to detect." This area of framing the problem at the appropriate
scale (Bar-Yam 1997, Simon 1997) and the near-linear behavior of complex systems is
an area worthy of more study.
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Appendix 10.1. BAU round 1 and round 2
BAU forecasts
current condition worst condition
BAU round 1 -6.0 -5.0 -7.0 -7.5 -4.0 -8.0 -10. -11. -14.5. -10.
BAU round 2 -4.0 -5.5 -7.0 -5.0 -5.5 -8.0 -10. -10. -9.0 -9.0
BAU forecasts
best condition
BAU round 1 -4.0 -1.0 -5.0 -7.1 -0.0
BAU round 2 -0.0 -4.0 -5.0 -3.0 -3.0
Appendix 10.2. Team confidence, BAU round 1, 2, and final
confidence average stdev
BAU round 1 4 2 4 3 3.5 3.3 0.84
BAU round 2 4 4 3 4.0 4.5 3.9 0.55
final i 3 3 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.3 0.25
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Appendix 10.3. Complete forecast data set.
p *mtruIlubI. Ftur
.7 - SI .-
=R.
BAIF 2, 2 2, 1 2 1
j4 I 2 2 2 2 2 1
2 C 33 1 2
1 fS 132 3 3 1 3 3
..... ...
04 21 1 2 2 3iti2
5 2 2 2 1 2 1
21 # 1 3 3 2 3 3
i, ... 2 3
22 1 3 2 3 2 1 3
n #R 3 3 1 3 2 1
1*fi 1 1 3 3 2 2
Offi' 1 2 1 1 3 3
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1 /7 2 31 2 3 2
30 IM 3 1 3 12 31
ON 3 3 2 3 12
32 C 3: 3 2 1 2 3
BAU
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uncontrollable factors
worse
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-1.70 -0.5 -2,O 8.30 -1.50
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optimal
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Appendix 10.4. Analysis of Operator #4's forecasts
The bar chart below shows forecasts of each team member for each of the three
environments. Data for operator #4 appear out of step wrt the other team members. This
is shown in the tables below. In Table 10.4.1 we note that operator #4's forecasts are in
the opposite direction of all the remaining participants in the current and the best
environment; he is more optimistic in all worst environments. Operator #4 appears to be
overconfident in his forecasts. Is he the only one that is right and all the others are
wrong? Ashton (1985) writes: "... there is the possibility that an oddball genius, who
does not agree with anyone else, could be proved correct by subsequent events". Ashton
credits Einhorn (1974) for the insight "that the identification of the oddball as a genius
requires that some criterion other than consensus become available." Operator #4 was
from finance. This is the organization that had missed filing SEC statutory financial
reports on time because of untimely and inaccurate financial reports and this is also the
organization that had to restate financial and accounting reports which had been
released officially and to the press. For these reasons we judge that it is appropriate to
exclude operator #4's data from the analyses.
Appendix Table 10.4.1. Profit forecast by operator by uncontrollable environments.
a-verage forecasts of 23 treatments
8..- - current
4.0 - M best
2.0 o - . . -. . .
-2.0 -
-6.0
-8.0
by team member
More specifically, operator #4's forecasts tend to bias the results. The tables below
show statistics for the forecasts of all the treatments with and without operator #4.
Appendix Table 10.4.2. Profit forecast statistics with and without operator #4 by
uncontrollable environments.
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forecasts for current environment
op #1 op #2 op #3 op #4 op #5
-3.03 -2.91 -4.96 - -2.76
-3.03 -2.91 -4.96 2.21 -2.76
average all istdev
operators
-3.4 1.0 without op #4
-2.5 2.7 with op #4
% deltal
36% 63% w/o op #4 vs.
with op #4
forecasts for worst environment
op #1 op #2 op #3 op #4 op #5
-6.89 -7.24 -7.09 - -6.8
-6.89 -7.24 -7.09 -3.85 -6.8
forecasts for best environment
op #1 op #2 op #3 op #4 op #5
-0.69 -1.46 -3.26 - 1.15
-0.69 -1.46 -3.26 6.22 1.15
average all
stdev
operators
-7.0 0.2 without op #4
-6.4 14 1 with op #4
1% delta|
9% 9% no op #4 vs.
with op #4
average all
stdev
operators
1.6 3.5 without op #4
0.2 3.7 with op #4
1% deltal
700% 5% no op #4 vs.
with op #4
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Appendix 10.5. Response tables for worst and best
environments
Response Table - Means for worst environment
Level
1
2
3
sg&a
-8.267
-6.904
-5.788
cogs
-10.625
-6.913
-3.421
capacity
-7.833
-7.046
-6.079
portfolio
-8.167
-6.650
-6.142
sales
-7.633
-7.225
-6.100
financing
-8.021
-6.792
-6.146
Delta 2.479
Rank 2
7.204
1
1.754
5
2.025 1.533
3 6
Response Table - Standard Deviations for worst environmerlt
sg&a
1.0595
1.6644
1.4388
cogs
1.2151
1.5312
1.4164
0.6049 0.3161
4 6
capacity
0.8157
1.0170
2.3300
portfolio
1.7668
1.2820
1.1139
sales
2.0012
0.7063
1.4552
1.5143 0.6529 1.2949
1 3 2
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Level
1
2
3
Delta
Rank
1.875
4
financing
1.3082
1.6549
1.1996
0.4553
5
Response Table - Means for Best environment
Level sg&a cogs capacity portfolio sales financing
1 -2.04583 -4.33333 -1.50000 -2.37917 -1.84583 -1.51250
2 -1.09167 -1.00417 -0.84583 -0.63333 -1.08333 -1.02917
3 0.12500 2.32500 -0.66667 -0.00000 -0.08333 -0.47083
Delta 2.17083 6.65833 0.83333 2.37917 1.76250 1.04167
Rank 3 1 6 2 4 5
Response Table - Standard Deviations for Best environment
Level sg&a cogs capacity portfolio sales financing
1 2.595 2.581 1.998 2.488 1.694 2.116
2 1.897 2.153 1.900 1.583 1.796 2.072
3 2.092 1.850 2.686 2.512 3.094 2.396
Delta 0.698 0.732 0.786 0.929 1.400 0.324
Rank 5 4 3 2 1 6
Appendix 10.6. Examples of constructions of alternatives
DOE is the calculus of our method. We inherit directly its advantages. One of the
distinctive features of DOE is that the construction of alternatives is integral and natural
to the method. Alternatives are simply treatments. And the outcomes of the treatments
are readily derived using the data from the orthogonal array and DOE procedures. And
provided the decision maker is prepared to tradeoff performance for robustness, the
alternatives can be constructed to achieve this goal. We illustrate this with two
examples. We construct an alternative knowing what the president would like to do.
Then we construct a series of alternatives from which the president is free to choose or
adjust consistently with his strategic goals.
appendix 10.6.1. An approach to construction
We construct our first alternative using DOE concepts for optimality: improve the mean
of the output, then tighten the distribution. Our objective is to construct an alternative
that will satisfice our HiTEM executives. Consider Figure 10.7 that shows the main
effects and the standard deviation plots for the current environment. The maximum
response alternative is (3,3,3,3,3,3). From the same figure, we find that the most robust,
i.e. the one with the lowest standard deviation, is (2,3,1,2,1,1). From the response Table
10.15, we know the ranking of each variable with respect to output and standard
deviation. We put all this information together in the first four columns of Table 10.20.
We consider each variable in the order of their rank in the response table.
1. COGS. This is the highest ranking factor for profit. Its maximum is at level 3. The
minimum standard deviation for COGS is also at level 3. The maximum response level
is also the minimum standard deviation level. So, for our alternative, we set COGS level
at 3.
2. Customer-portfolio mix. This is the second ranking factor for profit. Its maximum is
attained at level 3. The minimum standard deviation is attained at level 2. From
discussions with the operations executive, we know that to move this factor from level 1
to level 3 is an arduous undertaking of shedding a large set of customers. It is not
realistic to move two levels. Although changing from level 1 to level 2 is challenging, it
is doable with effort. More importantly, level 2 is where the minimum stdev is attained.
So we set this factor at level 2.
3. SG&A is the third ranking factor for profit. Set this level at its maximum level, 3.
SG&A is the lowest ranking factor for standard deviation, so the level for profit trumps
the setting for standard deviation.
4. Sales is the fourth ranking factor for profit. BAU is set at level 2. We don't want to
reduce sales, so we keep it at level 2. Although this level is not optimal for standard
deviation, it is second best, an acceptable compromise for a fourth ranking factor.
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5. Financing is the penultimate ranking factor. Its maximum is at level 3, Minimum
stdev is at level 1. It is unaffordable to have either the Mexico or the China plant. The
China plant is a bigger problem, so we set at level 3.
6. Capacity is lowest ranking factor for profit. Its highest level for profit is 3. For
standard deviation, minimum level is 1. BAU is level 2. We keep it at BAU level 2.
All this is summarized in Table 10.6.1 below. The derived profit for (3,3,2,2,2,3) is
$1.55 M..
Table 10.6.1. Optimum alternative by selective maximizing profit and stdev.
profit stdev
recommended setting & rationale
SG&A 3 3 6 2 2 3 needs improvement, rank 6 for stdev
COGS 1 3 3 3 2 3 optimum for both profit & stdev
_apt 6 3 2kep BAU level
portfoli 2 3 4 2 nm for stdev & need improvement
sales 4 3 1 1 2 2 keep BAUlevel
finance 5 3 5 1 1 3 China unaffordable hemorrhaging plant
derived profit $ 1.55 M
We know from discussions with the president that COGS level 3 is not realistic. We
change that to the realistic level of 2.5, we get then the treatment (3,2.5,2,2,2,3). Wefind
that we have rediscovered the realistic strategy+China divestiture +sales+ described in
Table 10.19.
appendix 10.6.2. Modified AOFAT procedure
We construct our second set of alternatives using a variation of Frey's AOFAT
approach (Frey 2004, 2005). Recall that the executives of HiTEM do not consider
executing the optimum treatment as realistic. Therefore the hill-climbing approach of
AOFAT is not directly applicable. HiTEM's executives will satisfice. In search of a
satisficing treatment, we modify the AOFAT approach. We start with the treatment that
yields the maximum profit and descend-downhill instead of hill-climbing. This
approach presents a set of alternatives from which the decision-maker can make a
selection or adjust with strategic consistency. This approach will produce a small set of
alternatives with decreasing response and decreasing standard deviation. Starting from
the maximum-response treatment, we "dial down" profit one-factor-at-a-time using a
factor that most decreases the standard deviation. We use the "most decrease in the
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standard deviation" on the assumption that the decision maker is willing to trade off
profit to reduce of risk. The algorithm has 4 steps:
Step 1 Begin with highest response treatment.
Step 2 Find most important response factor and set level to lowest standard deviation.
Step 3 Find next most important response factor and set level to the lowest standard
deviation.
Step 4. Do 3 until done.
Table 10.6.2 shows the results of this process. Row #1. We begin with (3,3,3,3,3,3),
obtained by inspection of left-hand panel Figure 10.7 is the treatment that will yield the
highest response $4.55 M (e.g. Phadke 1989, Taguchi 2000). Now we turn our attention
to Row #2. From Table 10.15, we find that the highest ranking factor is sales, ranked 1.
From the bottom right-hand panel of Table 10.7 we find that sales' lowest standard
deviation occurs at level 1. We change sales' level 3 to 1. We now have Row #2 with
treatment (3,3,3,3,1,3). The process continues for the remaining rows and is completed
in as many steps as there are controllable factors. We have "walked downhill" one-
factor-at-a-time to the treatment with the lowest standard deviation, which represents
the most robust treatment and an outcome of -$2.09M.
Table 10.6.2. Algorithmically constructed alternatives.
decreasing derived stdev of
row rank: profit profit $M treatmentfactors
#1 3.3 3 3 3 3 - 4.55 2.36
#2.33 3 3 1 3 sales 2.48 1.68
#3. 3 3 .31.3 capacity 1.37 1.08
# 4 3 3 1 3 1 3 COGS 1.37 1.08
# 6 3 3 1 2 1 1 finance -0.91 0.27
#7 2 3 1 2 1 1 sg&a -2.09 0.19
We now have a set of 6 strategic alternatives for the decision maker. Row #5 produces a
profit of $0.58M, HiTEM breaks even. But COGS at level 3 is not realistic. Change that
to level 2.5. Finance at level 3 means that the China plant is jettisoned; therefore
capacity utilization cannot be at level 1, change capacity to level 2. We now have
(3,2.5,2,2,2,3). We have rediscovered the realistic strategy+China divestiture +sales+
of Table 10.10. As in any construction, it cannot be mindlessly algorithmic. Domain
knowledge must be brought to bear on the problem; fortuitously, doing so we find that
our constructions have the property of equifinality.
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Appendix 10.7 ANOVA of BAU in best and worst
environments
....................................................................................................................................................
Analysis of Variance BAU in best environment
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
sg&a 2 56.826 56.826 28.413 5.29 0.008
cogs 2 532.001 532.001 266.000 49.48 0.000
capacity 2 9.236 9.236 4.618 0.86 0.429
portfolio 2 72.876 72.876 36.438 6.78 0.002
sales 2 37.502 37.502 18.751 3.49 0.037
financing 2 13.043 13.043 6.522 1.21 0.305
Error 59 317.165 317.165 5.376
Total 71 1038.649
S = 2.31855 R-Sq = 69.46% R-Sq(adj) = 63.25%
.....................................................................................................................................................
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Residuals. BAU in best environment
Normal
99.9. Mean 1.745517E-15
99- StDev 2.114
95 * N 72
90 AD 0.468
1 80 P-Vake 0.243
20
10
1- *
0.1
-7.5 -5.0 -2.5 0.0 2.5 5.0
residuals
Analysis of Variance for BAU in worst environment
Source DF Seq SS Adj SS Adj MS F P
sg&a 1 73.76 73.76 73.76 24.46 0.000
cogs 1 622.80 622.80 622.80 206.58 0.000
capacity 1 36.93 36.93 36.93 12.25 0.001
portfolio 2 53.27 53.27 26.64 8.84 0.000
sales 1 28.21 28.21 28.21 9.36 0.003
financing 2 43.55 43.55 21.77 7.22 0.001
Error 63 189.93 189.93 3.01
Total 71 1048.45
S = 1.73630 R-Sq = 81.88%
The residuals are plotted below.
4W
LN
0.
R-Sq (adj) = 79.58%
Residuals. BAU in worst environment
Normal
~99-
95-
90-
20-
10-
5-
1
0.1
-5.0 -2.5
.. . . .
... ..
.. .....
0.0 2.5
residuals
5.0 7.5
The residuals are not normally distributed, an undesirable fact. We note from the
Unusual Observations from the ANOVA statistics that there are three of unusual
observations, treatments #6, #26, and #42 from operators #1, #2, and #3 respectively.
(See table on top of next page.) The treatments are (2,3,3,1,1,2), (3,2,3,2,1,3) and
(2,3,3,1,1,2). We rule out that these observations are caused by a single operator
inconsistency. By inspection, we note that the most unusual observations are located at
the RHS. If we remote these observations from consideration, residuals pass the AD test
of normality with p>>0.05. Why are the treatments (2,3,3,1,1,2), (3,2,3,2,1,3) and
(2,3,3,1,1,2) unusual observations? Consider (2,3,3,1,1,2) and (2,3,3,1,1,2). They are
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Mean 9.745291E-16
StDev 1.624
N 72
AD 2.305
P-Va ke <0.005
... .. . ..
the same treatment made by two different people that widely divergent (see table below
for observation 6 and 42) with poor reproducibility. Now consider (3,2,3,2,1,3). This
represents the lowest reduction in SG&A, current level of COGS, highest plant
utilization, slight improvement in customer portfolio mix, BUT low sales, and the
divestiture of the non performing plants are achieved. Looking at Appendix 10.5 for the
worst environment, we note that the standard deviation for plant utilization and sales
have the highest Delta. They are the most volatile. It appears that this volatility makes
this case a difficult one to forecast, which is possibly why this treatment is an unusual
observation.
Unusual Observations for BAU in worst environment
Obs wo op4 Fit SE Fit Residual St Resid
6 -7.8000 -4.0653 0.7571 -3.7347 -2.32 R
26 0.5000 -4.2778 0.7571 4.7778 2.96 R
42 4.0000 -4.0653 0.7571 8.0653 5.00 R
R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual.
Residuals. BAU in worst environment
Normal
99.9
Mean -0.1873
StDev 1.202
95 N 70
9O AD 0.409
P-Vakue 0.338
C 70-_ _ __ _ _0oU50-
... ..
30
~ 20--J
10-
5
1 *
0.1
-4 -3 -2 -1 Q 1 2 3 4
residuals
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11.0 Experiment 2. e-business Services Company
11.1 Introduction
This chapter is about our second company experiment performed with an e-business
services company. We begin with a brief sketch of the company, follow that with a
description of the decision situation, and continue with the details of our experiment.
We close with our findings and the lessons-learned; findings and lessons from our
client, about our protocol, and about our experiment; tests of experimental validity, and
an analysis of the quality of the decision. This chapter follows the organization of the
previous chapter and the same experimental protocol below. This chapter is meant to be
self-contained. Repetitions from the previous chapter are unavoidable.
Table 11.1. Experimental protocol
Experimental Protocol
F Understand the decision situation, goals and objectives.Framing the problem
*Specify. the. problem in DOE normal form
Establish the base line - Forecast the BAU case
Foreast he ampl spae *Forecast the sample space in three uncontrollable
environments
Analyze summary statistics and test treatments
Analyze gage statistics
Analyze alternatives Construct and analyze alternatives
- Summarize findings and lessons learned from the client,
about the protocol, and the experiment
Analyze validity of the experiment
- Analyze the decision's quality
11.2 Framing the Problem
This step includes the discovery process for the decision situation and the framing of the
decision in our DOE normal form. Forming the work team and creating a management
system to review progress of the work are also part of this process.
11.2.1 The firm and the decision situation
This company wishes to remain anonymous. We will name the company eSvcs and its
client Yokozuna. eSvcs is a prestigious Japanese provider of high technology services.
It specializes in business management and IT services to address a broad spectrum of
business problems - from strategy, business transformation, IT design, implementation,
installation, to repair and maintenance. (e-business is eSvcs' strong suit. e-business is
the use of the technologies of the WWW to transform a legacy business process, or
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redefine a major business function, even an entire firm's strategy.) Yokozuna, a $70B
global manufacturer, has contracted eSvcs to design and install an e-business technical
platform from which Yokozuna can build and deliver internal and external services such
as HR information, scheduling services, and ordering parts. The Total Contract Value is
about $40M. eSvcs undertook this engagement as a medium risk project with high
expectations of very large, indeed massive (~$ 1 B), follow-on repeat business. Which is
why although the dollar volume of the contract is modest, the most senior officers from
eSvcs and Yokozuna actively review the progress of this project. The CEO's sit on each
other's board and they consider this product development (PD) effort to be very
significant. Delivery of the system for customer acceptance is scheduled for 3Q2005.
The Yokozuna project examines the period from YE2003 to 2Q2005 and concentrates
specifically on two critical decisions made by the Japanese Project-Manager (JPM). The
JPM wants us to critique his two key decisions. The first one was committed on April
2004 and the second one on July 2004. He wants to know: whether those decisions will
improve client satisfaction (CSAT) at the end of the project, whether he focused on the
right issues, and what level of CSAT he can expect during customer acceptance on
3Q2005. Because eSvcs considers CSAT as a strong predictor of follow-on business
volumes, the JPM would like to have a high CSAT score. His project-management
ratings also depend on a high CSAT from the client.
eSvcs organizational structure for this project is a geography and functional matrix.
This functional matrix is overlaid with a small group of senior managers who set
direction and guide the operations. This body is lead by an eSvcs Project Executive
(PE) through a Global Program Management Office (GPMO). The geographies are
represented by regional Project Managers (PM) who are executives from Japan, US, and
Europe. Project Leaders (PL) are responsible for major deliverables to the client: the
system (platform and middleware), the Information Architecture, the Content
Management subsystem, Development, Integration and Test.
Yokozuna's project management structure is a mirror image of eSvcs. Yokozuna has
appointed equivalent counterparts to the GPMO's, PMO's, and PL's in the eSvcs'
organization.
Difficulties in communicating across the geographies and functional groups resulted in
unstable project scope and conflicting requirements among the geographic regions. This
situation was exacerbated by unexpected dramatic sales improvements and declines in
regional markets. This created unexpected volatility and disagreements in the project's
PD priorities. eSvcs' project management system also had problems. A technical project
leader (PL) was inexperienced to lead the design and development of a major
subsystem. The situation with the JPM in the PMO was equally dire. The JPM lacked
multi-geographic project experience, e-business know-how, and business knowledge to
negotiate requirements and to bring the project under control.
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The decisions.
In April 2004, the current JPM made his first decision. The problematical PL was
replaced in order to bring the technical work under control. On July 2004, the current
JPM made his second decision. He had himself appointed as the new JPM in the GPMO
to replace its weak predecessor. This forceful action by eSvcs brought an equivalent
response from Yokozuna, who put a strong requirements leader to bring parity in the
GPMO. The JPM then made a number of project decisions to bring the project under
control. The first users of the e-services platform and its initial applications were going
to be US and Japanese nationals; so he decided to focus on their requirements and
reduced the European's priorities. He did not expect strong opposition because the
Europeans had reduced their manpower commitments to the project and because sales
in Europe were relatively stagnant. To meet the new requirements, the JPM decided to
deliver in three waves instead of one "Big-Bang" delivery. Since this would entail more
resources and a change in delivery date, at great risk, he chose to renegotiate those
terms. Surprisingly and grudgingly, the client agreed to renegotiate their agreement.
Since then, Yokozuna has been led through a forced march. The JPM is unsure that his
decisions will produce the CSAT index that will make the client want to engage eSvcs
for its follow-on projects. This project because of its risky nature was also reviewed and
approved by the Asia Pacific (AP) System Assurance Executive who felt that the
potential for follow-on business was worth the risk.
The JPM and the AP executive agreed to participate on this project because they:
- wanted a critique of the decisions they made to turnaround the project
" wanted to know what CSAT score was reasonable to anticipate, and
- liked the DOE concept and the results from the ADI surrogate analysis.
11.2.2 Objectives for the experiment
As in experiment 1, we held a number of planning meetings with the AP Executive and
with the JPM. As in experiment 1, we set the following objectives:
- Identify levers that result in an acceptable CSAT at project completion time.
Identify those within the control of the executive team
Identify those outside the control of the executive team
- Determine the influence of these variables on CSAT
- Create a set of sample scenarios that can be used to predict CSAT
Construct alternative solutions to estimate and contrast CSAT values against
those of the business-as-usual (BAU) case and under the worst, and best
environments
- Show that an analytical model could be used to quantify decision making under the
best and worse case environments.
- Present our findings.
259
11.2.3 The team and information used
The AP System Assurance Executive is the ex officio sponsoring executive for the
project. He supervises about $6.OB worth of selected projects a year and has a reserve
of $300M to help troubled projects. His sponsorship was pivotal to get the buy-in of the
JPM and the support of a team of consultants for this experiment. We ran this
experiment as a task force with the JPM as its operational leader. Collectively, the team
is very seasoned, it has about 75 person-years of experience in IT, systems engineering,
PD, and consulting. One team member is relatively young with <5 years of working
experience. The others have all been engaged from the beginning of this project. Morale
and team spirit is high and they respect the JPM highly.
In eSvcs, managing CSAT is a necessary skill and its measurement is a disciplined
business process. The eSvcs CSAT instrument was the key document which anchored
our experiment. Because it is a confidential document, we can only attach a few sample
questions in Appendix 11.1. The team members by virtue of their position in the firm
had access to line managers and other staff to obtain detailed and specific information
on-demand.
11.2.4 Framing decision in DOE normal form
Following many working meetings with the sponsoring executive and the PE, we were
able to frame the decision in our DOE normal form, with four controllable and three
uncontrollable variables (Table 11.2).
Table 11.2. Framing of Yokozuna's decision situation in DOE normal form
problem_ .can we exit client acceptance on schedule?
outcomes client satisfaction at level 5(highest level)
i. our project leadership
controllable variables 2. our project approach3. use of contingency
4_delivery schedule
1. stakeholder requirements consolidation
varil be 2. client budget flexibility
3. performance of a parallel eSvcs project
This was followed with team work sessions. We arrived at a three-level specification
that bracketed the limits of controllability for each of the decision variables (Table
11.3). "Level 3" was deemed doable, albeit with effort, and "level 1" judged the lowest
level of acceptability. Team members were free to consult with their staffs or run
models to help them determine these limits. We found they did not find it necessary.
We have already presented the leadership problem. We direct our attention to the other
controllable variables. Because of the instability of the requirements, the JPM was faced
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with three competing choices for a project approach. Level 1 was the worst for CSAT,
i.e. deliver all the functionality at once (Big-Bang, BB) and satisfy the strident
geographic requirements of the moment regardless of previous agreements. These
requirements did not accurately represent Yokozuna's corporate needs. Level 3, the best
CSAT choice was to meet their original contractual agreements, i.e. BB adhering to
"canned" worldwide functionality ("out of the box", OTB). Level 2 was: release in 3
waves and provide limited customization and scope expansion to accommodate the US
and Japan who had the largest contingent of developers and who committed to
immediate roll-out of the system in their country.
A brief note on "contingency" is in order. eSvcs encourages its project executives to
take on risky projects that are strategically significant. It does so by helping risky
projects cover potential cost overruns with contingency funds. Executives who have a
track record of taking on risky projects and not using any contingency are rewarded
financially and with rapid promotions. Project managers prefer not to use contingency
funds in order to demonstrate their management prowess.
The other controllable variables and uncontrollable variables are self explanatory. A
brief comment about the "parallel project" is in order. Yokozuna had engaged eSvcs in
the US for another high visibility PD project. Progress on that project was not
satisfactory to Yokozuna causing its executives to question the competency of the entire
eSvcs company. There was a strong negative spillover to this project. The JPM and the
sponsoring executive were very concerned that this would impact CSAT of this e-
services PD project.
Table 11.3. Controllable factors and levels.
ontrollable level 1 level 2 level 3factors
Change 1 PL, add
Project Do th. Change 1 project PM with geography
leadership noing leader (PL) * technical & business
skills
ProjectBB, custom, new 3 aeJapan & US
approach scope & regional custom. Expand BBt T imited
requirements. scope.
Use contingency to Use contingency to
contingency cover all cost cover some cost
overruns overrun*
Delivery date Slip 3-6 months Slip 2-3 months * Meet delivery date
*BAU
Working with the team, we specified the levels for the uncontrollable variables as
shown in Table 11.4.
261
Table 11.4. Uncontrollable factors and levels
level 3
uncontrollable level 1 level 2
factors worse condition current state better
condition
Stakeholder Client power struggle Client identifies
requirements persists.r ment same as level . * requirements leader.
consensus envirbnmen Requirements
unstable. environment is stable.
Client Client unwilling or Client will pay non- lient is willing and
willingness for has NO room in their trivial % ofPD cost has room in budget to
cost overruns budget for overruns overruns. * pay for all PD cost
overruns
Parallel projectParallel project Paale projectprjecParallel project failing, impacts this arallel project
with client ,oe' impact CSAwtciet fortis pjcts.S  project's CSAT & succeeds. No impactfor this project.confidence* to this project
*BAU
eSvcs' BAU decision situation on April 2004 is specified as [(2,l,2,2);(2,2,2)] below.
Table 11.5 eSvcs' BAU situation.
controllable factor BAU level
Project leadership 2 Change 1 project leader (PL)
Project approach 1 .BB, custom, new scope & regional
requirements.
Use of contingency 2 Use contingency to cover some cost overrun
Delivery date 2 Slip 2-3 months
uncontrollable factor BAU level
Stakeholder requirements 2 Client power struggle persists. Requirements
consensus environment remains unstable.
Client willingness for cost 2 Negotiate with client. Expect client to pay
overruns non-trivial % of overruns.
Parallel project with client 2 Parallel project failing, impacts this project's
______________________ 
_________client satisfaction and confidence.
Protocol Findings
This framing procedure took more effort and time than anticipated.
From start to finish, to specify the objectives of the experiment and all the
factor levels took the team one work-week to complete.
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11.3 Establish the base-line
During this step of our protocol, the team will forecast CSAT for the BAU case in all
three environments - current, worst, and best. This process is also a learning step.
Included is a procedure designed to diminish information-asymmetry within the group.
And to avoid false convergence, forecasting figures are held private and their
disclosure is prohibited. A record of their forecasting confidence is made for
subsequent analysis.
11.3.1 Experimental data set structure
Table 11.6 shows the data set structure. We have four controllable factors of three
levels. We chose an L9(34 -2) orthogonal array of nine treatments. To these, we add BAU
(2,1,2,2) and three "test" treatments, (1,3,1,3), (3,3,1,1), and (3,1,3,1). We obtain these
three high-leverage treatments using the Hat matrix (Montgomery 2001). These 14
treatments form the inner array. For the outer array of uncontrollable variables, we use
compounded noise factors, i.e. current (2,2,2), worst (1,1,1), and best (3,3,3)
environments. L9 data is sufficient to derive the outcomes of any treatment from the
entire full-factorial set of 3 4=8 1 treatments and for the whole solution space of
81*3=243 cases.
Table 11.6. Data set structure for the experiment
controllableeniom t
factors ______ ________
level 2 level 1I level 3
.. ...... .. .. . .. .. .. 
Slevel 2 level 1 level 3
- ~ level 2 level 1 level 3
current worst best
BAU 2 1 2 2 a b c
2 1 2 2 2
3 1 33 3
4 212 3
5 2 23 1
6 2 3 12
7 31 13 2
10 1 321 3
11 3 3 1 1
- 12 3 1 3 1 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
uncontrollable factors
<- stakeholder requirements
<- client budgetflexibility
<-parallel project
BA U treatment
L 9 treatment
L 9 treatment
L 9 treatment
L 9 treatment
L9
L9
treatment
treatment
treatment
treatment
treatment
test treatment # 1
test treatment # 2
test treatment # 3
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
The first column lists the sample treatments for our experiment. Treatments #1 through
#9 are the L9(34- 2). Treatments #10 to #12 are the test treatments. This is our inner array.
The outer array is comprised of three rows and three columns under the rubric
"environment."
11.3.2 Establishing the base line: Forecast BAU
To prepare the team for the work of populating the entire data set, we asked them to
first forecast CSAT for the BAU treatment at project-delivery gate-review for our three
uncontrollable environments, current, worst, and best. These data are placed in cells a,
b, c in Table 11.6. We directed them not to show each other their forecast figures. We
did not want any peer pressure that could lead to false convergence in the forecasts.
Each team member was then to record their confidence-level on a form we provided.
(Appendix 9.3 chapter 9)
We then requested each team member to write three reasons why their forecast was
accurate, and three reasons why their forecast was not accurate. This gave us a total of
15 reasons why the forecasts were considered to be accurate and 15 opposing reasons.
See Appendix 11.2 for examples of forecasting rationale. We asked the team to read all
these reasons and then to discuss and debate them. At the end of this discussion, the
team was directed to forecast once more the BAU treatment and to record their
confidence level.
Table 11.7 is a summary of the data from the above procedure (details in Appendix
11.3). Dispersion of the data declines from round 1 to round 2.
Table 11.7. BAU forecasts dispersions decline between round 1 and round 2.
CSAT forecast
BAU average CSAT stdev
round 1 round 2 round 1 round 2
current environment 2.59 2.84 0.68 0.23 4
worst environment 1.88 2.12 0.48 0.40 4
best environment 3.20 3.34 0.57 0.42 4
Confidence rises between round 1 and round 2, from 3.3 to 3.9. A "3" is specified as a
"toss-up", and a "4" is specified as "confident." (Table 11.8 and details are shown in
Appendix 11.4).
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Table 11.8. Confidence rises between round 1 and round 2.
confidence
current environment
average stdev
round 1 round 2 round 1 round 2
3.3 3.9 0.8 0.6
Protocol Findings
-BAU forecasting and rationale discussion took longer than anticipated.
Took about half a day to perform.
-The team welcomed the opportunity to understand each other's forecasting
rationale and to debate their reasons.
11.4 Forecast of the sample space
During this step of the protocol, each team member is asked to populate the entire data
set. Each participant was given a form that was similar to Table 11.6, but where all the
treatments are in different random order. Each team member made 13*3=39 forecasts
(13 treatments in 3 environments). And the entire team made 39*5=195 forecasts. We
reminded them not to disclose their forecast figures. But they were free to consult and
discuss with their staffs or people in their personal network. The completed data set is
shown in Appendix 11. 5.
Protocol Findings
-39 forecasts per team-member were readily completed.
-Unexpectedly, the team did the job in one afternoon.
11.5 Analysis of the data
The objective of this step is to analyze the summary statistics of the data set and to also
analyze the team's forecasting capability. In other words, are the data we have
something we can use and draw valid inferences from?
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11.5.1 ANOVA summary statistics
Table 11.9 is the ANOVA table for the forecast data for the current environment.
Approach has p<0.04, and Delivery has p<0.000. Residuals are N(0,0.47) with p=0.52
(Figure 11.1). Appendix 11.6 has the ANOVA tables for the other environments.
Appendix 11.7 shows that for the JPM, leadership is statistically significant (p=0.0 2 2 ).
The data for the JPM show that his contributions to CSAT were important!
Table 11.9. ANOVA Table for team forecasts for current environment.
Source
leadership
approach
buffer
delivery
Error
Total
Seq SS
0.3213
2.0520
0.0413
32.9453
9.5320
44.8920
Adj SS
0.3213
2.0520
0.0413
32.9453
9.5320
Adj MS
0.1607
1.0260
0.0207
16.4727
0.2648
Analysis of Variance for current environment t=12
DF
2
2
2
2
36
44
R-Sq(adj) = 74.05%S = 0.514566 R-Sq = 78.77%
Figure 11.1. Half Normal plot of residual of forecasts in current environment
An abbreviated summary of the ANOVA tables for the three environments, current,
worst and best, is shown in Table 11.10
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Residual Probability Plot of current
Normal
Mean 1.973730E-16
95- StDev 0.4654
90- N 45
80- AD 0.323
C 7P-Value 0.516
S60 4
u 50-
40-
a 30-
20-
10-
1 P
-1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
residuals
F
0.61
3.87
0.08
62.21
P
0.551
0.030
0.925
0.000
Table 11.10. Team forecasts for current, worst, and best environments.
ANOVA for CSAT forecasts
current environment worst environment best environment
adj adj adj
MS MS MS
leadership 0.16 0.9 0.55 0.038 0.2 0.89 0.13 0.7 0.55
approach 1.026 5.7 0.030 1.497 8.7 0.020 1.53 8.4 0.002
contingency 0.021 0.1 0.93 0.002 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.03 0.97
delivery 16.47 91.8 0.000 15.34 89.2 0.000 16.4 89.7 | 0.000
error 0.26 1.5 - 0.31 1.8 - 0.21 1.2 -
total 17.94 100% ____17.19 100% - 18.28 100/%
R2 78.8 R 2adj 74.1 R2 74.9 R 2adi 69.3 R2 82.5 R2adj 76.6
Only project delivery date and project approach are statistically significant (p<<0.05) in
every environment. They are strong predictors of CSAT. These findings were surprising
to the team. On reflection, Project Leadership and Contingency were of great concern to
the eSvcs team, but not to the customer. Troublesome internal eSvcs issues are not
important to the client, Yokozuna. Their fundamental concerns are: Will eSvcs deliver
on time, and will I get what I'm paying for? The statistics support this explanation.
..............................................................................................................................................................
Experiment Findings
Small number of variables are strong predictors of the profit outcome.
- Only the variables of importance to the customer are strong predictors of C SAT.
..............................................................................................................................................................
Consider the interactions of the controllable variables below and Appendix 11.8.
Table 11.11. Interactions of controllable factors
ANOVA for CSAT forecasts
current environment worst environment best environment
adj adj adj
MS MS MS
approach 1.03 5.7 0.03 1.49 8.7 0.015 1.53 8.4 0.002
delivery 16.47 92.3 0.000 15.34 89.3 0.000 16.39 89.3 0.000
approach 0.09 0.5 0.85 0.02 0.1 0.99 0.069 0.1 0.86
x delivery
error 0.27 1.5 - 0.315 1.8 - 0.21 1.8 -
total 100% -100% - ___100% -
R2 78.7 R2 adi 74.1 R2 74.5 R 2aij 69.3 R2 82.5 R2adi 78.6
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Findings
The data suggest that the interactions are small, and are not statistically significant.
11.5.2 Analysis of Test Treatments
We had 3 high-leverage test-treatments, (1,3,1,3), (3,3,1,1), (3,1,3,1). We have also
BAU (2,1,2,2), and (2,1,2,3), (2,1,3,3), (2,1,1,3), (2,2,1,3), (2,3,1,3), and (3,1,1,3). The
latter six are replicates obtained during the OFAT exercise (Section 11.6.2.3). The L9
forecasts are sufficient to derive the CSAT for other treatments. Therefore, we can
compare the values forecast for BAU, the test treatments and the OFAT treatments
against the derived values to obtain a measure of forecasting consistency. We get Table
11.12.
Table 11.12. Comparison of team forecasts versus derived forecasts.
CSAT |%IA
average of forecasts average derived forecast vs. derivedfrom the team from L18 data
current worst best current worst best current worst best
2,1,2,2 2.84 1.88 3.34 3.15 2.71 3.59 9.8 30.6 7.0
1,3,1,3 3.22 3.0 3.58 3.41 3.03 3.7 5.6 1.0 3.2
3,3,1,1 1.44 1.1 1.66 1.41 1.06 1.57 2.1 3.8 5.7
3,1,3,1 1.92 1.64 2.26 1.85 1.59 2.15 38 31 5.1
2,1,2,3 4.02 3.64 4.24 4.03 3.64 444 0.2 0.0 4.5
2,1,3,3 3.88 3.56 4.2 4.05 3.65 4.41 4.2 2.5 4.8
2,1,1,3 4.36 4.16 4.56 4.1 3.66 4.45 6.3 13.7 2.5
2,2,1,3 4.18 3.86 4.4 4.04 3.69 4.45 3.5 4.6 1.1
2,3,1,3 3.7 3.12 3.94 3.62 3.13 3.82 2.2 0.3 2.9
3,1,1,3 4.56 4.38 4.8 3.98 3.61 4.27 14.6 21.3 12.4
average 5.2% 8.1% 4.9%
For most cases, the absolute value of the I%IA between the team forecast and the derived
forecast is reasonably small. We can infer that the forecasts are fairly "consistent." We
will make the notion of consistency more precise in the next section, 11.5.3.
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Findings
The comparisons of their forecasts with the derived values
suggest "consistency."
We infer that the team's forecasts were not arbitrary.
11.5.3 Analysis of the Process
Table 11.12 suggests that the team's forecasts are consistent. But how can we determine
whether they are "good enough?" To explore this question, as we did in chapter 10, we
apply Measurement System Analysis (MSA). (See chapter 3 section 3.2 for details and
chapter 10 section 10.5.3 for its application in the other in situ experiment.)
Reproducibility
The individual forecasts for a given treatment by different operators give us an
indication of reproducibility across operators, i.e. for a given treatment, are different
operators able to reproduce a forecast? Figure 11.3 shows the forecasts for five
treatments (in current and worst environments) by our five operators. It is apparent that
operator #5 forecasts appear less consistent than the rest. Forecasts from the other
operators are "closer," they show more reproducibility.
Figure 11.3 Examples of reproducibility in two environments.
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Repeatability
To give us an indication of repeatability, we can plot the individual forecasts for the
five different treatments for a given operator along with values for the same treatments
derived from the operator's other forecasts. In other words, is an operator able to repeat
the forecast value for a given treatment? For example, in Figure 11.4, we show operator
3 and operator 4's forecasts versus the derived values from their forecasts for the
treatments shown. Each operator's graphs are "close" to each other; they suggest
repeatability from that operator as was the case in Chapter 10. The Gage R&R statistics
are shown in Table 11.14 below.
operator 3
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Cl
Cl
Cl
Cl
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Figure 11.4 Examples of repeatability for two operators.
Table 11.13. ANOVA for measurement variances
Two-Way ANOVA Table With Interaction
Source DF SS
treatment 9 89.855
operator 4 10.805
treatment * operator 36 8.091
Repeatability 50 9.605
Total 99 118.357
Gage R&R
Source
Total Gage R&R
Repeatability
Reproducibility
operator
Part-To-Part
Total Variation
VarComp
0.33055
0.20577
0.12478
0.12478
0.97781
1.30836
%Contribution
(of VarComp)
25.26
15.73
9.54
9.54
74.74
100.00
270
-.- .
- - -- - -
- - -
operator 4
5.0
4.0-
3.0-
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l-4 -4e C
MS
98391
70130
22476
19210
9.
2.
0.
0.
F
44.4212
12.0188
1.1700
P
0.000
0.000
0.300
Table 11.14 shows that for treatment, p=0.000 and for operator, p=0.000. Of the total
variation, 15.73% is from repeatability, 9.54% from reproducibility, and 74,74% from
part-part (treatment-treatment). A chart of the total variation and its elemental
components is shown in Figure 11.5 (details in appendix 11.7). The column on the RHS
depicts the variations from the measurements from all the operators. The column on the
LHS depicts the variations from the measurements by omitting operator 5 who exhibits
the largest inconsistency. The impact of operator 5 on the Gage R&R statistics is non
trivial.
2
G total
overall
variation in
measurements
(forecasts)
actual variation part-part part
variation over all treatments 2
2 repeatability rpt 86. 75.%
meas. sys. variation in forecast by
one operator
measurement for a given treatment
system --- L q2
variation a rpd
Gage R&R reproducibility 0
variation in forecasts
of different operators 1 /.%
for a given treatment 2.%
without op. 5 with op. 5
Figure 11.5. Sources of variability for forecasts.
For this "measurement system," we get a discriminatory capability of 4. This is
obtained by:
(number of distinct categories) = '[Var(part-to-part)/Var(total gage R&R)]* 12.
Our system is able to distinguish 4 categories (9.98/N2.01)*2-4). With operator 5,
the number of categories is only 1. In a conventional team oriented forecasting effort of
this kind, all data from all the operators (usually experts) would have been considered in
the analysis. With gage R&R we are able to be more selective, excluded operator 5, to
improve the discriminatory power of our forecasting system. We were also able to
improve the dispersion of the forecasts by means of our blind-Delphi approach (Table
10.7 and details are in chapter 9 section 9.42). How to produce more dramatic
improvements in the discriminatory power of our measurement system is a subject for
further research.
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Experiment Finding
MSA appears useful as a measuring method for forecasting quality.
Repeatability, reproducibility, and Gage R&R appear to be useful concepts to
determine the quality of forecasts by a group of experts.
Using gage statistics, we can pinpoint the lower quality forecasts.
Much more work is required in the use of this method for forecasting.
11.5.4. Forecasting confidence
Upon completing the forecasts for the data set, the team recorded their confidence level
(Table 11.13). The final round's confidence score is 3.86. Recall that a "3" is specified
as a "toss-up" and "4" as "confident." Although neither the confidence level nor the
standard deviation is better than in round 2, they are very close. These data suggest that
an intermediate round of documented counter-argumentation followed by discussions as
in the BAU case, could have raised the confidence level and lowered the standard
deviation further. This is a step that should be included in any future experiments.
Table 11.13. Confidence and stdev for round 1, round 2, and final round.
confidence
current average stdev
environment round 1 round 2 final round 1 round 2 final
3.3 3.94 3.86 1.0 0.33 0.38
11.6 Analysis of alternatives
The objective of this step is to analyze various decision alternatives: alternatives from
eSvcs senior executives, and alternatives we construct. We benefit from DOE. Using
DOE, alternatives covering the entire solution space are easily constructed and their
response readily derived. We will present two alternatives-construction mechanisms
that are general enough to apply to a wide variety of decisions. One of them will be
Frey's (2003a, 2003b) Adaptive-One-Factor-At-A-Time (AOFAT) procedure.
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11.6.1 Response Tables
The response Table 11.14 is obtained from the forecast data set structure*. The top panel
shows the main effects for profit, the bottom panel shows the response table for
standard deviations. "Rank" is an ordering of the variables by "Delta," the difference
between the highest and lowest values of CSAT or stdev for a given variable. It
identifies the variable that has the highest leverage on the output. (The tables for the
worst and best environments are in Appendix 11.10.) The main effects and stdev plots
are shown in Figure 11.6 on the next page. Inspection of the Response Tables below
and the LHS of Figure 11.6 reveals that delivery date is the dominant contributing
factor to CSAT; it has rank 1. The panel also shows that level 1 of approach (BB, new
scope, and customized) produces the highest CSAT for that variable. Inspection of the
RHS of Figure 11.6 shows that approach at level 2, i.e. three-waves approach results in
the lowest level of standard deviation. In contrast, Level 3 for delivery results in the
highest level of standard deviation. The data indicate that delivering on time, in fact, is
more risky. A 2-3 months delay, level 2, is the lowest standard deviation and presents
the lowest risk.
Table 11.14. Response Tables for CSAT and Standard Deviations in Current
environment.
* The response table is discussed in chapter 3, appendix 3.2.
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Response Table for Means current environment
Level leadership approach buffer delivery
1 2.680 2.960 2.820 1.680
2 2.887 2.900 2.747 2.893
3 2.773 2.480 2.773 3.767
Delta 0.207 0.480 0.073 2.087
Rank 3 2 4 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations
Level leadership approach buffer delivery
1 0.5022 0.6535 0.5173 0.5526
2 0.5101 0.3868 0.4125 0.3010
3 0.4259 0.3979 0.5084 0.5846
Delta 0.0842 0.2667 0.1048 0.2836
Rank 4 2 3 1
main effects t=12
4-- leadership approach
35
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* 1 2 3 1 2 3
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Figure 11.6. Response plots of CSAT and Standard Deviations in current
environment.
11.6.2 Analysis of Alternatives
11.6.2.1 Business-As-Usual (BAU) base line alternative
For BAU (2,1,2,2) in the three environments we get the following derived values:
Table 11.15. Derived CSAT for pre-BAU and BAU.
CSAT standard deviation
treatment
current worst best current worst best
pre-BAU (1,1,2,2) 2.9 2.6 3.5 0.4 0.6 0.3
BAU (2,1,2,2) 3.1 2.7 3.6 0.4 0.7 0.4
BAU (2,1,2,2) with a CSAT of 3.1 under current conditions is an equivalent of a C
grade. Did eSvcs help themselves by moving from (1,1,2,2) to (2,1,2,2)? Was changing
the project leader a smart move for CSAT? The data suggests so. BAU (2,1,2,2) CSAT
dominates pre-BAU of (1,1,2,2) CSAT. The nonperforming PL was not helping the
project.
11.6.2.2 Analysis of the JPM's alternatives
Recall that following this BAU move, the JPM made another decision, move from BAU
(2,1,1,2) to (3,2,2,3). The uncontrollable environment was more favorable at this time:
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the requirements environment had stabilized because of leadership changes in the
GPMO, negotiations revealed that the client would be willing, albeit grudgingly, to
renegotiate the terms of their agreement which demonstrated their budget could absorb
PD overruns. The eSvcs JPM renegotiated the delivery date to match his 3-wave
approach. Thus the environment changed from (2,1,2) to (3,3,3), best environment.
Under these conditions the derived results for CSAT are shown in the table below
(Table 11.16), where we show the pre-BAU and the BAU derived results. The data
show that the post-BAU (3,2,2,3) is an improvement. CSAT is better in every
environment, current, worst, and best. Moreover, the stdev is <= to the BAU case.
Table 11.16. Derived CSAT for post-BAU.
CSAT standard deviation
treatment
current worst best current worst best
pre-BAU (1,1,2,2) 2.9 2.6 3.5 0.4 0.6 0.3
BAU (2,1,2,2) 3.1 2.7 3.6 0.4 0.7 0.4
current worst best current worst best
post-BAU (3,2,2,3) 3.9 3.6 4.1 1 0.4 0.6 0.2
11.7 Analysis of Alternatives from Adaptive One-Factor-at-A-Time
(AOFAT)
We also used Frey's (Frey 2003a, 2003b) Adaptive One-Factor-At-A-Time approach to
find the treatment that would yield the highest CSAT. Since the goal of the procedure is
to consistently improve the outcome at every step, we begin with the BAU treatment.
The results obtained from the team are shown in the Table 11.17 in the next page.
AOFAT yields a maximum with (3,1,1,3). From Table 11.12, (3,1,1,3) has the highest
variation of all the test treatments relative to derived forecast values. Why? It was the
last forecast to be performed during the last day of the experiment. Forecast fatigue had
possibly set in. The team's AOFAT selection of (3,1,1,3) is not the treatment that will
yield the maximum CSAT (visual inspection of Figure 11.6). The maximum CSAT
treatments are (2,1,1,3), (2,2,2,3), and (2,1,1,3) for current, worst, and best
environments, respectively (Figure 11.6, Table 11.14 and Appendix 11.10). They all
have delivery at level 3 in common. Table 11.18 compares the team's forecasts. The
table shows that the participants AOFAT selection (3,1,1,3) is pragmatically the same
as the one that would be constructed for a maximum. They are within each other's 95%
CI for current, worst, and best environment. Although this team's AOFAT procedure
did not select the theoretical maximum, pragmatically it did.
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Table 11.17. Derived CSAT with AOFAT.
controllable
factors
c/i 0t
0--
0L
0--
2 1 2 2
2 1 2 3
2 1 2 1
2 1 3 3
2 1 1 3
2 2 1 3
2 3 1 3,
3 1 1 3
1 1 1 3
environment
level 2 level 1 level 3
level 2 level 1 level 3
level 2 level 1 level 3
current worst best
2.84
4.02
2.12 3.2
3.64 4.24
3.88 3.56 4.2
4.36 4.16 4.56
4.18
3.7
4.56
3.86 4.4
3.12 3.94
4.38 4.8
uncontrollable
factors
<- stakeholder requirements
<- client budget flexibility
<-parallel project
begin with BAU.
change delivery
from level 2 to level 3
not forecast, obviously lower
change use of buffer
from level 2 to level 3
change use of buffer
from level 3 to level 1
change project approach
from level 1 to level 2
change project. approach
from level 2 to level 3
reset project approach to level 1.
DONE
not forecast, obviously lower
Table 11.18. Comparison of maximum CSAT, AOFAT versus derived.
environments
maximum CSAT cases current worst best
treatment 3,1,1,3 3,1,1,3 3,1,1,3
AOFAT forecast CSAT 4.0 3.6 4.3
95% C.I. (3.8,4.2) (3.4,3.9) (4.1,4.4)
.c t treatment 2,1,1,3 2,1,1,3 2,1,1,3
derived value CSAT ---37 --
95% C.I. (3.8,4.3) 3.5,3.9) (4.1,4.4)
The virtues of AOFAT are very clear. It is very easy to use and very efficient. For n
factors each having k levels, the procedure requires only n(k-1)+1 steps (Frey 2003a).
Upon completion of this procedure, we asked the team to document their feedback. In
particular, we asked them to declare and document their preference of AOFAT versus
the more elaborate and complex approach we have described using orthogonal arrays.
We had anticipated that there would be a clear preference to AOFAT because its
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C)
c/i
#1
# 2
# 3
# 4
# 5
# 6
# 7
# 8
# 9
simplicity, efficiency, and easy appeal to intuition. The feedback proved us wrong. In
general the team preferred the orthogonal array approach. We also asked the team to
document whether they would use one approach over the other in the future. It was also
unexpected that they said that they would use both. Many in the team said they will use
AOFAT privately as a way to prepare themselves for important meetings and to test
their own thinking.
Finding
Though this team's application of AOFAT did not select the theoretical
maximum, they find the procedure to be useful and efficient in order to find
a region within the 95% CI of the maximum.
11.8 What actually happened?
The project is complete and delivered to the client on schedule. But the client has
requested eSvcs to perform some extra work on the product and documentation. This
has in effect caused the project to be extended by 2-3 months, although both parties
agree the project is "complete" in spite of the extension. PM states that CSAT is 3.5.
The environment is (3,3,3), the best situation. The overall situation is between (3,2,2,2)
the "actual completion" (2-3 months delay), and (3,2,2,3) "tacit-completion," (on
schedule by tacit agreement). The difference is in the fourth element of the 4-tuple,
between a level 2 and level 3, i.e. a tacit and ambiguous "on schedule" with an actual
delay of "2-3 months." The actual CSAT of 3.5 is bracketed by the derived CSAT
values of "tacit completion" (CSAT of 4.1) and "actual completion" (CSAT of 3.2). The
sequence of decisions is listed below on Table 11.19.
Table 11.19. Derived CSAT for post-BAU cases
CSAT standard deviation
treatment
current worst best current worst best
pre-BAU (1,1,2,2) 2.9 2.6 3.5 0.4 0.6 0.3
BAU (2,1,2,2) 3.1 2.7 3.6 0.4 0.7 0.3
current worst best current worst best
post-BAU 3.8 3.6 4.1 0.4 0.6 0.2(3,2,2,3)
tacit completion 0.2
(3,2,2,3)
actualcompletion 2.9 2.7 3.2 0.4 0.3 0.1(3,2,2,2)
actual situation 3.5
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CSAT was a dominant concern for the team because they were anticipating a massive
follow-on project from the Yokozuna company. Since then, Yokozuna has reformulated
its bidding approach for the follow-on project. Rather than having one services
company, such as eSvcs, perform the vast majority of the work, reap the lion's share of
the benefits, and have a hegemonic influence on project management, Yokozuna is
partitioning the project into many segments and is requesting bids from a wide variety
of services companies. eSvcs is skeptical about the client's capabilities to system
engineer the mega-project they have formulated, nevertheless they are making a very
strong effort to win follow-on business. We are told that CSAT is neither helping nor
hindering their chances at this time.
11.9. Findings from this experiment
This section follows the same format of the previous chapter. The findings are
remarkably similar as well. Between the two chapters, the content of this section
appears repetitious. We infer that this is an indication of the consistency of the two
experiments.
The findings and lessons from this experiment are from our client, about our protocol,
and about our experiment. Therefore this section is organized into three subsections.
The first summarizes our findings from our client, the decision maker and the working
team. What did they tell us and what did we learn from them? The second presents our
findings about the protocol used during this experiment. What worked well and what
should be improved? The third subsection presents findings about our experiment.
We want to know whether or not our method produces a valid experiment. Here we
follow the literature (Yin 2003, Hoyle, Harris, and Judd 2002) and subject our
experiment to "tests" of validity (construct, internal, and external validity) and one test
of reliability. We want to know whether our findings suggest that our experiment is
endowed with the qualities of validity and reliability.
11.9.1 Findings from our client
The sponsoring executive wrote to us: "I am AMAZED and ASTONISHED by your
work results". The JPM and team were enthusiastic about the analysis and the work.
The team was surprised that two decision variables (leadership and use of contingency
buffer) they had spent so much time debating were not statistically significant. Equally
unexpected was the fact that these two variables contributed a negligible % to the
outcome. However, they were gratified to learn that the analysis supported the decisions
they made during critical junctures of the project. Examples of their comments follow:
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- "the methodology gave us a good framework to reevaluate the decision that was
made at a critical timing of the project"
- "the thinking process helped identify the priorities we feel will affect CSAT"
- "knew that meeting the deadline is important but confirmed it with the analysis"
- "By contrasting the multiple scenarios, I have a better sense of the weight of each
factors [sic] have on CSAT, thus making the number more accurate (the fine tuning
process make so you come to realize which factor is more important than the
others)."
" "this framework & approach will help myself to make better decision in a short
time exercise"
- "this process visualizes the decision ... instead of making it on intuition. Better
solution to share with the team why a certain decision is made"
" "a wonderful experience"
We also received suggestions on ways to improve the process:
" "the realistic factor needs to get involved, [eSvcs] profitability ... add [eSvcs]
business revenue as an outcome"
- "do this more quickly in real life"
- "more time up front to tighten up definitions early"
- "do two cycles of this exercise ... would make the model more realistic"
- "summarize (1 chart) to explain all the process"
Taken as a whole, we find that the team found the experiment to be useful, but they also
recommended areas to improve. That will be covered in the next section.
11.9.2. Findings about the protocol
This section will summarize the results of effective and ineffective procedures in our
protocol. It will also address ways to improve future experiments. Table 11.22 (next
page) summarizes our findings and lessons. These are almost identical to Table 10.22 of
the previous chapter.
Taken altogether the findings and lessons from Table 11.20, we surmise that the
protocol was an effective blueprint for our experiment. However, several areas stand out
for improvement: (i) strengthen the front-end by developing a detailed procedure for
framing the problem, add more interactions among the working group and more
discussions for the factor-level specifications, (ii) as in the BAU forecasting procedure,
add a round of forecasting counter-argumentation followed by a debate and discussion,
(iii) include Gage R&R in the protocol to prepare for deeper and broader exploration of
this method.
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Table 11.20. Summary of findings and lessons about our protocol
___-Protocol Findings
Frame the problem
Findings Greater effort and time than anticipated, about a week of briefings & meetings.
Lesson Should have developed a detailed procedure for this step.
Establish the base line
Findings The 2-rounds BAU forecasting and discussion process works well, dispersions
decline and confidence increases. Team considers this procedure useful.
Takes > effort & time than anticipated, took - half a day to forecast BAU case.
Lesson Procedure works and should be used for the other forecasts.
Forecast the sample space
Findings Took << effort and << time than anticipated, ~half-day to complete 12 cases.
Suggests that the team has learned how to forecast complex treatments and has
the patience and discipline to forecast a large number of treatments.
Should have done one additional round of counter argumentation during the
forecasting of the treatments from the orthogonal array.
Lesson Can consider more complex orthogonal arrays in the future.
Analyze the data
Findings Analysis shows two of four controllable variables are statistically significant.
A small number of variables are strong predictors of the outcome.
Interactions are found to be small. (There are only 2 statistically significant
controllable factors. Thus we have only one interaction, which we found to be
small).
Lesson The team aided by the protocol is able to identify the appropriate variables
Findings The Gage R&R method is useful to analyze the team's ability to forecast.
Can analyze repeatability and reproducibility of forecasts.
Can analyze team's forecasting consistency (part-part Var) with Gage R&R
Lesson Need to find more ways to improve discriminatory power of the forecasts
Analyze alternatives
Findings Able to analyze and derive forecasts for all alternatives of interest to senior
executives
Lesson Able to construct and analyze other meaningful sets of alternatives.
The DOE approach appears to be effective for decision analysis.
Findings Team finds Adaptive One-Factor-At-A-Time useful to find a maximum.
Lesson Should be part of a forecasting effort.
Learning about the decision
Findings Executive sponsor, JPM, and team enthusiastic about the analysis and
findings.
Lesson The protocol appears to be effective and can be improved.
11.9.3 Findings about our method
What can we point to that suggests that we have a valid experiment? As in Chapter 10.
we will discuss how and whether our findings support these tests of validity and
reliability. These tests can be summarized as follows:
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- Construct validity: demonstrate that we have a conceptual framework for our
experiment, which can be operationalized with accurately specified independent and
dependent variables.
- Internal validity: demonstrate that we can draw conclusions about the causal effects
of the independent variables on the dependent variables. Address whether the
conclusions that can be drawn are plausible and credible, i.e. does the experiment
have face validity?
" External validity: demonstrate that we can generalize from this experiment to a
larger and more general population and/or broader settings.
- Reliability: demonstrate that the procedures can be repeated and that they produce
consistent results.
Construct validity
The roots of our conceptual framework are in DOE and the p-diagram, Figure 11.8.
uncontrollable variables
1. stakeholder requirements consolidation
2. client budget flexibility
3. performance of a parallel eSvcs project
controllable variables
1. project leadership
2. project approach
3. use of contingency
4. delivery schedule
uncontrollable variables
+
Project
-El - I-
t 4,f
controllable variables
Figure 11.8 Conceptual construct of our experiment
The independent variables are the four controllable and the three
variables; the dependent variable is the CSAT response (section 11.2.4).
rendered operational by its detailed specification (Tables 11.2-11.5)
procedures.
uncontrollable
The concept is
and the DOE
The ANOVA tables in Tables 11.9 and 11.10 show that approach and delivery are the
controllable variables that are strong predictors of the CSAT outcome.
The response tables of Tables 11.14 and Appendix 11.10 show that the independent
variables exert their influence on the dependent variable (CSAT) as one would expect.
The average response for all the controllable factors, i.e. 2.8, 2.5, 3.0 each of the three
environments, current, worst, and best respectively, show that that the uncontrollable
variables do exert their influence on the response (CSAT) as one would expect, i.e. the
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CSAT
average in the best environment is the highest, in the worst environment is the lowest,
and in the current environment is in between. To the sponsoring executive and the team
these tables and charts were judged to be qualitatively consistent with what they would
expect as domain experts. This is a test of face validity (Hoyle, Harris and Judd 2002).
The experiment is based on a DOE-based conceptual framework, and a model that is
defined with controllable and uncontrollable variables. The model is made operational
with a protocol and an experiment that shows they behave as expected. Taken all
together, our findings suggest construct validity for our experiment.
Internal validity
The interval validity tests are about whether the causal effects of the independent
variables on the dependent variables are credible. In particular, whether experts judge
these causal effects to be consistent with domain knowledge and the phenomenon being
studied (Hoyle, Harris and Judd 2002). Section 11.6.2 and 11.7 present inference and
conclusions drawn from the causal relationships of our variables. These were judged to
be qualitatively consistent with what the JPM and his working team would expect. This
suggests internal validity of our experiment.
External validity
We need to demonstrate that this method can be generalized to a larger population and
broader settings. All together with the ADI surrogate simulation of chapters 4 through
8, the experiment of Chapter 10, and the experiment of this chapter, we have four
examples using our method for corporate decision analysis. The two field experiments
reported in this chapter and chapter 10 and the remarkably consistent findings suggest
that the method has external validity. These cases are sufficiently general to suggest that
these types of experiments are applicable to other corporate decisions. Clearly more
experiments and more research are called for.
Reliability
The test of reliability is whether the procedures can be repeated to produce consistent
results. In section 11.3.2 we used two repeated forecasts for BAU. We found that the
BAU results were reasonably consistent (Table 11.7). Tests of consistency with our test
treatments also suggest consistency (Table 11.12). In Section 11.5.3, using the Gage
R&R method we obtained measures for repeatability, reproducibility, and part-part
variation. We noted that they would not meet AIAG benchmarks, which were
developed for manufacturing systems. But we have not found any literature to tell us
whether AIAG benchmarks apply in equal measure to forecasting. The Gage R&R
analysis of this chapter and the preceding chapter suggests that Gage R&R can be useful
to determine forecasting quality from a team of experts. This appears to be a potentially
useful area for further research.
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11.10. Quality of the Decision
In the previous section we argued that the experiment has validity according to accepted
practice and criteria for this type of experiments. In this section we apply Howard's
(2001) criteria to evaluate the eSvcs executive decision. We discussed these criteria
earlier in chapter 2 section 2.4 and showed its usage for the company experiment in
chapter 10. We therefore simplify the presentation below. Howard's criteria are:
- A committed decision-maker.
" A right frame.
" Right alternatives.
- Right information.
- Clear Preferences.
- Right decision procedures.
As in Chapter 10, we present our evaluation in table form (Table 11.21).
Table 11.21. eSves Yokozuna decision quality
criterion notes
committed - this project is a retrospective look at decisions made and the
decision-maker actions taken. The DM was committed.
right frame * framed as an opportunity for follow on business.M spvecified controllable and uncontrollable variables
- addressed all of executive's what if questions under a number of
right uncertainty conditions
alternatives - did explore other alternatives, but executive's priorities were on
the actual retrospective actions rather than hypothetical situations.
- forecasting protocol appeared to work well.
right Gage R&R identified the most troublesome forecasts and guided
information us in improving the analysis 0
f Need to find ways to improve the discriminatory power of the
Gage R&R (this is a potential research area)
- executive very clear on decision rules and communicated them
clear it appears that ability and aptitude for statistical thinking is not
Preferences pervasive with corporate executives 0
concept of variance reduction and trading off performance for
robustness was a difficult concept for the client
right decision - construct and internal validity is discussed in 11.9pgheduesn - we used client satisfaction index, adherence to rational and 0
procedures consistency rules is readily observable.
* completely true 0 largely true @ toss up 0 not so true
We conclude that the JPM had made quality decisions.
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0 not true
11.11. Summary and Conclusions
In this section we begin with a summary of our findings and the results of the tests for
the decision quality. We close with our observations about our initial hypothesis - that
as in an engineering system, corporate problems and their potential consequences
depend on the behavior of systems and processes under uncertainty. That as in
engineering systems, the behavior of a company's business systems, although complex,
can be studied with experiments, real or simulated. Finally that DOE and gage R&R
present us with useful machinery to perform valid experiments and generate quality
decision alternatives about corporate problems.
11.11.1. Summary of Findings
Findings from our client. The eSvcs sponsoring executive, the JPM, and the working
team found the experiment to be useful and a rewarding learning experience.
Findings about the protocol. Our protocol was effective, for us and the client, in the
planning and the execution of this field experiment. Our blind-Delphi forecasting
method was able to reduce the dispersion of the BAU forecast. This is important
because the BAU case is used as the baseline for forecasting. Our debiasing principles
and their embodiment in our data collection protocol resulted in improved forecasting
confidence and consistency. From first hand experience in using the protocol, the
working team suggested that more time should be spent in the front-end for team
discussions and executive communications.
Findings about our method. For construct validity, we demonstrated that using our
controllable and uncontrollable variables, and our forecasting procedures, we are able to
operationalize our DOE-based method. Feedback from the clients and analysis of the
data from our experiment show that we can draw inferences and draw conclusions about
the causal effects, which are credible and useful to the client. This suggests the face
validity of our method. To find statistical support of our constructs, we have relied on
the ANOVA statistics for our constructs. In order to demonstrate a degree of external
validity, this is the second company experiment in the field. For reliability, we used the
Gage R&R method to show that our forecasting procedure is reasonably consistent. Our
BAU forecasting process using the blind Delphi-method is also an example of
reliability.
In conclusion, the findings suggest that we have a valid experiment using the tests from
(Yin 2003, Hoyle, Harris, and Judd 2002). In the next chapter, we present another of our
field experiments and show that we get very similar findings which strengthen our
belief in the conclusion just stated.
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11.11.2. Summary of Decision Quality
Recall that in section 2.4 we presented the view that there is a distinction between a
good decision and a good outcome (e.g. Howard 1983, Baron 1988, Hazelrigg 1996).
The actual outcome is not a valid evaluative factor for the quality of a decision because
any decision can produce bad results given the stochastic nature of events. We have
adopted Howard's six criteria to evaluate the quality of a decision (Howard 2001).
These have been discussed in chapter 2, section 2.4 and in this chapter in section 10.8,
in which we have concluded that we have a quality decision.
11.11.2. Conclusions
The objective of this chapter has been to report on the validity of a field experiment
with a real company using our DOE-based decision analysis method. The company,
eSvcs, is an e-business services company. The executive sponsor wanted to know
whether his management initiatives would produce a high client satisfaction rating, a
key indicator of future business, and a key variable in his annual performance review.
We followed our experimental protocol that we had used with the ADI surrogate and
our other field experiment with the electronics manufacturing company. We wanted to
know whether the same approach that was useful in the laboratory with surrogate
simulations and with an in situ experiment (in the US) would be as effective in the field
with another company and in another country (Japan). In section 11.9 we have shown
that there is support for our experiment as being valid. Thus the experimental data from
our eSvcs field experiment suggest there is support for our DOE-based method for
decision analysis. Overall, the experimental protocol was an effective blueprint for the
planning and execution of the experiment. The data also suggest that the forecasting
protocol and the debiasing procedures were able to improve the quality of the forecasts.
Equally important, the team judged the procedure to be useful. Using the Gage R&R
method we were able to identify quantitative metrics to analyze the quality of the data
that were entered into the model as well as the quality of the data that were produced by
the model.
Our method is able to parameterize the system behavior of eSvcs for the outcome
specified by our sponsoring executive and the JPM. It is also able to parameterize the
set of uncontrollable uncertainties it faces. Using our DOE-based method, we were able
to explore all the "what-if' questions posed by the JPM and key team members without
imposing constraints on the range of hypothetical questions they could ask. This is a
direct result of the DOE method in which we can explore the entire solution space over
the key points in the space of environmental uncertainty. The alternatives for this
exploration can be easily and readily constructed using the controllable and
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uncontrollable variables. The data show that the one uncovered interactions was small
and its contribution to the outcome was also small. Therefore the data show that the
system behavior of eSvcs for the specified outcome is "nearly-decomposable" (Simon
1997) at our scale of analysis (Bar-Yam 1997), which says that we can represent that
emergent system behavior with a linear model. We have already raised the issue of
scale and its implications on the requirement of having to know the detailed behavior of
a systems' elemental parts (See the summary of chapter 6 and 8). Dawes (1979) first
pointed out the "robust beauty" of linear models in decision making, on the ability of
experts to identify the predictors of outcome, and to code them in a monotone
relationship with the outcome criterion. Research from the descriptive school of
decision theory sheds more light on this subject. Early studies from Slovic and
Lichtenstein (1971) suggest that people's verbally reported weights were substantially
overstated the importance of minor facts. They undertook to find judges (professional
experts) who exhibit non-linearity, i.e. the weights they assign to variables are not a
constant but in fact depend on other variables. They are known as "configural" judges
(Goldstein and Hogarth 1997). Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971) found that many
professions and experts who behave this way; the ANOVA statistics showed significant
interaction terms. And, "Despite their significance, however, these interactions rarely
accounted for much judgmental variance ... judges were not necessarily mistaken when
they claimed to use information configurally, but that linear models provided such good
approximations to nonlinear processes that the judges' nonlinearity was difficult to
detect." This area of framing the problem at the appropriate scale (Bar-Yam 1997,
Simon 1997) and the near-linear behavior of complex systems is an area worthy of more
study.
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Appendix 11.1. Client Satisfaction (CSAT) sample questions.
* How satisfied are you with the value you
received on this engagement?
Comments
* Demonstrated the necessary level of expertise,
knowledge and skills?
Comments
* How do we compare with other firms you have
engaged for similar work?
Comments
( ) 5
( ) 4
( ) 3
( ) 2
( )1( )O0
((((((
((((((
))))))
))))))
5
4
3
2
1
0
very satisfied
satisfied
neutral
dissatisfied
very dissatisfied
no opinion
/don't know
very satisfied
satisfied
neutral
dissatisfied
very dissatisfied
no opinion
/don't know
5 much more value
4 more value
3 comparable value
2 less value
1 much less value
0 no experience
with others
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Appendix 11.2. Forecast rationale examples.
why the data is accurate.
1. "... the actual decision (2,1,2,2) that we made and we know what happened after the fact. I
believe the CSA T is going to be neutral (3) and based on that number (baseline) the numbers for
worst and best uncontrollable factors should be relatively accurate."
2. "Their investment has been already huge comparing with past one. Therefore, even ifproject
succeeds, client sat will not be good with cost overruns."
3. "Client had no experience with this kind ofproject. Therefore, they see bad sides rather than good
sides in this challenging project. Client sat would not be high at this moments.
4. "Unless we meet the project schedule, won't be able to satisfy steering committee members."
why the data is not accurate.
1. "About stakeholder's requirements consensus (it is not realistic) it is difficult to imagine the
situation "requirement is stable" in this global complexed environments."
2. "The perception of [provider] based on parallel project with client could bias the CSA T numbers
no matter how the actual Yokozuna project did."
3. "Complexity of the project makes the client stakeholders outside of the project difficult to
evaluate the project accurately. However these stakeholders could influence the CSA T numbers."
4. "Can'tfully understand all stakeholder's intension. Couldn't assess all the impact on project."
5. "In the best situation, the client may not be happy even if the requirements are stable if the
project is behind. The client may be paying us but may feel that [provider] should be paying."
6. "The client in US is not pro-US ... no matter what we have done differently, the outcome would
not have been much different. It's hard to quantify this."
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Appendix 11.3. BAU round 1 and round 2
BAU forecasts
current condition worst condition best condition
BAUl 2.0 3.0 3.3 2.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 1.5 2.6 3.6 3.8 3.0
BAU2 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.2 2.4 1.5 2.5 2.0 4.0 3.5 3.0 3.2 3.0
Appendix 11.4. Team confidence, BAU round 1 and round
2, and final
confidence
BAUl 4.0 4.2 2.0 3.0
BAU2 3.8 4.0 4.4 4.0 3.5
final 4.0 3.7 3.8 3.0 3.8
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I uncontrollable scenarios
current worst best
+
outpot
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
2.00 3.00 3.30 2.00 -
2.70 3.00 3.00 3.00 2.50
2.20 2.00 2.80 1.00 1.00
2.70 3.00 3.00 2.70 3.00
4.00 3.80 3.20 3.20 2.60
4.20 4.60 4.50 4.00 2.80
2.30 2.00 2.00 1.00 2.20
2.70 2.80 2.50 2.50 3.20
2.70 3.30 3.60 3.20 2.50
4.20 4.60 3.50 3.80 3.50
1.00 1.90 1.30 14 110
3.50 4.30 3.40 1 310 1.0
2.10 1.50 1.30 1.20 1.10
Ontiollab
:in
212 2
2 2
2 1 2
2 2 3 1
23 1 2 3
1 3 1 33 3 2 1
3 3
..3131.....
output
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
1.50 2.00 2.50 1.50 -
2.20 2.40 1.50 2.50 2.00
1.50 1.50 2.50 1.20 1.00
2.20 2.80 2.80 2.40 3.00
3.50 3-50 3.00 3.00 2.10
4.00 4.40 4.30 3.40 2.10
1.80 1.40 2.30 0.0 2.00
1.80 2.20 2.30 2.20 2.50
2.00 3.20 3.50 2.70 2.00_
4.00 4.30 3.30 3.60 3.00
0.80 1.20 1.00 1.20 1.00
3.20 4.00 3.20 3.00 1.60
1.50 10 1.00 111.00 1.00
E
BA
14
Is
11/
I/M 2.00 1 2.30 1.90 1.00
output
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
2.50 3.50 3.80 3.00
4.00 3.50 3.00 3.20 3.00
2.80 2.50 3.00 1.70 1.20
3.70 3.30 3.20 2.90 3.30
4.50 4.00 3.50 3.30 3.00
4.50 4.0 4.80 4.10 4.00
2.80 2.20 2.40 1.20 2.20
2.80 3.00 2.80 2.80 3.50
3.20 3.40 3.80 3.30 3.20
4.50 4.60 3.70 3.80 3.80
1.50 2.00 1.50 1.O 1.20
4.20 4.30 3.60 3.20 2.60
2.30 2.00 1.50 1.30 1.20
2.70 2.50 2.70 2.20 1.20
Appendix 11.5. Complete forecast data set.
1.10 1.001.80 2.20 2.50 2.00
9 Q-()
Appendix 11.6. ANOVA Tables.
General Linear Model: ensemble worst versus leadership, approach,...
Factor
leadership
approach
buffer
delivery
Type
fixed
fixed
fixed
fixed
Levels
3
3
3
3
Values
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3
1, 2, 3
Analysis of Variance for ensemble worst, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source
leadership
approach
buffer
delivery
Error
Total
DF
2
2
2
2
36
44
Seq SS
0.0751
2.9938
0.0031
30.6724
11.3280
45.0724
Adj SS
0.0751
2.9938
0.0031
30.6724
11.3280
Adj MS
0.0376
1.4969
0.0016
15.3362
0.3147
F P
0.12
4.76
0.00
48.74
0.888
0.015
0.995
0.000
S = 0.560952 R-Sq = 74.87% R-Sq(adj) = 69.28%
General Linear Model: ensemble best versus leadership, approach,...
Factor
leadership
approach
buffer
delivery
Type Levels Values
fixed 3 1, 2, 3
fixed 3 1, 2, 3
fixed 3 1, 2, 3
fixed 3 1, 2, 3
Analysis of Variance for ensemble best, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source
leadership
approach
buffer
delivery
Error
Total
DF Seq SS
2 0.2618
2 3.0698
2 0.0124
2 32.7964
36 7.6840
44 43.8244
Adj SS
0.2618
3 .0698
0.0124
32.7964
7.6840
Adj MS
0.1309
1.5349
0.0062
16.3982
0.2134
F
0.61
7.19
0.03
76.83
P
0.547
0.002
0.971
0.000
S = 0.462000 R-Sq = 82.47% R-Sq(adj) = 78.57%
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Appendix 11.7. JPM's ANOVA statistics
Analysis of Variance for curr 4, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source
project leadership
project approach
use of buffer
delivery date
Error
Total
DF Seq SS
2 0.2122
2 0.2966
2 0.3279
2 12.2525
4 0.1184
12 13.2077
Adj SS
0.6832
0.3964
0.1154
12.2525
Adj MS
0.3416
0.1982
0.0577
6.1263
0.1184 0.0296
S = 0.172033 R-Sq = 99.10% R-Sq(adj) = 97.31%
The residuals are N(0,0.099).
292
F
11.54
6.70
1.95
207.00
P
0.022
0.053
0.256
0.000
Probability Plot of JPM forecasts
Normal
99. Mean 1.024821E-16
StDev 0.09932
95- N 13
90 A D 0.525P-Value 0.146
80-
70-
60-
4o-
30- F .. ....
10-
-0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
RESI1
Worksheet: Worksheet 1; 10/19/2005
Appendix 11.8. Interaction ANOVA Tables
General Linear Model: ensemble best versus approach, delivery
Type Levels Values
fixed 3 1, 2, 3
fixed 3 1, 2, 3
Analysis of Variance for ensemble best, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source DF
approach 2
delivery 2
approach*delivery 4
Error 36
Total 44
Seq SS Adj SS
3.0698 3.0698
32.7964 32.7964
0.2742 0.2742
7.6840 7.6840
43.8244
S = 0.462000 R-Sq = 82.47% R-Sq(adj) = 78.57%
General Linear Model: ensemble worst versus approach, delivery
Factor Type Levels Values
approach fixed 3 1, 2, 3
delivery fixed 3 1, 2, 3
Analysis of Variance for ensemble worst, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source
approach
delivery
approach*delivery
Error
Total
DF Seq SS
2 2.9938
2 30.6724
4 0.0782
36 11.3280
44 45.0724
S = 0.560952 R-Sq = 74.87% R-Sq(adj) = 69.28%
General Linear Model: ensemble curr versus approach, delivery
Factor Type Levels Values
approach fixed
delivery fixed
3 1, 2, 3
3 1, 2, 3
Analysis of Variance for ensemble curr, using Adjusted SS for Tests
Source
approach
delivery
approach*delivery
Error
Total
DF Seq SS
2 2.0520
2 32.9453
4 0.3627
36 9.5320
44 44.8920
Adj SS
2.0520
32.9453
0.3627
9.5320
Adj MS
1.0260
16.4727
0.0907
0.2648
F P
3.87
62.21
0.34
0.030
0.000
0.847
S = 0.514566 R-Sq = 78.77% R-Sq(adj) = 74.05%
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Factor
approach
delivery
F PAdj MS
1.5349
16.3982
0.0686
0.2134
7.19
76.83
0.32
0.002
0.000
0.862
Adj SS
2.9938
30.6724
0.0782
11.3280
F PAdj MS
1.4969
15.3362
0.0196
0.3147
4.76
48.74
0.06
0.015
0.000
0.993
Appendix 11.9. Gage R&R
Gage R&R for neutral csat
Gage name:
Date of study:
Reported by:
Tolerance:
Misc:
no op 5
LAI seminar
Two-Way ANOVA Table With Interaction
Source
treatment
operator
treatment * operator
Repeatability
Total
D
2
4
7
F SS
9 74.5307
3 1.8112
7 3.8671
0 4.8986
9 85.1076
MS
8.28119
0.60373
0.14323
0.12246
Alpha to remove interaction term = 0.25
Two-Way ANOVA Table Without Interaction
Source
treatment
operator
Repeatability
Total
DF SS
9 74.5307
3 1.8112
67 8.7657
79 85.1076
Gage R&R
Source
Total Gage R&R
Repeatability
Reproducibility
operator
Part-To-Part
Total Variation
Source
Total Gage R&R
Repeatability
Reproducibility
operator
Part-To-Part
Total Variation
%Contribution
VarComp (of VarComp)
0.15448 13.17
0.13083 11.15
0.02364 2.02
0.02364 2.02
1.01879 86.83
1.17327 100.00
StdDev (SD)
0.39303
0.36171
0.15377
0.15377
1.00935
1.08318
Study Var
(6 * SD)
2.35821
2.17024
0.92261
0.92261
6.05612
6.49906
%Study Var
(%SV)
36.29
33.39
14.20
14.20
93 .18
100.00
Number of Distinct Categories = 3
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F P
57.8192
4.2152
1.1695
0.000
0.014
0.321
MS
8.28119
0.60373
0.13083
F
63.2968
4.6146
P
0.000
0.005
Appendix 11.10. Response tables for worst and best
environments
Response Table for Means worst
Level leadership approach buffer delivery
1 2.400 2.620 2.460 1.413
2 2.500 2.647 2.440 2.507
3 2.453 2.087 2.453 3.433
Delta 0.100 0.560 0.020 2.020
Rank 3 2 4 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations
Level leadership approach buffer delivery
1 0.4925 0.7351 0.4515 0.4419
2 0.5938 0.4775 0.4803 0.4223
3 0.4577 0.3314 0.6122 0.6798
Delta 0.1360 0.4038 0.1607 0.2575
Rank 4 1 3 2
Response Table for Means best
Level leadership approach buffer delivery
1 3.060 3.353 3.107 1.987
2 3.193 3.180 3.093 3.213
3 3.013 2.733 3.067 4.067
Delta 0.180 0.620 0.040 2.080
Rank 3 2 4 1
Response Table for Standard Deviations
Level leadership approach buffer delivery
1 0.5480 0.4636 0.4951 0.5472
2 0.4238 0.4315 0.3175 0.2796
3 0.3185 0.3952 0.4777 0.4635
Delta 0.2295 0.0684 0.1775 0.2676
Rank 2 4 3 1
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Appendix 11.11. Constructed Alternatives
Construction of alternatives for this experiment is straight forward. We construct the
following table for the current environment.
Table 11.17. Optimum alternative by selective maximizing profit or stdev
CSAT stdev
recommended setting & rationale
r. C- 1 >
leadership 2 2 3 2 2 2 highest CSAT lowest stdev, keep at 2
approach 3 2 4 2 2 2 highest CSAT, lowest stdev, keep at 2
buffer 4 2 2 2 2 2 highest CSAT, lowest stdev, keep at 2
delivery 1 3 1 2 1 3 highest rank & CSAT, keep at 3date
derived CSAT 4.0 with stdev 0.5
This constructed alternative (2,2,2,3) presents us with the highest CSAT for the current
environment. From a derivation perspective this alternative is no different than the post-
BAU decision of (3,2,2,3), given that only approach and delivery are statistically
significant (i.e. the second and fourth element of the 4-tuple). And both derived values
are within the 95% confidence interval of the other, i.e. table below.
Comparisons of constructed CSAT and post-BAU CSAT
current environment mean stdev 95 % CI
constructed (2,2,2,3) 4.0 0.5 (3.8,4.1)
post-BAU (3,2,2,3) 3.9 0.4 (3.7,4.0)
We know there are only two statistically significant variables (p<<0.05), approach and
delivery date. They are represented by the second and fourth element of the 4-tuple. In
both the constructed and post-BAU cases in Table 11.18, they have the same levels.
And in the current case, these two factors contribute >97% to the outcome (Table
11.10). It appears that the JPM made an appropriate decision. The first element of the 4-
tuple is leadership. Did moving from level 2 to level 3 make a difference? Although the
data indicates that the mean declines, was the post-BAU still an appropriate decision? It
appears so. For without the JPM in the GPMO where he had inside knowledge of the
client executives, it is likely that neither the JPM nor the team would have had the
information or the confidence to have made the decisive decision to propose a 3-wave
delivery approach, renegotiate the schedule and the financial agreement. So, the
decision to change leadership appears to have been an appropriate one.
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PART IV. Summary, Conclusion, and Future Work
12.0. Evaluation of Our Method
12.1. Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to evaluate our method as a whole. Throughout this
dissertation, we have subjected our work to various tests in pieces. We tested our ADI
system dynamics model as a simulation surrogate of a real company. Then using two
ADI corporate problems we concept-tested our DOE-based decision analysis method
and found support for the concept. Although it is necessary to know that our method
appears to work with a surrogate simulation model, it does not assure us that it will
work in practice. Therefore, we took our method to the field and performed in situ
experiments with a manufacturing company and an e-business services company. And
using the Gage R&R method, we tested the quality of the forecasting composite, as a
measurement subsystem of the companies. Then guided by the work of scholars (Yin
2003, Hoyle, Harris, and Judd 2002) we subjected our field experiment to tests of
validity (construct, internal, and external validity) and one test of reliability. As a result
of these tests, we infer that our experiments are valid and reliable. In this chapter, we
evaluate our method as a whole in its entirety.
12.2. Evaluation Criteria
Bacharach (1999) in a widely referenced paper discusses in detail the necessary
components of a good theory and evaluation criteria for a candidate theory. His thesis is
that a theory is a cogent framework of variables, constructs, hypotheses, and
propositions that comes together with explanatory potential and predictive adequacy.
We believe that in Part II and Part III of this dissertation, we have demonstrated (to a
meaningful degree) that we can pass Bacharach's tests. However, we prefer a test of
method rather than a test of theory. To that end, we subject our method to Carroll and
Johnson's (1990) six criteria for evaluating methods. We first list their six criteria in
Table 12.1 on the next page and then we discuss them in the context of our method in
section 12.3. Then given our observations vis a' vis Carroll and Johnson's criteria, we
conclude with a judgment about our method.
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Table 12.1. Caroll and Johnson's criteria for method evaluation
criterion specification for criterion
discovery_ _ _-_power to uncover new phenomena
understanding - valid constructs that uncover mechanisms
prediction ability to make predictions based on rules of logic or mathematics
prescriptive - capability to modify the decision process including better
control....................................... prescriptions, and what-if situations and conditions
confound control *creating controlled situations to rule out confounding elements
ease of use - economic and efficient use of time and resources
12.3. Evaluation
Each criterion is presented with two topics under them, Criterion, and Results. Under
Criterion, we present the explanatory specifications. These are taken directly from
Caroll and Johnson (1990). Under Results, we comment on how and whether our
method satisfies a specific criterion. In this section's closing paragraph, we state an
opinion about our method.
Discovery
Criterion. "Having the power to uncover new phenomena, surprise the researcher, and
lead to creative insights."
Results. The most significant discovery is that we can study corporate business
decisions using engineering methods. Specifically, there are three major discoveries.
The first one is what we set out to do, i.e. demonstrate that our DOE-based method is
useful for corporate decision analysis. Secondly, we can use Gage theory to evaluate an
organization's capabilities to perform business forecasting. Thirdly, that at the scale in
which we framed our problem, the behavior of a company's business processes is near-
decomposable. This issue of scaling of heterogeneous complex systems is worthy of
deeper exploration.
Understanding
Criterion. "Providing a cause-and-effect analysis that uncovers the mechanisms or
processes by which decisions are made."
Results. We have shown that framing our corporate decision situation by means of
controllable and uncontrollable variables and from the experimental data, we are able to
determine and analyze the cause-and-effect relationships between these variables. From
experimental data, we can derive (predict) the phenomenological behavior of corporate
business processes as a system. Moreover, these derivations (predictions) can be made
for system behavior under a wide variety of uncertainty conditions. These capabilities
unconstraint the range of "what if' questions that an executive can pose. And we can
determine the % contribution that each of the controllable variables makes to the
performance of the system.
298
Prediction
Criterion. "Having logical or mathematical rules that predict the judgment and
decisions that will be made. The rules need not represent the actual decision processes."
Results. Using our orthogonal arrays, we are able to derive (predict) the output of every
decision alternative. In this way, we can explore the entire solution space under the
whole space of uncertainty conditions. See also Results above under the Understanding
criterion.
Prescriptive Control.
Criterion. "Providing opportunities and techniques for changing the decision process, as
in prescribing better decision rules or testing potential manipulations."
Results. We interpret decision process to mean step-6 of the canonical-model of
decision-making: "selection of an alternative". In our method, this task is deferred to the
decision-maker (DM). We concentrate in the construction of alternatives and the
derivations (predictions) of their outcomes under a variety of uncontrollable conditions,
and defer to the DM to select among these alternatives. Because all our results are
presented in the natural units of the problem, this selection among constructed
alternatives is very natural to corporate executives. The second part of the criterion is
about better decision rules or testing potential manipulations. With our method, we can
design the treatment that yields the maximum output. This output can also be the most
risky, i.e. its stdev could be higher than those of other treatments. A risk averse DM can
elect to have a treatment with a lower stdev (less risk) at a lower output. This would be
a solution that satisfices for that DM. Appendix 10.6 shows such an example for the
HiTEM company with whom we performed a field experiment. For testing potential
manipulations, can we construct different alternatives that are demonstrably superior in
different ways and present them to the decision maker? The capability of our method to
construct alternatives that cover the entire solution space and the complete set of
uncertainty conditions is in fact the hallmark of our method.
Confound Control
Criterion. "Creating controlled situations so as to rule out other explanations of the
results (known as confounds)."
Results. Edwards (1992) declares that "it is far better to be lucky than wise." Edwards is
describing a confounded outcome. Is the good outcome a result of sound analysis or
uncontrollable conditions? In our method, the uncontrollable variables are explicitly
identified and combined into uncontrollable environmental conditions through either
full-factorial combinations or compound noise conditions. Another source of potential
confounding is the interactions between controllable variables. In our method we can
use high resolution arrays that permit us to determine the interactions and their
contributions to the outcome.
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Ease of Use
Criterion. "Taking less time and resources for the same progress to the other goals."
Results. This method is not difficult to learn or administer. Some elementary knowledge
of statistics is required. To simplify its use, we have developed a detailed protocol for
planning and executing experiments. Executives and participants in our field
experiments found it easy to use and told us so in written feedback sheets we asked
them to document their views.
Summary Judgment
We follow Carroll and Johnson's (1990) tabular scoring approach to summarize the
evaluation of our method.
Table 12.2. Evaluation summary of our method
criterion specification for criterion evaluation
power to uncover new phenomena
- corporate decisions can be analyzed with DOE
discovery - forecasting composite can be analyzed with Gage theory
- at the appropriate scale, complex business processes behave
as a near-decomposable system
valid constructs that uncover mechanisms 0
- phenomenological behavior of corporate processes can be
determined with our controllable and uncontrollable
understanding variables.
- the uncertainty space can be characterized with our
uncontrollable variables
ability to make predictions based on logical or mathematical0
rulesprediction p we can derive the output of treatments across the entire
solutio space ina wide variety of uncertainty conditions
capability to modify the decision process including better
prescriptions and what-if situations and conditions
- we can construct alternatives that trades-off between
prescriptive performance and risk
control
n DM can chose alternatives based on the output of
treatments across the entire solution space in a wide variety
of uncertainty conditions
creating controlled situations to rule out confounding
elements
confound - controllable and uncontrollable variables separate their
control effects on performance of the corporate system
high resolution arrays separate the interaction effects from
the main effects
ease f use economic and efficient use of time and resources
a written feedback indicates that the method is easy to use
0 true to a large extent 0 largely true ® toss up 0 not so true 0 not true
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From the discussion of section 12.3 and Table 12.2 above, we infer that our method is
valid. It is valid in addition to having produced valid experiments as shown in Part II
and Part III of this document.
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302
Chapter 13. Summary, Conclusions, and Future Work*
13.1 Summary
This dissertation has explored a new idea: corporate problems and their potential
solutions under uncertainty can be studied using DOE. These problems are hard. They
tend to be multi-disciplinary where discipline specific methods can only offer limited
guidance to problem representation and solution optimization. These problems are also
messy, wicked, and defy programmable solutions (see chapter 9). To address these
challenges, we have taken an engineering approach. Our proposition is that as in an
engineering system, corporate problems and their potential solutions deal with the
behavior of systems and processes under uncertainty. It then follows that the behavior
of a company's business systems and processes, although messy, wicked, and hard, can
be measured and studied with experiments. Using the methods of DOE an experimenter
can determine the phenomenological behavior of a system or process. Therefore, DOE
presents us with a way to study the behavior of the systems that underpin a corporate
problem and determine the performance of potential solutions. DOE presents us a
method to specify experimental constructs. And perhaps more importantly, the method
helps us determine the sufficient set of experiments that can guide us to make inferences
and predictions about the behavior of this system over the entire solution space and
under a wide range of uncertain conditions. DOE presents us with a systematic
approach to answer the questions of the kind of experiments that can be constructed; the
ways they can be analyzed, and the necessary rigor required to make reasoned and
informed predictions about outcomes.
In Part I, we surveyed the literature for decision theory and DOE. We showed that
scholars segment decision theory into three schools: the normative, descriptive, and
prescriptive schools. Our work is located in the descriptive school whose goal is to
"help people make better decisions." The literature reveals a common meta-process that
is implicit in decision analysis. The scientific method is an instantiation of this meta-
process in the domain of scientific inquiry. The engineering method is another
instantiation that is employed by skilled practitioners of that profession. This meta-
process is known as the "canonical model" and it identifies a sequence of seven steps to
decision-making. They are: recognizing that a problem exists, defining the problem,
specifying goals and objectives, generating alternatives, analyzing alternatives,
selecting an alternative, and learning about the decision. A large majority of scholars
focus on the back-end of the canonical process: analyses of alternatives and selection a
preferred alternative. The assumption is that alternatives are "free gifts to the decision
* This chapter omits citations because they have all been made elsewhere in this dissertation
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maker," i.e. alternatives exist or are readily and easily constructed. In contrast, we elect
to concentrate on the front-end of the canonical model. We choose to pay special
attention to the generation and the analyses of alternatives. Rather than assume that
alternatives have been gifted, we assume that presented with a sufficient set of reasoned
alternatives, senior executives are able to make a selection and commit to action.
Construction of alternatives is natural with a DOE approach. We can construct
alternatives that cover the entire solution space under a wide variety of uncertainty
conditions.
In PART II, we use a system dynamics (SD) model of a real company, Analog Devices
Inc. (ADI), as a surrogate to test our DOE-based approach to decision analysis. This SD
model is a comprehensive representation of ADI's operational behavior. The SD model
uses 620 equations to represent 85 internal processes, such as R&D, manufacturing,
finance, and exogenous processes that include customers, competitors, financial
markets, and industry-sector demand. We used the SD model as a surrogate to simulate
corporate problems and decisions. Our goal was to find support for our decision-
analysis method. Given ADI's strategic problem, we identified two corporate problems
to study: how to design decisions to maximize the Market Value of the Firm (MVF) and
Annual Operating Income (AOI).
We framed the ADI problems in our DOE normal-form by specifying controllable and
uncontrollable variables each at three levels of performance. Then we used a
progression of experimental designs from the most complex (full factorial), to the most
parsimonious orthogonal array, and finally to the most efficient and simplest approach
using Frey's One-Factor-At-A-Time hill-climbing procedure. We found that all our
models consistently showed that all our variables were statistically significant predictors
of the specified outcomes (except for rare cases), and that interactions were present but
small. Moreover, we found that our models exhibit the properties of sparcity, hierarchy,
and inheritance. We found that the results and the behavior of ADI using our variables
under varying conditions of uncertainty are consistent with our understanding of their
business problems. This suggests face validity or our surrogate experiments. Using
DOE, we have been able to ascertain the phenomenological behavior of a wide range of
potential solutions for two ADI corporate problems with statistically significant
variables. Taken as a whole, we infer that our controllable variables parameterize the
behavior of ADI under uncertainty conditions. And we note that the entire space of
uncertainty conditions has been parameterized using our uncontrollable variables.
In PART III of this dissertation, we take our work out of the "laboratory" into the field.
We report our findings with two in situ experiments, one with a technology
manufacturing company (in the US) and another with an e-business services company
(in Japan). Our goals were to learn from the practice, to obtain field data to evaluate our
experiments' validity and reliability, and, of course, help the companies as well. We
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found that the sponsoring executives from both companies were enthusiastic about our
analyses and findings. The president of the manufacturing company directed his
operations executive to prepare a presentation for his board of directors to demonstrate
that his decisions were grounded in rigorous analysis. The information from the
feedback sheets gathered from the participants in the experiments indicates that they
were equally enthusiastic about the value of the process. As in our ADI experiment we
were able to parameterize the problem with variables that significantly caused the
system's behavior, and to make predictions of outcomes with high statistical
significance that covered the entire solution space. The analyses and results of a wide
variety of constructed alternatives were consistent with the company's team members'
domain knowledge about the operations of their company. During the design of our
protocol, we paid special attention to one of the most challenging aspects of our
experiments: forecasting and its biases. To ground our protocol on the work of scholars,
we surveyed the literature and distilled a set of debiasing principles and constructed a
forecasting procedure embodying them. Our four debiasing principles are: clarity of
distinctions, counter-argumentation, experimentation, and feedback. Data from the
company experiments suggest that our forecasting procedure was effective. To study the
question of data and process reliability, we explored another idea: that the composite
consisting of team members who are doing the forecasting, their knowledge, data bases,
formal and informal procedures, and their network of contacts is a measurement system.
This led us to the Gage R&R method from Measurement System Analysis (MSA).
Using MSA, we analyzed the sources of variation in our data and in our measurement
system. We find that our measurement system's variation is comprised of
approximately 80+% part-part, and the rest about evenly divided between repeatability
and reproducibility. Unfortunately, unlike manufacturing where there are person-
centuries of cumulative experience and data from literally millions of parts produced,
we are unable to find any Gage R&R benchmarks for forecasting variation. This looks
like a fruitful area for further work.
Do we have valid experiments? We tested our experiments for construct, internal, and
external validity, and also for reliability. Construct validity is shown by the efficacy of
our DOE formulation and its implementation in the field with companies. Data and
company feedback (about the conclusions of the causal effects of the independent
variables on the dependent variables) support internal and face validity. For external
validity, our company experiments show that we can implement our approach to more
general situations than laboratory simulations. And for reliability, our Gage R&R
analysis, our protocol, and our field experiments show that our procedures can be
repeated to produce consistent results.
Do we a quality decision? We tested the quality of the decisions using Howard's six
criteria (Howard 2001) for evaluating a decision. And we concluded that the decisions
made do pass Howard's test for decision quality. We have pointed out in section 2.4 of
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chapter 2, section 10.9.2 of chapter 10, and section 11.1.2 in chapter 11, that the
outcome of a decision is not an appropriate factor to evaluate the quality of a decision.
A thoughtfully made decision can produce bad results given the stochastic nature of
events.
And how do we evaluate our method? By what criteria do we make a judgment? We
apply Carroll and Johnson's (1990) six criteria to evaluate our method. As a result of
that evaluation, we infer that we have a valid and useful method.
With this summary, we now proceed to present:
" our contributions to the state of the art
- the collective findings from our experiments and
- recommendations for future work.
13.2. Contributions to the State of the Art
The research breaks new ground in corporate decision analysis and furthers DOE and
MSA research for a new class of problems. The following summarizes our contributions
to the state of the art.
13.2.1 Demonstrated an engineering approach to corporate decision analysis
This dissertation has been about the exploration of a new idea: that corporate problems
and their potential solutions under uncertainty can be studied using engineering
methods. And to render this concept operationalizable, we developed experimental
protocols - grounded on the work of scholars on DOE, MSA, and debiasing - that are
actionable for in situ company experiments. In the paragraphs that follow, we
summarize our findings from the field and from tests of validity that show support for
the effectiveness and validity of our experiments and our method.
13.2.2. Demonstrated that company decisions can be studied with DOE.
In our literature survey (chapter 3), we noted that DOE has progressed through distinct
stages punctuated by the classes of problems it addresses. Progression from one class of
problems to another proceeded in parallel with the development of new methods to
explore, study, and understand new problems.
In the first stage, Fisher, a statistician, invented DOE to study problems of crop yield.
The science he created was the analysis of variance. In the second stage, Box and
Wilson, an industrial chemist and a statistician, respectively, expanded the domain of
applications to chemical and industrial processes. Simultaneously, they created the
method of Response Surface Analysis to explore in detail regions of a solution space. In
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the third stage, an engineer, Taguchi, broke new ground and demonstrated the efficacy
of DOE in the engineering and manufacturing domains. The science he brought to the
table is a repertoire of orthogonal arrays and analytic procedures for their systematic
use. We cannot claim parity with these giants, but we have tried to learn from them. Our
new idea was to bring to bear the DOE composite on decision analysis of company
problems. The sciences we bring to our work are Gage theory from Measurement
System Analysis to address the issues of data and measurement system reliability and
debiasing to address the issues of overconfidence in decision analysis. And because the
consensus of scholars is that overconfidence is such a pernicious bias, we formulated
debiasing principles and embodied them in an actionable protocol we developed for use
with our company experiments (see 1.2.2 below).
Corollary 1. We can explore the entire solution space.
The solution space in DOE is parameterized by controllable variables. Taguchi's
orthogonal arrays give us the most parsimonious set of treatments from which the
outcomes over the entire solution space can be derived. This gives us the capability to
explore the entire solution space, thereby unconstraining the range of "what if'
questions that can be posed by executives engaged in the decision analysis. The
executives in our company experiments were particularly impressed by this feature.
Corollary 2. We can explore outcomes over the entire space of uncertainty.
The space of uncertainty conditions is constructed using uncontrollable variables using
the same method that is used to parameterize the solution space Therefore, as in
Corollary 1, we have the capability to explore the outcomes from the solution space
under the entire set of uncontrollable conditions, and thereby expanding into the
uncertainty space the range of "what if' questions executives can pose. The executives
in our company experiments were particularly impressed that this could be done at all.
Corollary 3. We can vacate the assumption that alternatives already exist as "gifts
to the decision-maker." We can construct them.
Corollaries 1 and 2 are the resultant benefits that accrue as a result of the ability to
construct alternatives at will.
13.2.3. Developed debiasing principles and embodied them in an actionable
protocol.
There is a substantial body of work that identifies overconfidence as one of the most
common and pernicious biases in forecasting. Scholars point out that although
awareness of this problem exists, "there is little evidence that debiasing techniques are
frequently employed in actual practice." To address this issue, we distilled from the
work of scholars a set of debiasing principles. They are:
307
" Principle of clarity. Specify unambiguous kinds of distinctions and degrees of
distinctions. Distinctions are at the core of clarity. We do this with our controllable
and uncontrollable variables and their level specifications.
- Principle of counter-argumentation. Document the reasons why a forecast is correct,
as well as, the reasons why it is incorrect and insist on an open debate of these
opposing reasons. This a key debiasing procedure.
* Principle of experimentation. Explore alternatives over wide regions of the entire
solution space and under sharply contrasting conditions of uncertainty. This avoids
getting trapped in a local extremum.
- Principle of feedback. Provide in-process and end-process feedback to improve
learning.
Finally to make these principles useful in practice, we developed a protocol that
embodies these principles in a set of actionable procedures we used in our field
experiments.
13.2.4. Demonstrated that a company's forecasting composite can be studied
as a measurement system using gage theory
To explore the question of reliability of the forecasting data, we consider the team
members who are forecasting, their knowledge, data bases, formal and informal
procedures, and their network of contacts as a measurement system. Then using Gage
theory on our forecasting system, we were able to measure sources of variations in the
forecasts; they were variations due to the differences in the treatments (part-part),
variations from forecaster's inability to repeat a forecast with same accuracy
(repeatability), and variations due to different forecasters forecasting different
treatments (reproducibility). Unfortunately, there is no body of work that we can use to
benchmark our data from our experiments. This is new territory, to study a group's
forecasting capabilities and ways to improve them.
13.3. Collective Findings from our Experiments
Our findings from the analyses of two company problems using the ADI SD surrogate
and two company experiments in the field are remarkably consistent. In the following,
we summarize the collective findings from those experiments.
13.3.1 Corporate executives are willing to spend the time.
Our company experiments show that senior executives are willing to spend their time
and assign their direct reports and staff to participate in this work. The following are
quotations from the sponsoring-executives of our company experiments:
"I am taking this information to the board. [of directors]."
308
"I am AMAZED ad [sic] ASTONISHED by your work results."
And these are typical comments from the working team:
"... excellent, rational .... understand risk with factors cannot control."
"Approach will make better decisions."
"This process visualizes the decision ... instead of making on intuition. Better
solution to share with the team why a certain decision is made."
13.3.2 People can forecast complex scenarios with consistency and reliability
Framing the problem of the manufacturing-company experiment required that each
team members forecast 24 treatments of different factor-level combinations under three
uncontrollable conditions for a total of 360 cases of five forecasts. We were surprised
that in spite of this apparent complexity, they performed the task professionally and
with dispatch. Data from the supplemental treatments and from the Gage R&R analyses
of both company experiments show that no one was guessing or making random
forecasts. Unexpectedly, a comment on the process was: "relatively easy to understand
and use."
Corollary 1. The debiasing principles and their embodiment in the protocol appear
effective.
Use of a wrong reference point leads to the anchoring bias. To address this bias, we
developed our "blind Delphi" procedure to establish the forecasting baseline. We found
that after this procedure, the dispersion declines and participant's confidence improves.
13.3.3 All the variables are strong predictors of the outcomes, in general.
We have studied four corporate problems, two from our ADI surrogate and two from
the field. We find that all the controllable variables are statistically significant (in
general) for the problems we are trying to address, i.e. they are strong predictors of the
outcome required by the problem. For the two cases using the ADI SD surrogate, we
find that the uncontrollable variables are equally strong predictors of the problems'
outcomes. The data support the proposition that our controllable and uncontrollable
variables parameterize effectively the behavior of the corporation under the specified
uncertainty conditions. (For our two company experiments, we did not frame the
problem with the uncontrollable variables in such a way that we could test the statistical
significance of the uncontrollable variables. It would have added to the forecasting
complexity which we feared might already be quite high.)
13.3.4. The interactions among the controllable variables exist but are small.
The interactions among the controllable variables are small. This finding is persistent.
This result was observed in the simulations using our ADI surrogate, as well as, with
our company experiments in the field. At the level of abstraction that we are addressing
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the company problems, it appears that the executives have mental models of the
problem and its processes such that their representation of their company is indeed
nearly-decomposable.
13.3.5. People will use both orthogonal arrays and Adaptive-One-Factor-At-
A- Time (AOFAT) procedure, but for different reasons.
We used the AOFAT procedure with the e-business services company. The results are
consistent with those obtained using orthogonal arrays. The substantial difference in
complexity between the orthogonal array procedures and OFAT led us to anticipate they
would prefer using AOFAT to the exclusion of orthogonal arrays. We were proven
wrong, in their judgment there was a role for both. For accuracy, they prefer orthogonal
arrays. But they find AOFAT useful for personal use for a quick analysis or to prepare
themselves for group meetings.
13.3.6. We have valid experiments.
Recall that in section 12.1 we summarized the results of three tests of validity -
construct, internal, and external validity, and one test of reliability, which collectively
assess the validity of experiments. We will not repeat the discussions of 12.1, but say
that these tests support our proposition that our experiments are valid.
13.3.7. We have a valid method.
Chapter 12, Evaluation of Our Method, was devoted to the evaluation of our method.
To that end, we used Carroll and Johnson's six criteria for method-evaluation criteria.
Based on the evaluation and our understanding of the criteria, we infer that we have a
valid method.
13.4. Future Work
Our work is predicated on the proposition that as in an engineering system, corporate
problems and their potential solutions deal with the behavior of systems and processes
under uncertainty. And that the behavior of a company's business systems and
processes, although messy, wicked, and hard, can be measured and studied with
experiments. This work is an exploration of the ideas that corporate decisions can be
studied using DOE and that the quality of the forecasting composite and its output can
be analyzed using Gage theory. Our surrogate and company experiments suggest that
there is support for the validity of these ideas, but there is much work that remains to be
done.
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13.4.1 Refine and improve the protocol.
Feedback from the company experiments tells us that there is a need for explicit and
detailed instructions at the front-end of the protocol for the identification of solution
concepts and the specification of controllable and uncontrollable variables. The
feedback also calls for more senior executive and team member discussions during this
phase. For these requested improvements, we propose the use of proven engineering
methods.
13.4.2. Study more difficult company problems.
Problems with multi-attribute objectives. In this work, we studied corporate problems
whose performance objective could be specified with a single metric, e.g. profit, market
value of the firm, or customer satisfaction. In more complex problems, there are many
attributes that collectively measure performance of a decision problem. Our protocol
will need to be extended to address this problem.
Dynamic Problems. The problems we studied in this thesis are called "static." In
contrast, in a dynamic problem, there is a "signal factor," a continuous critical
adjustment parameter that is directly related to the response, which is then represented
by an "ideal function." In static problems, the signal factor is assumed to be constant.
The efficacy of DOE to dynamic corporate problems remains unexplored and represents
a potentially rich area of study of a new set of corporate problems.
Problems requiring Central Composite Designs (CCD). There are many problems for
which it is necessary to perform an initial experiment with a simple model to obtain a
better understanding of the problem under investigation. Based on the results of the
initial trial, the model and operating conditions are refined before proceeding to a
second experiment. The process is repeated with new experiments until a satisfactory
solution is found. CCDs are used for this type of experimentation. The data set
requirements for CCDs are more complicated than forecasting corner points of a
hypercube, so these experiments will test the tolerance and ability of people to forecast
more complex treatments than the ones studied in this thesis. But for this increase in
complexity, quadratic terms now enter in the representation of the solution space.
13.4.3. Deepen the study of Gage R&R in forecasting.
By conceptualizing a company's forecasting composite as a measurement system, we
used the Gage R&R method from Measurement System Analysis (MSA) to study the
measuring system. We studied the key precision measures, viz. part-part, repeatability,
and reproducibility variations of our measurement system. There are many other useful
measures such as the effective resolution measure that analyzes the sensitivity of the
measurement system, system capability measures, discrimination ratios, and the like.
More work is required to understand how Gage theory helps us understand the
properties of a forecasting system and the way to improve. To deepen the study of Gage
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R&R will also require quite a range of additional specifications and testing of our
protocol.
13.4.4. Deepen the study of solutions to corporate problems using a system
design approach.
There has been a consistent ethos in our work - engineering. Our protocol frames and
parses a company problem using an engineering-system construct, the p-diagram. We
try to analyze and predict the outcomes of a potential solution using the engineering
method of DOE. We study the quality of the forecasts using another engineering
method, Gage R&R from MSA. And as engineers, we have chosen to take a design
orientation to decision analysis. We concentrate on the design and construction of
alternatives. More extended and intensive use of engineering methods offers the
potential of addressing other important issues in decision analysis in addition to
optimization. The use of engineering methods offers us a way to study and understand
the system behavior of solutions to difficult company problems, for example:
" how to design solutions for flexibility?
" how to design alternatives in anticipation of costly failure modes?
- is near-decomposability of company problems always possible?
- how to design business processes that produce quality information for decisions?
We are disciples of Simon (1996) who writes: "Everyone designs who devises courses
of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones."
13.4.5. Explore the issue of scale in the representation of corporate problems
In all our experiments, interactions among controllable factors were present, but small.
The implication is that system behavior is near-decomposable. This was true with the
simulations with the ADI surrogate of two corporate problems. The ADI SD model is
complex by any measure. The model uses 620 equations to represent 85 business
processes (Chapter 4). The variable MVF which we analyze in chapters 5 and 6 is part
of 310 loops in the model. We looked at a dozen of those loops and they each contain
about 20 other variables. In chapters 6, 8 and 11 (for example) we have presented the
arguments of scale that are advanced by Simon (1997) and Bar-Yam (1997). How do
we characterize non self-similar complex systems, such as corporate business processes,
at different scales?
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